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BRITISH PARTY ORGANIZATION[1]

NEARLY thirty years have passed since Ostrogorski produced his penetrating and pioneer work on party organization. But as a well-known and experienced American writer has recently observed: "There is singularly little up-to-date and really informing literature on the general subject of party organization in Britain."[2] Surely this lack of attention to such a vital field of politics is not due to a paucity of developments, for in the last quarter of a century British party organization has seen almost as important and far-reaching changes as Ostrogorski described for the last quarter of the nineteenth century. But writers on British political parties have given most of their time to a consideration of programs and policies, to personalities, and to a rather mechanical although not complete description of the national and local party organizations. Considerable space has been devoted to the framework of the National Union or Federation of the party, while a sentence or two has sufficed to mention the Central Office. Consequently, our general knowledge of British party organization does not extend much beyond what was known at the opening of the century. To be sure, the growth and development of the Labour Party has been quite adequately treated by recent writers, and its organization quite

[1] I am greatly indebted to several of the important persons in the British party organizations for assistance in the preparation of this paper and I especially wish to express my appreciation to Mr. Philip G. Cambray and to Mr. H. F. Oldman.

[2] F. A. Ogg, *English Government and Politics*, p. 594, note.

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satisfactorily portrayed. But the significant changes in the organization of the two older parties and the general tendencies of party organization in Britain remain to be discussed. Likewise party organization in Parliament has been well treated and is generally understood, but only sly glances have been cast at the focal points of British party control.

It is the purpose of this paper, therefore, to portray how party organization in Britain outside of Parliament has developed in a quarter of a century, and the effect these changes have had and will probably have on English political life. Inasmuch as the structure of local party organization has not undergone any significant changes during this period,[1] attention will be given principally to the central part of the organizations, and to the general organization developments. Only the briefest discussion can now be attempted, for lack of both time and ability, to mention but two handicaps, prevent the writer from producing a third volume of Ostrogorski. Few authorities can be cited because one is forced, in treating such a subject as party organization, to rely upon direct personal observation and inquiry.[2]

What have been the principal developments in British party organization since 1902? Immediately one can say that there has been a tremendous growth in the size of the organization. Since Ostrogorski and Lowell wrote their significant books there have been two large extensions of the franchise, until today Britain enjoys universal suffrage. A doubling of the electorate in twenty-five years is bound to make party organization expand. And furthermore, with a larger electorate, party organization becomes much more important. Where there are millions of voters the mechanization of politics seems to be inevitable, and the organization counts for more, the individual for less. The expansion of party activity as well as the enlargement of the electorate has also necessitated a

[1] Local party organization has of course been affected by the development of the junior movement and by the extension of the franchise to women. The organization is now bisexual and youthful as well as adult.

[2] I have spent several months of each of the last three years in England observing political parties and electoral methods.

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great growth of party organization. To keep this larger organization running, more political workers are required, and the estimate made by Ostrogorski that the professional politicians "would hardly reach the figure of 2,000 for the whole of England, with Scotland and Wales",[1] must be more than doubled today.

Next, and more significant, there has been a growth in the size and importance of the Central Office. Ostrogorski pointed out the influence of the Central Office even though it was a small affair when he wrote. But today the Central Office is the keystone in the whole party organization. It is the focal point of party control, and its activities extend to every phase of party life. More and more does the whole party turn to the Central Office for guidance. Writing as late as 1911, a *Times* correspondent described the physical appearance of the Unionist Central Office: "One mounts a squalid staircase", he said, "and is shown into a small and uncomfortable waiting room which a railway company would despise."[2] Such a description would not fit the large and elaborately equipped offices which now house the Central Offices of all three parties. The very physical change bespeaks the other changes which have taken place.

Gradually the Central Office has assumed the tasks which must be performed to win elections and keep the party functioning. The National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations which was founded in 1867 was originally intended to stimulate and direct the organizing movement in the country. The National Liberal Federation established in 1877 considered itself to be the policy-determining agency of the party. But gradually, and since 1900 more rapidly, both of these associations have become more and more unimportant and their work has been assumed by the Central Offices. One cannot say today that "the business of the Union is the winning of elections", nor that "its own function is really that of an electioneering body." Today the Union takes no part in

[1] M. Ostrogorski, *Democracy and the Organization of Political Parties*, vol. I, p. 593.

[2] *The Times*, January 30, 1911.

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elections and the local associations do not legally exist during an election. They are dissolved as soon as the election begins and are not revived until the election is over.[1] The secretary of the National Union does not even occupy his regular office at the Central Office during an election because there is no National Union work for him to do. All electioneering work is done by the Central Office and its subordinates in the constituencies, rather than by the Union. The same is true of the National Liberal Federation. It is not "a very active and influential agency for the administration of party machinery." It is merely the ruffle of the party, the parsley around the ham, so to speak, and it does not now bother itself with handling elections. It is almost entirely concerned with policy.

In the Labour Party, where the Annual Conference really amounts to something, the Central Office is the most important unit in the party machinery. Unlike the Liberal and Conservative Central Offices, the Labour Central Office is controlled from outside, namely, by the National Executive elected at the party conference; and the control is real, not merely nominal. But in studying the Labour Party organization one should give the most attention to its Central Office and to the National Executive. At the latest party conference time was used for educative speeches and the important decisions were left to the National Executive.[2] Perhaps this is merely indicative of the development which the Labour Party organization will have. If it is, this newer party will merely be going the way of the two older parties—it will be concentrating control within the machine, and not in the rank and file. After all, it is very difficult for a convention to combine the functions of discussion and control.

In the matter of candidatures the Central Offices have control. The Labour Party in its constitution requires that before any parliamentary candidate can be regarded as finally

[1] This is done to avoid any possible violations of the Corrupt Practices Act which would invalidate the election. The point has not been raised in a petition and some authorities think that the court would look behind the fiction. But the practice of dissolving the associations is indulged in nevertheless.

[2] See *The Observer*, October 6, 1929, p. 11.

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adopted for a constituency as a candidate of the Labour Party, his candidature must be sanctioned by the National Executive.[1] This requirement goes farther than that of either of the two other parties but the practice is quite the same in all parties. A Tory who is *persona non grata* is not likely to be nominated against the objection of the Central Office, and in normal times the same has been true of the Liberals. As the number of candidates fighting forlorn hopes has increased, the Central Offices of the two older parties have increased their power. Obviously when the Central Office has suggested the candidate, provided the funds, and determined the policy of the campaign in the constituency, it is likely to control the candidate. One must remember, however, that in the selection of Liberal and Conservative candidates, constituency organizations, especially those which have sufficient funds to meet their own expenses, frequently maintain considerable independence. Even then, the candidates are expected to accept the policy of the leader of the party. This is formally required by the Labour Party's constitution: "At any general election they [the candidates] shall include in their election addresses and give prominence in their campaigns to the issues for that election as defined by the National Executive Committee in its manifesto."[2] There has thus been a general gravitation toward the Central Offices of power over candidatures, and to an even greater extent of control over the policies and programs of the candidates after they have been selected.

One can go a stage further and say that the M. P. when elected is expected to support in Parliament the policies of the party as laid down by the leaders. In this respect too, the Labour Party makes a strict regulation: "If they [the candidates] are elected they shall act in harmony with the constitution and standing orders of the party in seeking to discharge the responsibilities established by parliamentary practice."[3] And "it shall be the duty of every parliamentary representative of the party to be guided by the decisions of such parlia-

[1] *The Constitution of The Labour Party*, clause ix, section 3.

[2] *Ibid.*, clause ix, section 5.

[3] *Ibid.*, clause ix, section 8.

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mentary representatives, with a view to giving effect to the decisions of the party conference as to the general programme of the party."[1] In other words, Labour M. P.'s must follow the decision of the caucus whether they agree with it or not. The Liberals and Conservatives do not write a similar regulation into their party constitutions, but in practice the M. P.'s of these two parties are just as regular as are the Labour members. Party discipline in the Commons has been strong for fifty years, but it has never been stronger than at present. Members file through the division lobbies like so many school children, and the independent is almost nonexistent. This strict party voting has its undoubted advantages, but the point here is that the strength of the party organization has increased until party regularity in the Commons is nearly one hundred per cent perfect.

In another way the Central Offices have extended and consolidated their power. Large staffs of trained Central Office workers are continually covering the country in systematic fashion performing the multitudinous tasks which a good party organization must perform.[2] There are also provincial branches of the Conservative Central Office, for example, which really head up all the local party work. These provincial offices are not mere clearing houses of information. They assist with candidatures, with literature, with speakers, with money, and they exercise great control over the constituency organizations within their areas. Hundreds of full-time, paid workers, usually the most experienced ones, those who have proved unusually successful in local constituency affairs, are selected to do this work and they do it under Central Office guidance.

The importance of the Central Office is demonstrated in another way. In 1903 when Ostrogorski wrote about the Tory Central Office it had about twelve employees. Today the Central Office personnel of that party numbers around two hundred and fifty persons and its annual expenditures, not in-

[1] Article 4 c of the constitution adopted in 1918. This particular clause was left out in the revision of 1929.

[2] See the *Annual Reports* of the Labour Party for instance.

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cluding any general election expenditures which might be necessary, amount to at least half a million dollars! The Liberal Party and the Labour Party are not so well provided, but their Central Office staffs have more than quadrupled in a quarter of a century.[1]

Sufficient evidence should now be at hand to demonstrate that the Central Office really *is* the party organization, and that the large federations of constituency organizations have ceased to play an important part in the party mechanism.[2] Contrary to certain written accounts, the Central Office is not the child of the big federation, nor has it been established or extended by it. It has grown up despite the opposition of the democratic organization of the party until it has crowded out control by the rank and file. Just as the development of parliamentary government has carried with it the corollary of strong, centralized leadership in the Commons, so has the extension of the suffrage necessitated the concentration in the Central Offices of control over the party organizations outside of Parliament. As the Cabinet has grown in power and authority, so have the Central Offices, and the leaders have of necessity come closer and closer to the Central Offices.

The Liberals were the first to realize that duality of control is unwise. They learned their lesson after the election of 1895 and from that time forward they gave increased authority to the Liberal Central Association. Formed in 1860, this body had roots in the constituencies but was in reality a more or less self-perpetuating oligarchy intended to develop strong

[1] It should be pointed out that the Liberal Party at present is not in a normal condition, and also that the Labour Party gets the full benefit of the organizations of the trade unions.

[2] In the recent annual conferences of the Liberal and Conservative parties there was evidence of a reawakening of interest in the national associations. In the Conservative conference there was serious criticism of the Central Office and of the impotent position of the National Union. A movement is on foot to displace the Chairman of the Party Organization as Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Union so that the Union will have a leader of its own choosing, and the conference put itself on record as favoring this change. For the Liberal conference see *The Liberal Magazine* for November 1929. The Conservative Conference is well reported in the *London Daily Telegraph*, Nov. 22, 1929.

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central control. The leader of the party was President of the Association, and the Chief Whip was Chairman of the Executive Committee. The Secretary of the National Liberal Federation became Honorary Secretary of the Central Association. During the War, party organization practically ceased to exist, and following the War the Liberals fell on evil days. Today the Liberal Central Association still lives; control of the party organization, however, has passed nominally to the Administrative Committee,[1] but really to the smaller Organization Committee headed by Sir Herbert Samuel, who has been Chairman of the Party Organization since 1927. The National Liberal Federation still has an important function to perform but in no sense can the rank and file of the party as there represented be said to control the party organization. The Central Office headed by the Chairman of the Party Organization runs the party machine.[2]

Up to 1911 the Conservatives allowed the National Union and the Central Office to run side by side. When a general election came along there was duplication and lack of coördination, for there were two offices working without consultation. Reports made to the National Union were sometimes not received by the Central Office. When the tariff-reform controversy occurred, the Central Office advocated the leader's policy while the National Union advocated the more advanced policy of the majority of the party. Following the three unsuccessful elections in 1906 and 1910, the Conservatives completely rearranged their party machinery so that today the Central Office is the important cog in the organization. The

[1] The Administrative Committee consists of the Executive Committee of the National Liberal Federation together with nine other persons representing among others the Liberal Parliamentary Party, the Scottish Liberal Federation, the Women's National Liberal Federation, and the League of Young Liberals, forty-four in all.

[2] The offices of the National Liberal Federation are at present separate from those of the Central Office. But the Secretary of the Federation has offices in both places, and in fact does his important work at the Central Office, where he is the subordinate of the Chairman of the Party Organization. Until 1911 the Chief Whip's officials, the Liberal Central Association, and the National Liberal Federation were all housed at 42 Parliament Street.

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meetings of the National Union of Conservative and Unionist Associations are important as social affairs but not as meetings to control the party.[1]

Inasmuch as the Labour Party organization has been developed in comparatively recent years, the leaders could set up machinery which was suited to modern needs as well as to the needs of the party. It is indicative of the general trend of party organization in England to observe that the Labour Party contrived to centralize power in the party without paying too much attention to democratic control. At the recent annual conference of the Labour Party when the new constitution and standing orders were adopted, the National Executive proposed a new type of party member to be known as an associate who would subscribe and be attached to the Central Office.[2] Upon serious objection being raised, the proposal was withdrawn for a year, but the tendency even in this party toward a stronger central organization was indicated by this suggestion of its National Executive. As has been previously observed, however, the Labour Central Office is not a law unto itself, for it is controlled by the National Executive elected at the party conference. But regardless of the control, the Central Office is most important and is becoming more so.

Coincident with the growth in importance and power of the Central Office, and the decline in the control of the National Union and the National Federation, has been the lessening influence of the local constituencies in the control not only of the party but of their own affairs. This is most noticeable in the matter of candidates and in the matter of agents. The Central Office cannot do the local work, but it can lay down the plans and furnish the necessary funds. In fact as the number of local subscribers to the party funds has fallen off, the associations have become more dependent upon the

[1] Following the Conservative defeat in the elections of 1929, the party conference pressed for several changes in the constitution of the Union, among them one to force the leader not to ignore resolutions passed at the annual meetings. See *The Times*, Nov. 22, 1929, p. 19, for the report of the meeting.

[2] See the *Labour Magazine*, vol. VIII, p. 316, for an article on the new constitution and standing orders of the party by G. R. Shepherd, the National Agent.

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central organizations. The Central Office cannot actually adopt the candidates but it can greatly assist in their choice. The M. P. is elected by his constituency but he is much more the agent of his party than of his constituency. There is an increasing number of small administrative favors for the member of Parliament to perform for his constituents, but he is less and less a free agent so far as his parliamentary votes are concerned. Of course the Central Office is useless without efficient constituency organizations, and effort and money are not spared to keep the roots of the party organization in the constituencies well protected. The Labour Party is still weak as a constituency organization in most places, and its individual membership as opposed to the membership arising out of affiliated organizations is small.

Having in mind now the predominating power of the Central Office, let us observe how its organization has changed in the last two and half decades. Inasmuch as the details are different for each party, it is necessary to treat the parties separately. Looking at the Conservatives first, we find that up to 1911 their Central Office was nominally under the control of the Chief Whip, with the Principal Agent as the working head. The office of Chief Whip is a rather old one,[1] but that of Principal Agent in the Conservative Party was not created until 1870, when Sir John Gorst was appointed to the post. The Principal Agent in time became the Honorary Secretary of the National Union, thus linking the two organizations. This practice was continued by Captain Middleton, who succeeded Sir John Gorst as Principal Agent in 1885 and who continued until 1903 in this important post. Captain Middleton was in direct touch with the Whip and with the leader of the party and as long as he remained Principal Agent the machine worked smoothly.[2] After a few years under Captain Wells and Colonel Haig, Sir Percival Hughes took

[1] See M. Ostrogorski, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 137-49. Also the article on the Chief Whip by Viscount Gladstone in the *American Political Science Review*, vol. XXI, pp. 519-29.

[2] A. L. Lowell, *The Government of England*, vol. I, p. 578.

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the office of Principal Agent and held it until after the reorganization of 1911 had become effective.[1]

By the reorganization of that year, a revolution was worked in the organization of the Conservative Central Office. As the report of the Committee on Reorganization stated: "All executive power as regards organization, literature and speakers should be vested entirely in the central office."[2] But most important of all, a complete divorcement of the Chief Whip from the Conservative Central Office was brought about, and a new post was created to be known as the Chairman of the Party Organization.[3] This person was to be responsible to the leader of the party for the organization of the party outside of Parliament in the same way as the Chief Whip was responsible to the leader for the party organization in Parliament. This was recognition of the fact that the Chief Whip was too occupied with parliamentary duties to pay much attention to the Central Office. He rarely would go to the Central Office and the Principal Agent would have to see him at the House of Commons.

Since 1911 then, the Conservative Chief Whip has had nothing to do with the Central Office.[4] The head of the office has been the Chairman of the Party Organization, and in every case the holders of the office have been M. P.'s at the time they held the office. The post has been considered of Cabinet rank. Even in the matter of recommending persons for honors, the Chief Whip at present only prepares that part of the

[1] The post of Principal Agent has been held successively in the Conservative Party by Sir John Boraston (1912-1921), Sir Malcolm Fraser (1921-1923), Sir Reginald Hall (1923-1924), Sir Herbert Blain (1924-1926), Sir Leigh Maclachlan (1926-1928), and now Mr. H. R. Topping.

[2] *The Times*, October 26, 1911.

[3] The first Chairman of the Party Organization was Sir Arthur Steel-Maitland. Following his resignation in 1916, the post was held by Sir George Younger, later Viscount Younger of Leckie, until 1922. Colonel Jackson was Chairman from 1922 until 1926, when he was succeeded by the present Chairman, Mr. J. C. C. Davidson.

[4] It is not now correct to say that "the Central Office is essentially an extension of the Whip's Office."

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list which suggests M. P.'s.[1] The larger part of the list is prepared by the Chairman of the Party Organization, who also collects most of the money for the running expenses of the organization.[2] Inasmuch as the Principal Agent now serves under the Chairman, his office has been decreased in importance. His work is now directed by the Chairman, who is always in the office. The Principal Agent's importance was further decreased in 1928 when Mr. J. C. C. Davidson, the Chairman, divided his office first into three and finally into two offices. As matters now stand there is a Director of Publicity who has complete charge of publicity outside of the control of the Principal Agent. It is therefore the Chairman of the Party Organization who directs the regular work of the party, and he is responsible only to the leader of the party. The local associations have no power over him. He has, in the words of a recent critic, "more power vested in him than a Tammany Hall boss."[3] This *is* centralized control, but few will argue that the organization of the party suffers from it.

The Liberals have had a different experience, but the result has been the same. The Chief Whip, by virtue of being Chairman of the Executive Committee of the Liberal Central Association, continued his control over the organization of the Central Office. He was assisted by the Principal Agent but retained the chief power himself. He collected and disbursed the party funds, and in general controlled the party organization. He frequently consulted with the district federations, and their officials were in fact district agents of the Chief Whip. The Master of Elibank, who was Chief Whip for many years down to 1912, developed the practice of having a whip for each section of the country to stimulate party activity.[4] Sir Robert Hudson, who was both Secretary of the National

[1] At any rate this has been the practice under Conservative governments of recent years.

[2] The Chairman collects the money for current expenses and relies upon the Treasurer to collect the big sums for elections.

[3] *The Times*, Nov. 22, 1929, p. 19.

[4] The Conservative Party does this also. The success of the plan depends entirely on the personality of the whip.

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Liberal Federation and Honorary Secretary of the Liberal Central Association, was also a power in the machine. During the War, party organization languished. Then in 1918 it was found practically impossible for the Chief Whip, in addition to the increasing burden of his parliamentary duties, efficiently to supervise organization work, and this latter task devolved upon his Chief Assistant Whip. After 1918 the Liberals were divided and there were two separate Liberal organizations. The Independent Liberals placed the question of candidatures, funds and other organization work in the hands of a small committee, while the Coalition Liberals used their Chief Whip and a few others to handle organization work. In the meantime, as from January 1, 1924, the constitution of the Federation was changed and the district federations became branches of the National Liberal Federation; moreover, the executive committee, elected by districts and quotas, was made more representative of the whole party. Following the election of 1924, a convention was called by the National Liberal Federation, and the party was reunited. An Administrative Committee, as previously described, was set up and placed in control of the party. This Administrative Committee then appointed a small Organization Committee and selected a Chairman of the Party Organization.[1] It is the holder of this last-named office, at present Mr. Ramsay Muir, who controls the Liberal Central Office. There is a Chief Agent and a Chief Whip, but both are under the direction of the Chairman so far as party organization throughout the country is concerned. The Whip is not in control, nor does he collect or disburse the funds. Centralized control is given to one man, the Chairman of the Party Organization, who in this case is not responsible to the leader of the party, but to the Administrative Committee.[2]

[1] *The Times*, Feb. 17, 1927.

[2] The Liberal Party has hardly recovered its equilibrium and its organization is therefore somewhat tentative. But the present plan seems to be working satisfactorily to everyone and is likely to continue. The Liberal Central Association, sometimes called the Liberal Central Office, is only concerned with the Chief Whip's activities, which are now purely parliamentary. The Chief Whip,

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In the Labour Party, the Whip never has been an important person in the organization. The Central Office work has been performed under the direction of the Secretary of the party, Mr. Arthur Henderson. It is he who is largely responsible for building up the organization of the Labour Party. Under him have been the National Agent and the Chief Woman Officer.[1] Considerable power is possessed by the Treasurer, who has been Mr. Ramsay MacDonald, the leader of the party.

In all three parties, therefore, the Chief Whip is no longer the head of the party machinery outside of Parliament. He may or may not be in the Central Office,[2] but he has no control over it. A new post has been developed, that of Chairman of the Party Organization, and the holder of this position is the head not only of the Central Office, but also of the whole party organization. In the Labour Party the party organization is really controlled by the National Executive and the Secretary of the party, who directs the Central Office. Finally, in the two older parties the Principal Agent has been placed under the Chairman and has been shorn of some of his powers. One can now grasp the great transformation of party organization which has taken place.

It has been observed previously that party activity has greatly increased in volume and scope. It is in these respects that the greatest changes are noticeable. For instance one of the greatest developments since 1902 has been the extension of full party membership to women, and the organizing of the newly enfranchised women after 1918 within the various parties. Both the Conservatives and Labourites created a new Women's Department within the Central Office, while the

however, is *ex officio* a member of the Administrative Committee and is also at present on the smaller Organization Committee. All these bodies are distinct but there is proper liaison among them through several officials.

[1] Mr. Edgerton P. Wake was National Agent from 1919 until 1928. He was succeeded by Mr. G. R. Shepherd. Dr. Marion Phillips has been the Chief Woman Officer.

[2] After the Conservative defeat in the elections of 1929 the Conservative Chief Whip was provided with an office at the Central Office. But he in no sense controls the office. When the party is in power the Whip has an office provided for him at No. 12 Downing Street.

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Liberal women organized themselves into a separate Women's National Liberal Federation. The head of the Conservative Women's Department is Deputy Principal Agent, but she does not of course interfere with the men's side. In the Labour Party the women's work is headed by a Chief Woman Officer who is at the Central Office.

Women have taken to party work with such eagerness that in many constituencies they do more of the work than the men. At present one cannot say that they are having the influence on policy that their activity warrants, but in the years to come they should be watched.

Another great development of British party organization has been the creation of junior organizations. As early as 1908 the Conservative annual conference resolved "that in the interest of the party it is desirable that junior associations should be formed throughout the country." The Conservatives made an early start and today they are far in advance of the other parties.[1] The Junior Imperial League has 1,500 branches and 250,000 members. It has full-time organizers, a regular publication and regular meetings. Lord Stanley regards work of this League as so important that he recently resigned as Deputy Chairman of the Party Organization in order to direct it.

These two new party activities are responsible for a considerable portion of the expansion of the Central Offices. But the publicity activities are also responsible. With the rise of the art of publicity, parties necessarily expanded their staffs so as to keep pace with the times. In every Central Office there is a press and publicity department. The Liberal Party maintains a separate Publication Department which is responsible to the Federation and the Central Association, but which coördinates with the Liberal Campaign Department to take charge of all forms of propaganda.[2]

Another interesting development is the setting up of educa-

[1] The financial difficulties of the Labour Party have precluded them from subsidizing the Labour Party League of Youth, which has therefore flourished only in a few of the better organized constituencies.

[2] See the *Annual Report* of the National Liberal Federation, 1928, p. 98.

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tional institutions to teach politics and party organization work to the active members of the party. The Conservatives have established Philip Stott College and have recently been given a large estate to develop further their educational work.[1] The Liberal Summer School has been going for nine years now and one should not minimize its influence on the Liberal Party.[2] The Labour Party occasionally holds summer schools of a week's duration, but the party has been handicapped in this work by lack of funds.

The development of extensive research agencies at the various Central Offices is another significant development of post-war years. An adequate idea of the work performed by these agencies cannot be given here, but suffice it to say that no more valuable and significant development in British party organization has occurred than the growth of the research and information side of the Central Offices.

One final development of party organization should be mentioned. The agents of the various parties, those professional politicians upon whom largely depends the success or failure of the party at the polls, and who bear the burden of the all-year-round party work, have improved the organization of their national associations.[3] Examinations have been instituted and agents are carefully certified. Increased pay is attracting better men and women to the profession. Since registration work is no longer of importance, the problem of the agent today is largely that of organization and propaganda; consequently a different type of agent is required. These agents,

[1] Ashridge House, a large country estate not far from London, was given to the party in honor of Bonar Law to serve as a college for the Conservative Party. It was completely remodeled and was dedicated in July, 1929.

[2] See the article on the Liberal Summer School by E. D. Simon in *The Contemporary Review*, September 1929, p. 273.

[3] The National Society of Conservative and Unionist Agents was founded in 1890. The Society of Certified and Associated Liberal Agents was founded in 1893. The Labour Party Association is called The National Association of Labour Registration and Election Agents. All three of these associations publish regular magazines for confidential circulation among the members. In addition to the regular annual meeting, there are many meetings of the agents in the various areas.

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although usually employed by the constituency associations, constitute a strong force in favor of the Central Office. They look to London for assistance and promotion.[1]

With all of these changes in party organization one might expect a change in the methods of financing parties. But with the exception of the Labour Party, little change can be observed. The Labour Party secures its funds largely from the rank and file through collection of the affiliation fees of the trade-unionists. The two older parties, on the other hand, still rely upon the gifts of a comparatively small number of persons.[2] The Liberals have attempted to democratize their financial methods, but little success has attended their efforts.[3] The Conservatives, already adequately financed, find no reason to discard a system which is so productive.[4]

One notable feature of British political life remains to be mentioned, because of its bearing on party organization. Before the War there were numerous powerful associations founded to advance or oppose some one policy. One recalls the Tariff Reform League or the Free Trade Union. These non-partisan bodies greatly assisted the parties and had a profound effect upon elections. Since the act of 1918, however, they have been so restricted that they now have little influence at elections. As they cannot take part openly in elections, much of their power is gone. Whatever work they once performed is either accomplished by the parties or left undone. The probability is that a good deal of their effort was sheer

[1] The Chairman of the Conservative Party Organization is President of the National Society of Conservative and Unionist Agents. The Labour Party advances money to pay for the services of party agents in the constituencies. A plan is now in effect which will eventually cost the national Labour Party about $10,000 a year. In 1925 about $25,000 was paid for this purpose. *Annual Report*, 1926, pp. 23-24.

[2] There are a number of constituencies where expenditures are met out of funds collected in small amounts from the members.

[3] The so-called Million Fighting Fund was launched as a serious attempt to broaden the subscription lists of the party and to make it less dependent upon the subsidies from the Lloyd George Fund. Although the project was not a complete failure, it did not come up to expectations and has now been ended.

[4] The writer has in preparation a book which will treat of the use of money in English, French and German elections.

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waste, although they added considerably to the liveliness of elections.

With all of these significant developments in British party organization in mind, what can be said of their effects on British political life? A number of conclusions may be ventured. In the first place, the great centralization of power which has been brought about, the strengthening of the machine, has not been a blow to leadership as Ostrogorski feared. On the contrary the lessening influence of the democratic federations and the growing influence of the Central Offices have resulted in a strengthening of party leadership. The parties have become more cohesive forces, and the party organizations more efficient instruments of popular government. Even in the Labour Party, where at first the parliamentary caucus and the National Executive were devised as checks on a Labour Government, these have been reduced to the position of being consulted by the Labour Ministers. Committees are less important and leadership is more important. Even the tremendous growth of the organization has not lessened the power of leadership. As Professor Munro has written: "Leadership counts for somewhat more and organization for somewhat less than in the United States." [1]

In the next place the greater power of the Central Offices and the strength of the party leadership have tended to increase party discipline. This tendency has been bitterly assailed by critics who lament the absence of real, independent voting in the Commons. Debate is more stereotyped, and the results of divisions could be announced before the divisions occur. The arguments presented have little or no effect on the voting, although they probably do affect opinion in the country. The unity, however, which strict discipline insures, greatly simplifies popular government and makes for stronger party responsibility.

As to the control of British parties we should speak more cautiously. But it is clear that the control of the parties is not possessed by the rank and file. With the increase in the

[1] W. B. Munro, *The Governments of Europe*, p. 258.

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power of the organization and the expansion of the electorate has come the enhanced importance of the professional element. In the Conservative and Liberal parties, the leader of the party controls the party organization, whereas in the Labour Party the control is possessed in final analysis by the trade unions. Perhaps democratic control of party organization in England is foredoomed to failure, because under a system which concentrates power in a Prime Minister immediately responsible to the Commons, the Commons in turn being responsible to the people, the determination of policy and the control over the party machine are almost necessary powers of a party leader. Even the Labour Party seems now to have recognized this. Every leader desires popular confidence in the control, but not necessarily popular control. This formalism and regularity, this reliance upon leaders, is not necessarily the degradation of democracy, as Ostrogorski charged. It is a rejection of democratic methods, but it may result in the achievement of democratic ideals.

Clearly British parties have raised the tone of public life somewhat higher, and without question they are performing their task of political education better than ever before. This is all to the good. And yet it is equally clear that present-day party organization has not sufficiently modernized itself so as to handle a vast electorate. As Mr. Baldwin said recently before the Central Council of the Unionist Association: "The whole organization of a party has to adapt itself to the modern conditions of electioneering, and to the enormous electorate that has come into existence after the war; and I doubt if any party has yet adapted itself fully to meet the new conditions."[1] Nor have British parties, with the exception of the Labour Party, devised adequate means for the expression of the opinion of the party. But they have not become more like American parties as Ostrogorski predicted they would become. Rather have they developed more as English parties would be expected to develop. That is, they have become more centralized and integrated. As the Cabinet has become more power-

[1] *Monthly Gleanings and Memoranda*, vol. LXX, p. 178 (August, 1929).

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ful, so have the central party organizations. Their general tendency has been centripetal. As Ostrogorski in another connection predicted:

> . . . it must be admitted that among the divergent forces which have just been reviewed, those which hold the Caucus in check are, if anything on the decline; that in their perpetual contests the chances are rather on the side of the centrifugal forces favouring the formalism and the mechanicalness which the Caucus tends to introduce into English political life under the auspices of democracy.[1]

Political organization in Britain has become more mechanical, more strongly controlled from the center. As Sir Charles Marston said a short time ago in criticizing the Conservative organization, "It is democratic until it reaches the top".[2] In theory English party organizations are quite democratic and anyone can fill even the highest offices. But in practice the higher positions are restricted. Through the maze of committees the discerning eye can see that the leader of the party holds the power and that the party is expected to follow his lead. The organization is his tool and it responds to his decisions.

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[1] *Op. cit.*, p. 618.

[2] *The Times*, Nov. 22, 1929, p. 19.

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STATE PENSIONS AND OLD AGE DEPENDENCY IN GREAT BRITAIN

PROVISION for the maintenance of the aged poor is a problem to which in the course of history society has addressed itself in various ways. Recent advances in medical knowledge and public health administration have considerably increased the expectation of life. There have, however, been no accompanying advances in economic knowledge which might, by reducing the economic risks of working life, have made possible a correspondingly greater provision on the part of individuals for this prolonged old age. The problem of providing for the aged poor is, therefore, likely to increase in magnitude. The granting of state pensions to persons above a certain age is one method of attacking this problem and of late has been resorted to in increasing measure. The experience of Great Britain, extending over a period of twenty-one years, with such a scheme of state-provided old age pensions offers material for a study of the evolution of this system under the stress of practical administration, and for an analysis of the effects of its operation.

The decision to attack the problem of old age dependency in Great Britain by means of state pensions was not taken without due reflection and experimentation. During the last two-thirds of the nineteenth century aged persons were provided for by the system of public relief, the main lines of which were laid down by the Poor Law Amendment Act of 1834. Administration of poor relief is and was in the hands of local authorities, guided as to general principles by circulars from the central government. As a result considerable diversity of practice has developed, but three methods of dealing with the aged can be distinguished.

The earliest of these was the policy of indiscriminate, insufficient and unconditional outdoor relief to all the aged who could manage to exist outside the workhouse, coupled with

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indiscriminate accommodation in the General Mixed Workhouse for the remainder. This policy was fairly generally adopted between 1834 and 1871. From that year until 1890 a second policy was in evidence. It had long been customary, in accordance with the prevailing theory that poverty was largely a matter within the control of the individual, to use the offer of support in the General Mixed Workhouse (where conditions were deliberately made unpleasant) as a test of the urgency of need for support on the part of able-bodied applicants. It was now decided to extend the "offer of the House" to the aged poor, in the belief that it would lead the poor to provide or to induce their relations to provide for old age, or that if no such provision had been made the "offer of the House" would lead other relations, not legally liable, to come forward with offers of support, rather than have the disgrace of a relation in the workhouse. Individual Boards of Guardians, however, occasionally departed from this policy to the extent of permitting outdoor relief to be given to aged persons who had led deserving lives and who had no relations legally or morally bound to support them.

From 1890 a third policy is discernible. As officially promulgated by the Local Government Board in 1895-96 it implied an attempt to secure to every aged deserving destitute person outdoor relief fully adequate for subsistence, or if he or she were unwilling or unable to use such an allowance, good maintenance in comfortable quarters in the General Mixed Workhouse. Experience had shown that it was unjust to group together the deserving aged poor who happened to have no relatives or friends who could support them, with the mixed and frequently undesirable characters to be found in the General Workhouse. Moreover it was felt in some quarters to be illogical to regard assistance from private charitable sources as carrying no stigma while treating the receipt of assistance from public sources as degrading. The general growth of interest in social problems which is so marked a feature of English life during the nineties inevitably directed more attention to the problems of old age dependency, and a demand for pensions for the aged deserving poor arose. As a result a

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Royal Commission was appointed in 1893 which reported in 1895 that "neither the exercise of thrift, nor the support of relations, nor the intervention of voluntary charity, could be absolutely relied on to prevent deserving persons from requiring public assistance in old age." Its recommendations, that outdoor relief should be given to all the deserving poor, and that when these latter had to accept institutional relief, they should be separated from and treated quite differently from the undeserving, were embodied in circulars of the central authority, and some of the local authorities acted upon the new principles. Henceforth in several areas the aged deserving poor were allowed special privileges in the workhouse both in the form of food and minor luxuries and in relaxation of the rules regarding dress, visitors, hours of rising and retiring, and separate living accommodations. Nevertheless when the Poor Law Commission of 1909 reported, all three systems that have been discussed were found in operation in different parts of the country, and the third, although the authoritative policy of the central authority, was officially adopted by but a few of the local bodies.

The views of the commission of 1893-95 as to the nature of the aged dependent persons had, however, given new impetus to the demand for a reform of their treatment, and the movement in favor of state pensions grew apace. Committees were appointed by the governments of the day to examine specific proposals, and despite their failure to approve of individual schemes, bills were introduced into the House of Commons year after year, on each occasion gaining greater support. Finally in 1908 the first Old Age Pensions Act was passed.

Scope of the Pensions System

The first act reflected the attitude of the time toward the aged poor and toward state assistance: it confined the receipt of the pensions to "deserving persons" (by excluding from the right to pension persons who had failed to work according to their ability and opportunity) and to persons in great need (by fixing a low income level above which individuals were disqualified from receipt of pension). Since 1908 the act has

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been four times amended and concessions have been made in two administrative orders. These changes have affected firstly the amount of the pension payable, secondly the maximum private income permitted to applicants, and thirdly other conditions of qualification for a pension.

The act of 1908 provided for a pension of five shillings a week for applicants receiving an income of not more than twenty-one pounds a year, and for a lesser pension for persons receiving greater incomes, the pension being graduated according to the means possessed.[1] This pension was equal to between one-fourth and one-fifth of the average unskilled wage for males at the time. The rise in the general level of prices between 1914 and 1920 rendered this pension, never generous, quite inadequate for those pensioners not in receipt of other income. Accordingly, an administrative order of July 1, 1916, authorized an additional allowance of two shillings and sixpence weekly to pensioners upon whom the War inflicted special hardship. This allowance was extended in 1917 to all old age pensioners not in receipt of wages, separation allowances or grants in excess of five shillings a week, over and above the weekly income permitted by the act.

A Departmental Committee which reported in 1919 examined several pensioners and collected budgets in an effort to determine the adequacy of the pension to its original purpose. Emphasizing its belief that the pension had never been intended to cover the whole cost of living of those otherwise without resources, the committee expressed the opinion that the allowance made in consequence of the rise in prices was inadequate and recommended that the maximum pension be raised to ten shillings: it also expressed the hope that "there may be gradually such a fall in prices that this ten shillings

[1] The rates granted were as follows:

Where income is not more than £21,	rate of pension	5/–
" " " between £21 and £23–12–6	" " "	4/–
" " " " £23–12–6 and £26–5–0	" " "	3/–
" " " " £26–5–0 and £28–17–6	" " "	2/–
" " " " £28–17–6 and £31–10–0	" " "	1/–
" " exceeds £31–10–0	no pension	

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will ultimately represent a substantial increase in the value of the original pension."[1] This recommendation found legislative expression in the same year. The maximum rate of pension has remained unchanged since 1919.[2]

In the second place the maximum private income permissible to pensioners has been raised since the original act was passed in 1908, and methods of computing it have been modified. It has already been indicated that under the 1908 act the full pension was payable only to persons in receipt of private incomes of less than £21 per annum, and that no pension was payable in respect of persons in receipt of an income of more than £31-10-0. This income included, in addition to cash income, the yearly value of property personally used or enjoyed by the applicant, property which might be, but was not, invested and assistance from friends or relatives in the form of gifts of food or house room. In 1911 certain changes more favorable to the pensioners were made in the methods of calculating means, and in 1917 administrative concessions were made whereby part of war separation allowances paid to, and earnings by, pensioners were excluded from the calculation of income in determining the eligibility of aged persons for pension. Many witnesses before the Departmental Committee of 1919 urged that the income limit should be abolished. The retention of the limit was assailed on the grounds that it imparted to the pension a pauper taint, that the inquiries into personal circumstances caused irritation and friction, and that it acted as a deterrent to private charity and to thrift and industry

[1] *Cmd. 410* of 1919, p. 8.

[2] The graduated rates are as follows:

Yearly means exceeding			and not exceeding			Weekly rate of pension	
£	*s.*	*d.*	£	*s.*	*d.*	*s.*	*d.*
—	—	—	26	5	0	10	0
26	5	0	31	10	0	8	0
31	10	0	36	15	0	6	0
36	15	0	42	0	0	4	0
42	0	0	47	5	0	2	0
47	5	0	49	17	6	1	0
49	17	6				*nil*	

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on the part of the old age pensioners. These arguments and the evidence offered in their support so impressed the members of the committee that they were "irresistibly forced to advocate that the means limit be abolished altogether, and that the old age pension be given to all citizens at the age of seventy."[1] But this advocacy was ineffective; the act of 1919 merely increased the income limit for the maximum pension to £26-5-0 per annum, raised the upper limit beyond which no pension would be payable to £49-17-6, and provided that the first £25 in the capital value of property should be excluded from the calculation of private income.

Agitation for the alteration of the means restriction continued, however, and by 1924 the National Conference on Old Age Pensions, an association formed to advance the interests of old age pensioners, had obtained pledges from more than half of the members of Parliament to abolish the "inquisition into means." In 1924 the Labour Government introduced a bill which subsequently became law, which provided for the exemption of a sum up to £39 a year from the calculation of the individual's income, provided that such income were received from sources other than earnings. This provision was intended to remove any possible check to savings that might have resulted from the application of the older income limit. Since 1924, although no further amendments regarding permissible private income have been made, the whole significance of the existing provisions has been changed, as will be indicated below, by the passage of the Widows, Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Acts, 1925 and 1929, whereby ultimately the great majority of aged persons will receive pensions free of any investigation into means.

The third group of changes brought about by the series of amendments to the act of 1908 related to other requirements of applicants for pension. These conditions concerned the place of residence and the character of the applicant. The original act restricted pensions to those who had been British subjects for the twenty years preceding application and who had re-

[1] *Cmd. 410* of 1919, p. 9.

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sided during that period in the United Kingdom. The act of 1911 extended the right to pension to wives of aliens under certain conditions,[1] and reduced the residence requirement to an aggregate of twelve years out of the preceding twenty. Hardships resulting from this latter requirement, which differentiated against persons who had been absent for several years in the immediate past,[2] induced the Departmental Committee of 1919 to recommend the payment of pensions to persons who had resided in the country for twelve years in the aggregate since attaining the age of fifty, and to British subjects of alien birth ten, instead of twenty, years after naturalization, provided they had been resident in the United Kingdom for at least twenty years. Both these recommendations were carried into effect in the act of 1919.

The original act excluded from the right to pension a person who had "habitually failed to work according to his ability, opportunity and need, for the maintenance or benefit of himself and those legally dependent upon him". The far-reaching inquiries made by the committee of 1919 embraced also the operation of this clause and the committee curtly reported, "We understand that this disqualification is rarely operative, and we think that it will be better frankly to abandon it."[3] This recommendation was also accepted and embodied in the 1919 legislation.

Other provisions intended to insure the restriction of pensions to the deserving poor remained. Thus conviction for offenses involving imprisonment without the option of a fine, which under the 1908 act disqualified for a pension for ten years, under the 1911 act disqualified for only two years, provided the imprisonment was for not more than six weeks. Al-

[1] Namely where the woman but for her marriage would have fulfilled the provision as to nationality, provided that the alien husband had been dead for not less than two years, or the marriage had been dissolved or she had been legally separated from or deserted by the alien for a similar period.

[2] The committee pointed out that an otherwise pensionable person who had been absent from the United Kingdom from 1910 to 1918 would have to wait until 1930 before he could receive his pension, whereas if he had been absent from 1900 to 1908 he would become entitled to it in 1920.

[3] *Cmd. 410* of 1919, p. 11.

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though it was commonly objected that this clause imposed a double punishment for a single offense and differentiated against those who offended in old age as compared with those who sowed their wild oats before the age of sixty, the clause remained until abolished by the act of 1919. The right to pension was forfeited likewise for a prescribed period after conviction for offenses under the laws relating to habitual inebriacy, but this double punishment was also abolished in 1919.

The persistence of the belief, almost traditional in England, that recourse to the poor law is evidence of a shameful determination to live upon the enterprise of others, found expression in the 1908 act in a provision disqualifying from the right to receive a pension persons who had received poor relief other than medical or surgical relief (including "food and comforts"). The inadequacy of the pension to meet the needs of those without other means of support became more than ever evident during the rise in the general level of prices between 1914 and 1920. Nevertheless, receipt of public assistance in the home (other than that referred to above) continued to disqualify recipients from receiving a pension. The 1919 committee recommended the removal of this disqualification, but its theories concerning the proper basis for the allocation of poor law expenditure between the central and local authorities prevented it from recommending the payment of pensions to persons while they continued in receipt of institutional relief. It did, however, suggest that the pension should continue to be paid for a period of three months to persons who entered an institution for medical treatment, such pension being used to prevent the breaking up of the home of the pensioner, or to support dependents during his absence. This suggestion was adopted in the act of 1919. The Local Government and the Contributory Pensions Acts of 1929 have now provided for the payment of the pension throughout the whole period of medical and surgical treatment in a poor law institution.

All the foregoing changes operated either to increase the amount of the pension or to broaden the class of persons entitled to a pension by relaxing either economic or moral quali-

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fications. The Widows, Orphans and Old Age Pensions Contributory Act of 1925, however, introduced a fundamental change: persons over seventy became entitled, by virtue of this act, to pensions *under the Old Age Pensions Acts,* provided they had been contributors to an insurance fund instituted by the 1925 act, irrespective of means, nationality or other qualifications. Wives or widows of persons who had been contributors were also entitled to receive a pension *under the Old Age Pensions Acts* on reaching the age of seventy. Moreover, under the act of 1929 contributors who have fulfilled the other statutory requirements do not forfeit their right to a pension merely by virtue of emigrating to any part of the British Empire.

The act of 1925 extended the existing system of pensions in a second direction by providing for the payment of pensions to persons between the ages of sixty-five and seventy. These pensions of ten shillings a week are paid to men and women contributors and to the wives or widows (above the age of sixty-five) of men who have contributed[1] to a pensions fund, toward which the state also makes a contribution. Contributors to this fund and their wives are entitled to a pension upon attaining the age of sixty-five provided they have been continuously insured five years and have paid at least 104 weekly contributions in the course of that insurance, and that the average number of contributions, or weeks of incapacity for work through illness and weeks of genuine unemployment for each of the three contribution years ending in July preceding the attainment of the age of sixty-five, has constituted a minimum

[1] The amounts of the weekly contributions are:

	Total weekly contribution (pence)	Share paid by employer (pence)	Share paid by worker (pence)
Men	9	4½	4½
Women	4½	2½	2

As from January 1, 1936, these rates will be increased, in the case of men by twopence a week and in the case of women by one penny a week (in both cases the addition being shared equally between employer and worker) and similar additional increases will be made in the contributions at the beginning of the decennial periods commencing the first day of January 1946 and 1956.

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of thirty-nine.[1] A married woman claiming a pension by virtue of her husband's insurance need not herself be insured, but her right to pension depends upon her husband's compliance with the above conditions.

These requirements would, of course, have postponed the general application of the act until all wage-earners had made their full quota of contributions. Special provision was made, however, to extend the benefits of the act to those aged persons who, at the time of the passage of the act, were too old to have made the required number of contributions.[2] Even so, some groups of aged persons were excluded from the right to a pension and the Amending Act of 1929 made provision for some of these groups.[3]

The Blind Persons Act of 1920 is a third source from which the right to a pension in old age may be derived. Under this act, persons so blind as to be unable to perform any work for which eyesight is essential, are entitled to a pension under the conditions prescribed in the Old Age Pensions Acts for other aged persons, except that pensions are payable to blind persons at the age of fifty instead of seventy, while the qualifying

[1] This "average" test is modified to the advantage of persons who on reaching the age of sixty (or fifty-five if women) had been continuously insured for ten years, or since July 12th, 1912, whichever is the shorter period. Such persons may elect to have their claim decided on an average of twenty-six instead of thirty-nine, but if they do so, weeks of unemployment cannot be counted toward the number required. The Act of 1925 also imposed a residence qualification of two years, but this was abolished in the 1929 Act.

[2] Persons who reached the age of seventy before January 2, 1928, the date on which pensions became payable, and who have been continuously insured under the National Health Insurance Act since April 29, 1925, are entitled to unconditional old age pensions of ten shillings a week if they have been resident in Great Britain or Northern Ireland for two years immediately before the date on which the pension becomes payable and if their last employment was in those countries. Similarly, a widow who would have been entitled to a widow's pension but for the fact that she was seventy years of age or over when her husband died, may also claim an old-age pension in respect of his insurance.

[3] In particular the new act made provision for wives between sixty-five and seventy, of men who were over seventy on January 2, 1928, and thus too old to qualify their wives for old age pensions between sixty-five and seventy, and for old people and widows who had previously been debarred because they, or their late husbands, had not paid a stated number of contributions during the three insurance years specified in the act.

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TABLE I

NUMBER OF PENSIONS PAYABLE ON THE LAST FRIDAY IN MARCH IN THE UNITED KINGDOM [a]

Year	Number of pensioners	Number at maximum rate	Pensions at maximum rate as percentage of all pensions
1909	647,492	none	none
1910	699,352	638,147	92.4
1911	907,461	847,614	93.5
1912	942,160	889,783	94.5
1913	967,920	915,750	94.6
1914	984,131	931,344	94.6
1915	987,238	934,416	94.6
1916	978,112	923,275	94.4
1917	947,780	891,678	94.1
1918	943,077	881,884	93.7
1919	920,198	855,274	93.0
1920	957,915	910,494	95.0
1921 [b]	1,002,342	936,517	93.4
1922	1,029,367	958,909	93.2
1923 [c]	936,953	872,912	93.1
1924	957,543	891,463	93.1
1925 [d]	1,051,358	1,023,948	97.4
1926	1,112,869	1,079,086	97.0
1927 [e]	1,245,887	1,222,466	98.1
1928	1,285,904	1,263,547	98.2
1929	1,317,233	1,292,715	98.1

[a] Figures up to 1927 obtained from the *Nineteenth Abstract of Labour Statistics of the U. K.*, 1928, p. 202; from 1928 onwards, from answers to questions in the House of Commons.

[b] In this and subsequent years the figures include a small number of blind persons between fifty and seventy receiving the maximum pension, under the Blind Persons Act (see Table III).

[c] In this and in subsequent years the figures exclude the Irish Free State.

[d] In this and subsequent years the numbers obtaining the pension and the number obtaining the maximum amount are affected by the provisions of the act of 1924 (which does not apply to Northern Ireland).

[e] In this and subsequent years a growing number (see Table II) of persons over seventy years of age entitled to a pension irrespective of means (under the act of 1925) is included. This act also did not apply to Northern Ireland.

period of residence in the United Kingdom for natural-born subjects is calculated from the age of thirty instead of fifty. The residence qualification for blind persons of alien origin is the same as that set out for such aliens in the Old Age Pensions Acts.

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TABLE II

NUMBER OF PERSONS RECEIVING PENSIONS UNDER, OR BY VIRTUE OF, THE CONTRIBUTORY PENSIONS ACT OF 1925 IN GREAT BRITAIN [a]

Year ending March 31	Persons between 65 and 70 years of age [b]	Persons over 70 years of age [c]
1927	none	166,132
1928	472,269	289,926
1929	538,936	366,428

[a] Figures obtained from answers to questions in the House of Commons, July 27, 1927, July 31, 1928, and July 26, 1929.

[b] Payable out of funds under the 1925 act.

[c] Payable out of funds under the 1908-24 acts and included in figures of Table I.

TABLE III

NUMBER OF BLIND PERSONS BETWEEN THE AGES OF 50 AND 70 RECEIVING PENSIONS IN ENGLAND AND WALES [a]

Year ending March 31	Number of pensioners
1922	9,107
1923	9,921
1924	12,404
1925	14,007
1926	13,663
1927	16,400 [b]
1928	17,337

[a] The figures in the table were obtained from answers by the Ministers of Health to questions in the House of Commons and from the annual reports of the Ministry of Health.

[b] Approximately.

The effect of these changes in the qualifications for pension upon the number of pensions is evident in Table I: the number of persons over seventy years of age receiving old age pensions under the acts of 1908-24 has steadily increased. Their effect upon the proportion drawing pensions at the maximum rate is equally evident in a marked upward trend.

The pensions authorized by the act of 1925 to persons over seventy years of age were payable from July 2, 1926, but pay-

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ment of those to persons between the ages of sixty-five and seventy years was postponed until the beginning of 1928. It is anticipated that sixty-four per cent of all men and married women and twenty-seven per cent of all single women in this latter age group will ultimately receive pensions. The number of persons to whom pensions have already been paid under the act of 1925 is set out in Table II.

The total number of pensions payable in Great Britain under the Blind Persons Acts is not available; the numbers receiving pensions under these acts in England and Wales are set out in Table III.

Machinery of Administration

No simple coherent machinery has been established for the administration of the Old Age Pensions Acts: the work is distributed between the Local Pensions Officers, Local Pensions Committees, the Ministry of Health and the Post Office. The original act called for machinery for the investigation and local adjudication of claims for pensions. The local Boards of Guardians charged with the administration of the poor law naturally suggested themselves as most suited to this task, yet so prevalent was the traditional aversion to contact with the poor law that it was generally agreed that if the aged were to be induced to take advantage of the pensions a complete break must be made with the old system of public relief. New administrative bodies were therefore set up and special persons appointed to administer the Pensions Act. Claims for pensions are heard before and adjudicated by special Local Pensions Committees which may delegate their power to subcommittees. These committees, consisting of not less than seven members, are appointed by the council of the borough or district wherever the population of the borough or district exceeds 20,000; elsewhere the committees are appointed by the county council.[1] The councils in appointing the Local Pensions Committees and the latter in appointing subcommittees are permitted, but not compelled, to select from their own

[1] These bodies are the usual local government authorities roughly corresponding to the American city, township and county authorities respectively.

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membership. This authority to appoint from outside their own membership has been freely exercised and many of the councils have appointed representatives of trade unions, officials of friendly societies and other persons experienced in the administration of social legislation. In 1926, the last year for which information is available, there were 558 Local Committees and 1,347 subcommittees in Great Britain.[1]

Detailed information concerning each applicant is collected by a Local Pensions Officer appointed by the Board of Customs and Excise.[2] At first the work was performed by revenue officials in the course of their other duties but since 1917 full-time women Pensions Officers have been appointed. In 1926 the administration of the acts was in the hands of 304 such full-time officers and an unknown number of officials who combined the work with the administration of the Customs and Excise Acts.

Central control was exercised by the Local Government Board until 1919 when the Ministry of Health took over these and other functions of the board. In addition to his responsibility to Parliament for the administration of the acts, the minister is the final court of appeal against decisions of the Local Pensions Committees.

Finally, the weekly payments of the pensions are made by the Post Office.

Before the passage of the Widows, Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act of 1925, applications were submitted in the first place to the Local Pensions Officers who after investigation placed them before the Local Pensions Committee. Since 1926 claims have been sent in the first instance to the Insurance Department of the Ministry of Health. Where there is a clear statement of non-insurance and limited means the application is transmitted to the appropriate Pensions Officer for investigation in accordance with the Old Age Pensions Acts of 1908-24. If, however, the insurance qualifica-

[1] Answer to question in the House of Commons, November 24, 1927.

[2] This department is generally believed to have been selected as being, of all departments having a local organization, the freest from any taint of the poor law.

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tion is established, the Local Pensions Officer is notified that the claim has been admitted under the Contributory Act. When the pension is authorized, either by the Ministry of Health (under the 1925 act), or by the Local Pensions Committee (under the 1908-24 acts), the Local Pensions Officer issues a book of fifty-two authorizations for weekly payment of the pension at the local post office.

The greatest concentration of power in this machine is in the Local Pensions Officer, who investigates each application and in view of all the facts revealed recommends to the committee a course of action thereon. But the local committees by no means merely concur in the recommendation placed before them. Their attitude varies widely according to the social condition of the district which they administer. In large cities the committees are usually well informed and competent.[1] In rural districts, especially where the farming interest prevails, they are apt to be "rather niggardly" and to interpret the law regarding income qualification as narrowly as possible.[2] In some urban districts where labor sympathies are prominent there is a tendency to grant pensions to the majority of applicants. In general, however, while the Pensions Officers regard themselves as the representatives of the Treasury and endeavor to secure rigid adherence to every letter of the law (particularly in the interpretation of clauses relating to the means possessed by the applicants) the Pensions Committees tend to be biased in favor of the applicant. The discretion allowed to the Pensions Officers in estimating the means of applicants has, it appears, rarely been abused to the advantage of the pensioners. All witnesses before the Departmental Committee in 1919 testified to the almost excessive severity of the officers in this respect,[3] and it was significant that officers themselves used the word "inquisition" in their evidence to describe their relations with the applicants.[4]

[1] *Minutes of Evidence before Departmental Committee*, 1919, Questions 782 *et seq.*

[2] *Ibid.*, Question 761.

[3] *Cf.* Answers to Questions 781, 3496, etc.

[4] The number of prosecutions under the acts of 1908-24 for giving false in-

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Appeal from any decision of the Pensions Committee may be made by the Pensions Officer or the pensioner to the Ministry of Health. This right is very generally exercised if, on reëxamination of the facts, the officer feels that the committee's award was improper. From 1908 to 1919 (inclusive) 17,955,331 claims came before the committees and of these 62,575, or .035 per cent, were carried on appeal (either by the officers or by the applicants) to the Local Government Board. More than half of the appeals concerned the estimate of the means possessed. The decision of the committee was reversed in 44 per cent of the appeals.[1]

Before 1926 when the Contributory Act came into operation the average time taken to complete all inquiries was about sixty-five days. The new act reduced this average considerably and, in the course of time, as more and more pensioners come to qualify because of contributions under this act, irrespective of means, the period of investigation is likely to be materially reduced. It had fallen to fifty days by June 14, 1928.[2] The hardship to the pensioner, however, is reduced by the provision that claimants may apply four months before reaching the age at which the pension becomes due.

The Financial Burden

In any discussion of the distribution of the financial burden of these pensions a sharp distinction must be made between the old age pensions paid under the 1908-1924 legislation and those paid from the contributory fund initiated in 1925. The cost of the former (irrespective of whether the applicant qualifies because he satisfies the conditions laid down in the Old Age Pension Acts, or because he is over seventy years of age and has been an insured person under the Widows, Orphans and Contributory Old Age Pensions Acts of 1925 and 1929) is

formation to obtain a pension has been surprisingly small. During the period 1908-24, 2,281 pensions were thus prosecuted. In only 128 cases were the offenses so serious that the culprit was sentenced to imprisonment without the option of a fine. (Answer to question in House of Commons, May 18, 1925.)

[1] *Minutes*, Question 731.

[2] Answer to question in the House of Commons, June 14, 1928.

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defrayed wholly by the state.[1] The cost of the pensions paid to persons between the ages of sixty-five and seventy under the 1925-1929 legislation is, on the other hand, defrayed out of a fund partly maintained by contributions from insured workers and their employers. All persons who are insured under the National Health Insurance Act of 1924 must be insured for widows', orphans' and old age pensions. Some 15 million people are insured under the Health Insurance Act and represent, roughly, all manual workers, plus those non-manual workers who earn less than £250 a year. The distribution of the burden of the pensions between the state, the employer and the worker is impossible to determine with exactitude because a single weekly contribution covers the cost of both the pensions for the aged and the pensions for widows and orphans. On the assumption, however, that contributions are allocated toward the payment of each type of pension in proportion to the relative total cost of each, contributions from employers and workers would, by the time the 1925 scheme was in full operation,[2] amount to roughly 61/87 of the total cost of the pensions given to persons between the ages of sixty-five and seventy.[3]

Provision was made in the 1925 act for the creation of a Pensions Account into which the weekly contributions from workers and employers shall be paid and to which the state

[1] There is so much confusion on this matter that it is worth quoting Mr. Chamberlain in the House of Commons on November 17, 1927: "The cost of old age pensions to persons aged seventy and over, payable by virtue of the Widows and Orphans and Old Age Contributory Pensions Act, is borne wholly by the Exchequer."

[2] I. e., by 1956, when the contributions have been increased to the full maximum provided for by the act, and when the scheme will have been in operation for a complete industrial generation.

[3] It was estimated (*Cmd. 2406* of 1925, p. 24) that in the decade commencing 1956, the total expenditure under the 1925 act (*including pensions for widows and orphans as well as those between the ages of sixty-five and seventy*) would be as follows:

Period	Total expenditure £ millions	Contributions from industry £ millions	Deficit £ millions
1956-8	58.0	42.7	15.3
1960-1	59.1	42.8	16.3
1965-6	60.8	42.7	18.1

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shall also contribute. But while other acts establishing social insurance funds in Great Britain have precisely defined the contribution to be made by the state in respect to each person insured, the Contributory Pensions Act of 1925 merely provided that the state would meet the deficit during the first ten years. Thereafter the contribution of the state was to be "such sums as Parliament may determine."[1] The new burdens added by the Amending Act of 1929 necessitated a revision of this arrangement, but although the period of legally prescribed state payments is extended from 1936 to 1946, the amount of state contribution after the end of that period is left to the determination of a future Parliament.[2]

The total annual liability of the state in the year 1965 and thereafter for old age pensions to persons over sixty-five years of age will be as follows:[3]

	Millions of pounds
Cost of old age pensions under the 1908-14 acts[4]	64.4
Share of cost of contributory pensions for those between sixty-five and seventy[5]	6.4
Added cost of extensions of the amending act of 1929[6]	.54
Total liability	71.34

[1] During each of the ten years commencing with the year ending March 1927, the state was to make a uniform payment of £4,000,000, being one-tenth of the estimated amount by which industrial contributions were expected to fall short of total expenditure during the period. It was estimated that contributions from industry would exceed expenditure during the first three years of the system by £20,400,000; the deficit during the next eight years was estimated at £66,300,000, leaving a net deficit for the eleven years of £45,900,000.

[2] In the year ending in March, 1931, the annual state contribution is increased to £9,000,000, rising in subsequent years by annual increases of £1,000,000 to £21,000,000 in 1943. During the next three years it will remain at that figure and thereafter be determined by a new parliamentary decision.

[3] *Cmd. 2406* of 1925, pp. 24-26.

[4] £56,800,000 under the previous acts plus £7,000,000 by virtue of the 1925 act.

[5] Calculated on the assumption that the contribution by the state to the cost of pensions to those over sixty-five years of age will be divided between these pensions and the pensions to widows and orphans roughly in proportion to the total estimated costs of each.

[6] These extensions involve unconditional pensions to new classes of widows admitted to widows' pensions under the act of 1929 and to inmates of lunatic asylums.

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It is further to be noted that the liability of the state on account solely of old age pensions even before the extensions of the Contributory Pensions Acts would have risen by this date (because of the increase in numbers of aged persons) to no less than £56,800,000. Moreover as the payment of the pension at the age of sixty-five years has effected a reduction in the liability of the state in respect to unemployment and health insurance for persons over this age,[1] the net additional annual cost of the 1925-1929 legislation in respect of old age pensions approximates £12,040,000.

It has been pointed out, however, that the ultimate burden of the pension system will not necessarily call for additional taxation. It was estimated when the 1925 act came into force that the total cost of all pensions (widows, orphans and old age) in 1965 would be £125,000,000, to which industry would contribute £43,000,000, leaving £82,000,000 to the Exchequer.[2] The Chancellor of the Exchequer was able ingeniously to point out that the annual increase in the state contribution to pensions of all kinds under the 1908-24 and 1925 acts would be almost exactly equal in amount to the annual decreases in the liability of the state in respect of war pensions to ex-soldiers.[3] The symmetry of this scheme has of course to some extent been destroyed by the increased annual liability accruing in respect of widows' and orphans' pensions under the Amending Act of 1929.[4]

The Effects of the Legislation

The effects upon public opinion of this twenty-one years of experimentation with old age pensions in Great Britain are not in doubt; the legislation is generally popular. The meas-

[1] It was estimated that the annual relief to the Exchequer on this account would be roughly equal to £2,500,000.

[2] Answer of Mr. Churchill in the House of Commons, November 29, 1928.

[3] *Cf. Cmd. 2406* of 1925, p. 26.

[4] Since, however, most of the changes introduced by the legislation of 1929 provide for payments to "hard cases" of persons who had not paid the minimum number of contributions envisaged by the actuarial scheme, this extra cost falling upon the state, which amounts to as much as £5,000,000 per annum in the ten years ending in March, 1946, will ultimately fall to a permanent addition of £600,000 per annum.

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ure of this popularity is indicated by the continued extension of the scheme and the favorable attitude of all political parties. Every successive act has widened the pensionable classes. The pension has been increased in amount. Most significant of all, from this point of view, are the acts which have been introduced since the end of the War in 1918. Despite the already heavy burden of taxation, which might have been expected to operate unfavorably to the extension of the pensions system, and which had already led to serious reductions of national expenditure in other directions, and despite even the knowledge that the proportion of aged persons in the total population is expected to increase greatly within the next two generations,[1] the scope of the acts has been three times widened. Nor is this legislation the result of the efforts of one particular party. The Departmental Committee of 1919 was decidedly Conservative in membership, but it reported in favor of universal pensions. A Labour government initiated the extension of the system in 1924 and a Conservative government introduced in 1925 a more far-reaching extension, as regards both numbers affected and ultimate cost to the nation. No party is prepared to advocate a return to the methods of dealing with the aged poor that were in vogue before 1908.

The economist and social scientist must, however, probe beyond contemporary popularity. The effectiveness of this experiment in social control must be assessed by measuring it

[1] This increase is attributable to the high birth rates ruling in the decades 1870-1880 and 1880-1890, and to the subsequent rapid fall in the rate, which in 1926 was less than half that of 1870. The estimated future population in Great Britain is as follows:[a]

Middle of year	Total population over 16 years of age (in thousands)	Total population over 65 years of age (in thousands)	Population over 65 years of age as percentage of total population over 16 years of age
1926[b]	31,585	2,881	9.1
1930	32,995	3,237	9.8
1940	35,480	4,184	11.8
1950	37,123	4,942	13.3
1960	37,886	5,212	13.7

[a] Report of Government Actuary, *Cmd. 2406* of 1925, p. 41.
[b] Figures for 1926 are for January.

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against specific criteria. The criteria to be used are (a) its success in allaying the distress to alleviate which it was introduced; (b) its cost and more particularly the extent to which it has caused unnecessary payments to the well-off many in order to assist the needy few; (c) the facility and cost of the administrative machinery in relation to the service rendered; (d) its tendency to reduce the incentive to save, and thereby to aggravate the conditions it was intended to remedy.

(a) Since only a small proportion of the aged poor are completely destitute apart from the pension, any discussion of the adequacy of the pension to alleviate poverty among the aged must be preceded by some analysis of the private means possessed by persons obtaining pensions. Unfortunately the official statistics give no information concerning the size of the incomes of pensioners receiving less than the income entitling a person to the maximum pension.[1] On the basis, however, of information supplied to the commission of 1919, and from other sources,[2] it may be roughly estimated that:

7 per cent of the pensioners	possess annual incomes of between £26–10–0 and £49–10–0.[3]
50 " " " " "	possess *money* income of not more than £26–10–0.[4]
33 " " " " "	obtain help from relatives and friends to an annual value of not more than £26–10–0.[5]
10 " " " " "	have no income of any kind and receive no private assistance.[6]

[1] *Cf. supra,* p. 186.

[2] The estimates relate to the period from 1908 to 1919 and, in the case of the upper 7 per cent, up to 1924. The compilations introduced by subsequent legislation render it impossible to infer from the official figures the numbers in each category. In general, however, it is probable that by 1929 the prolonged depression had reduced the proportions in the higher income groups, especially where the income came from friends.

[3] The proportion of all pensioners who receive less than the maximum pension.

[4] A residual figure.

[5] Obtained from the evidence of Pensions Officers, members of Pension Committees and others to the Departmental Committee of 1919. (Answers nos. 2411, 2205, 3511, 6771, 7365, 6274, 6775, etc.)

[6] The estimates of the witnesses varied from 7½ per cent to 50 per cent. This variation is largely due to the fact that many committees adopt a more

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It is not possible to present satisfactory evidence of the cost of living for aged persons. Their needs differ markedly from those of the other adult groups of the population; their food and clothing requirements are much smaller; their need for fuel and heating is relatively greater, and their age and condition render house shelter imperative, often at the cost of a disproportionate amount of their income. Weekly budgets of several pensioners living solely upon their pensions, presented to the committee of 1919, indicated that such pensioners were able to exist only when enjoying good health and when exercising the most rigid and pitiful economy, eked out by the sympathy of neighbors who might, for example, occasionally allow them to sit by their fires in winter. Although since that date the pension has been increased from seven shillings and sixpence to ten shillings a week, and prices have declined, there is reason to believe that the pension is still barely adequate for the support of persons having no means of any kind and no assistance from friends or relatives. An income of twelve to fifteen shillings per week is probably the lowest amount which will support independent existence without a degree of economy that amounts to penury and hardship.[1]

For roughly ten per cent of the pensioners, therefore, who possess no other means at all, the living provided must be poor in the extreme, and it is a tribute to the frugality and independence of the aged poor that, until 1921, less than one per cent of all pensioners applied for further public assistance.[2]

generous interpretation of means than is provided for in the acts and class as "having no means" all persons having no *money* income, many of whom are nevertheless living with children or receiving support from relations or from private charity. The only official estimate supplied to the committee which was arrived at on the basis of three months' investigation into the conditions of new applicants for pensions, concluded that about 7½ per cent of all applicants had in the narrow legal sense of the term "no means at all".

[1] The new Survey (1930) of Life and Labour in London, inaugurated by the London School of Economics, has selected a weekly income of forty shillings for a man and wife and a normal family as representing the "poverty line" most nearly comparable to the classic poverty lines of Booth and Rowntree. *Journal of the Royal Statistical Society*, Part IV, 1929.

[2] See Table IV. The increase since that date, up to 5.96 per cent in 1927, is probably attributable to other causes as is suggested below.

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Moreover, the greater part of this extra public assistance took the form of medical benefits.

It was, however, never claimed that the pension would completely meet the needs of those with no other means of support. It was intended rather to assist the much larger number who possessed some small means of their own, or obtained from friends and relatives assistance inadequate in itself to provide a livelihood; these groups according to the foregoing estimate are respectively one-half and one-third of all those drawing pensions. Thus the annual private income from all sources is less than £26 a year for approximately four-fifths of the pensioners. Even this maximum sum is inadequate in itself to provide anything above a penurious and precarious existence, and for this group as a whole the pension has undoubtedly converted penury into mildly comfortable existence.

The efficacy of the pension in meeting the needs of these groups is indicated in Table IV, which shows the extent of the decrease in the number of aged persons in receipt of public assistance in England and Wales.[1] It will be observed that the number receiving assistance in the home (and being therefore persons who, because of aid from others, or because of private means, needed only a supplementing payment from public sources) fell from 168,098 in 1906, the last normal year before the Pensions Acts, to 8,563, in 1913,[2] and to 6,950 in 1919. The fall in the number of aged persons in public institutions (from 61,537 in 1906 to 49,207 in 1913 and to 36,299 in 1919) was less spectacular, mainly because the inmates of these institutions are largely persons so sick and feeble as to be incapable in any circumstances of independent existence. But these statistics doubtless give a less than adequate measure of the degree in which the pensions system has alleviated the poverty of the aged because the traditional abhorrence of recourse to public relief must have deterred many whose needs

[1] No comparable poor law figures are obtainable for Great Britain as a whole.

[2] Of these 8,563, a considerable number were persons previously receiving institutional relief, who on the receipt of a pension became qualified for domiciliary relief. The real reduction in the number previously receiving public domiciliary relief is, therefore, probably greater than is indicated by the table.

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were great from seeking assistance from the public authority before pensions were provided.

Some members of this group, possessing a small private or charitable income, find independent existence impossible, even with the addition of the pension; the percentage of pensioners relying on supplementary public assistance has steadily increased since 1920.[1] The prolonged depression, resulting in a more highly competitive labor market, has borne with especial hardness on the aged and has, at the same time, reduced the ability of friends and relatives to contribute to their support. Pensioners can no longer so frequently tide over periods of sickness, or supplement the inadequacies of the pension by personal exertion or by assistance from friends. Many have been transferred by the depression, at least temporarily, into the class of completely destitute,[2] and the "non-pension" income of all groups has probably been diminished. Nevertheless, at the end of ten years of abnormal unemployment, which must have depleted both the savings and the income from work of the employable aged and their private benefactors, it is significant that the total number of aged persons obtaining poor relief is less than half as great as in a normal year before the institution of the pensions system, although the septuagenarian population increased by thirty-six per cent between 1911 and 1926.[3]

(b) The second line of criticism, that the system may be costly in that it involves payment to a large number of pensioners where only a few are in need, appears, at first sight, to be supported by the fact that so a large proportion of all the aged receive pensions. It was estimated that in 1926-1927 58 per cent of all men over seventy and 74½ per cent of all women of that age group were receiving pensions. The act of 1925 increased the percentages to 69 and 76 respectively, and it is estimated that ultimately they will reach 74 and 77. Furthermore it was estimated that the pensions payable to per-

[1] *Cf.* Table IV.

[2] Apart from the pension.

[3] *Cf.* Table IV. It is estimated that by the middle of 1930 the population over seventy will be 50 per cent greater than that in 1911.

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TABLE IV

NUMBER OF PERSONS OVER SEVENTY YEARS OF AGE IN RECEIPT OF PUBLIC RELIEF IN ENGLAND AND WALES [a]

On or about January 1st	Institutional Relief		Domiciliary Relief		Total number of pensions paid on March 31	Proportion of pensioners obtaining relief [d]
	Total number of recipients over 70 years of age	Old Age pensioners [b]	Total number of recipients over 70 years of age	Old Age pensioners [c]		
1906.....	61,537	—	168,098	—	—	—
1910.....	57,701	—	138,223	—	441,489	—
1911.....	55,262	—	93,177	—	613,873	—
1912.....	49,373	2,194	9,530	4,630	642,524	0.72
1913	49,207	2,850	8,563	5,080	668,846	0.76
1914.....	48,103	3,071	8,945	6,173	684,635	0.9
1915.....	47,197	3,413	8,456	5,897	691,405	0.84
1916.....	45,747	3,233	8,792	6,333	689,110	0.94
1917.....	43,456	2,400	8,479	6,304	670,393	0.94
1918.....	39,129	2,365	7,624	5,796	671,809	0.86
1919.....	36,299	2,576	6,950	5,059	658,818	0.76
1920.....	38,134	3,053	8,621	6,284	695,133	0.9
1921.....	40,939	3,311	11,752	9,998	734,295	1.36
1922.....	42,692	3,190	21,278	19,084	761,958	2.5
1923.....	43,072	3,025	29,548	27,577	795,832	3.46
1924.....	43,780	3,393	36,624	34,793	814,889	4.68
1925.....	44,475	3,535	45,064	42,852	900,536	4.76
1926.....	45,705	3,877	55,832	53,624	953,324	5.62
1927.....	46,731	4,273	65,480	63,489	1,064,145	5.96
1928.....	46,395	4,280	69,921	67,867	.... [f]	.. [f]
1929.....	46,837	.... [e]	75,119	.... [e]	.... [f]	.. [f]

[a] Figures up to 1919 obtained from the Appendix to the *Minutes of Evidence* of the Departmental Committee investigating old age pensions legislation in 1919 (*Cmd. 411* of 1919). From 1920 onward they are obtained from answers given by the Minister of Health to questions in the House of Commons each year.

[b] Included in second column.

[c] Included in fourth column.

[d] Percentage obtained by dividing column five by column six.

[e] The figures as given do not differentiate between persons over 65 and those over 70 who obtain pensions.

[f] Figures not available.

sons between sixty-five and seventy would immediately become payable to 53½ per cent of the male population and married women of those ages, and to 13 per cent of single women, in-

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creasing ultimately to 64 per cent and 27 per cent of the two groups respectively.[1] Judgment concerning the liberality of these payments turns upon the facts concerning the economic condition of these age groups: is the condition of three-quarters of the population over seventy such as to warrant the payment of a pension?

No question can arise concerning the necessity of public expenditure on pensions to the ten per cent of the pensioners having no other means, nor in respect of the thirty-three per cent whose only income is derived from friends or relatives. To the extent that any generation contributes to the upkeep of a previous generation, its ability to provide for its own independence in old age is impaired, and dependency is likely to be perpetuated. There remain, however, some fifty per cent of the pensioners who possess incomes up to £26-5-0 a year[2] and who receive the full pension of ten shillings a week, and roughly another seven per cent who have annual incomes between £26-5-0 and £49-17-6 and receive a pension varying inversely with the size of their private income. In view of our estimate that a weekly income of between two and five shillings is needed to supplement the pension to save the pensioner from penury, it may be argued that all those pensioners who possess property yielding over five shillings a week are treated with unnecessary and unjustifiable generosity. The number of such pensions included in the class receiving £26-5-0 per annum or less is not directly available, but an estimate can be made.

If it be assumed that the majority of families are precluded by family responsibilities from saving before they attain the age of thirty-five to forty, there remains a period of thirty to thirty-five years in which to accumulate capital. The accumulation of a capital sum of £250 would necessitate a weekly saving of approximately three shillings per adult for thirty years, while the accumulation of a capital sum which would yield the maximum income permissible if a full pension is to be obtained

[1] Report of Government Actuary, *Cmd. 2406* of 1925, pp. 13 and 17.

[2] As calculated under the act. See note 1, p. 207.

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would call for weekly savings of twice this amount.[1] Such savings would have to be made out of an average weekly income of forty-five shillings for unskilled workers, and sixty-five to seventy shillings in the case of skilled workers.[2] Moreover this saving is *additional* to savings to provide against loss of income due to sickness, unemployment[3] and the other incidental risks of active working life. Furthermore, the assumption of a savings period of thirty years presupposes no charge on income on account of children or other dependent persons after the age of thirty-five to forty, and the continuance of undiminished earning power up to the age of seventy. In all these circumstances there is little probability that many pensioners have accumulated capital yielding an income in excess of five shillings a week:[4] the number of pensioners drawing the full pension and possessing some means of their own, who are treated with unnecessary generosity, is, therefore, small.

Concerning the remaining seven per cent who possess means in excess of £26-5-0 a year and whose total income, including the graduated pension, is somewhat less than twenty shillings a week, it may be granted that the pension establishes a standard

[1] At least if the income is to be obtained without encroaching upon capital. The legal method of calculating income, however, after excluding from calculation the first £25, assesses the annual value of the next £375 of capital at one-twentieth of the capital value, but estimates the yearly value of property in excess of £400 at one-tenth of its capital value. Thus the actual capital sum qualifying for full pension is not £530, but £471, while that disqualifying for any pension at all is a capital of over £711–5–0, instead of £1,000. These calculations assume a normal capitalization of twenty times the annual value.

[2] In 1919 it was estimated that 78.5 per cent of all income receivers had incomes of under 61 shillings a week, while 62 per cent received incomes of less than 50 shillings a week. *Cf.* estimates quoted by Wedgwood, *The Economics of Inheritance,* p. 42. No estimates of individual income have been made since that date, but in view of the fall in prices the general level of incomes is likely to be even lower in 1930.

[3] The sums paid by the Health and Unemployment Insurance Systems in the event of inability to work because of sickness or unemployment amount to but 15 shillings a week per insured worker—a sum which obviously needs supplementing.

[4] Some confirmation of this view is found in the fact that roughly 77 per cent of the estates left by persons over 25 years of age are worth less than £100. *Cf.* Wedgwood, *op. cit.*, p. 45 *et seq.*

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more than adequate to meet bare living needs. Two considerations must however be borne in mind before payments to this class become the basis of condemnation of the system. In the first place, the total cost of these pensions is not large: of the 63,004 pensions paid to this group in 1923 (the last year before the change in qualification referred to below came into force), 20,991, or roughly one-third, were for amounts less than four shillings a week. The remainder were at rates between five and eight shillings. In the second place, this extra charge is the price paid in order to retain the stimulus to saving.

This latter consideration applies also to the exemption of the first fifteen shillings weekly of saved income from the means calculation (allowed under the amending act of 1924). It cannot be denied that the payment of the full weekly pension of ten shillings to possessors of private incomes which might amount to as much as twenty-five shillings makes possible by state payment a degree of comfort unusually high among the working-class standards: the change must be regarded as evidence of excessive anxiety to avoid the charge that the pensions system discourages saving. But here too the numbers affected are small. In the first year after the passage of the act 53,896 persons, until then excluded, received pensions, while 55,576 persons receiving less than the full pension were raised to the maximum.[1] The unfavorableness of conditions for working-class saving also renders it unlikely that this concession will greatly increase the number of pensions in the future.

(c) Even if it could be shown that, in view of the necessity for safeguards against discouraging savings, the pensions system had not resulted in payments to any significant proportion of the "non-needy" aged, the system might yet be criticized on the ground that it has been cumbersome and costly to administer. This charge is in part answered by reference to Table V.

[1] Of these, 38,295 were previously drawing pensions varying between 5 and 8 shillings weekly, while 17,262 had been receiving between 1 and 4 shillings. (Answer to Question in the House of Commons, June 25, 1925.)

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TABLE V.[a]

COST OF ADMINISTRATION OF OLD AGE PENSIONS LEGISLATION

Year ending March 31	Total amount paid in pensions £	Expenses of Pension Committees £	Expenses of other departments £	Total costs £	Total costs as percentage of amount paid in pensions
1920	19,110,000	54,500	512,010	566,510	2.9
1921	25,087,000	65,333	708,051	773,484	3.0
1922	26,009,500	59,350	998,893	1,058,150[c]	4.0
1923	22,362,000	54,000	810,270	864,270	3.8
1924	23,222,000	49,600	749,006	798,606	3.4
1925	24,904,000	66,200	756,642	822,842	3.3
1926	27,020,000	56,800	803,811	860,611	3.2
1927	29,983,000	51,400	877,000	928,400[b]	3.1
1928	35,830,000	43,000	826,000	869,000[b]	2.4
1929	47,829,000	42,000	820,000	862,000[b]	1.9

[a] The figures in this table are obtained from answers to questions in the House of Commons, given every year at the end of June or beginning of July. All the figures are approximate and relate to the United Kingdom up to 1923. From that year onwards they relate to Great Britain and Northern Ireland only.

[b] The total amounts paid in pensions for these years include the pensions payable under or by virtue of the act of 1925. The costs of administering these additional pensions, however, cannot be estimated, as the Ministry of Health has no means of separating the costs of these pensions from the costs of the widows' and orphans' pensions also paid under that act. As stated above, however, the expenses of the Pensions Committee and of the Pensions Officers are likely to be less in future. Part of the cost of administering the act will in future fall on the approved societies assisting in the administration of the National Health Insurance Acts, who will be called upon to verify the claims of applicants to be contributors under these or the Contributory Act of 1925.

[c] The higher cost for this year is probably due partly to the great fall in prices which called for a revision of pension rates, and partly to the transfer of part of the administration from the British authorities to those of the Irish Free State.

It will be seen that despite the several changes in the methods of calculating means and in the conditions of qualification which have been introduced since 1918, and which have, together with the sharp fall in prices, necessitated the reconsideration of many cases, the cost of administration has been as high as four per cent of the benefits paid in but one year, and has generally been nearer three per cent. It should also be remembered that any attempt to solve the problem of

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old age poverty by public or private relief would inevitably involve as much or more detailed investigation of individual cases, a process which accounts for the major share of the administrative expenses of the old age pensions system. In relation to the magnitude of the problem, therefore, and in the absence of any agreed criterion by which to judge administrative costs, it may be suggested that from this technical administrative point of view the pensions system has not been an unduly expensive method of social amelioration. Moreover, the act of 1925, whereby ultimately the majority of pensioners will receive pensions without investigation into means, may be expected considerably to reduce the costs of administration.

(d) Finally, it may be argued that the large number of persons qualifying for the pension supplies the best possible evidence that the pension exerts an undesirable influence upon thrift; the certainty that the state will provide a pension discourages individual provision for the future. The facts do not support this contention. Had the anticipation of pensions reacted in this manner, as the existence of the pensions became more widely known, the proportion of the aged qualifying for the pension might have been expected to increase. Yet the increase in the numbers of pensioners in Great Britain between 1911 (the first full year of operation) and 1921 is a little *less* than the increase in the number of persons over seventy in this period.[1] Moreover the percentage of pensioners receiving the full maximum pension has remained almost constant from the first full year of operation.[2] Had the prospect of pensions operated as an incentive to improvidence, this proportion would have increased.

There is little doubt that the amount of saving by recipients of small incomes has increased during the period under consideration. The funds invested in industrial assurance, build-

[1] The number of pensioners in Great Britain increased from 705,678 to 829,262, an increase of 17.5 per cent, while the population over seventy increased from 1,224,600 to 1,473,582, or 20.3 per cent.

[2] The increase from 1925 onward is due to the higher income limit allowed by the act of 1924. *Cf.* Table I.

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ing societies (house purchase associations), the post office savings bank and, since 1918, National Savings Certificates, all patronized largely by persons of small means, have shown a steady increase.[1] Moreover, witnesses representing friendly societies and bodies familiar with the administration of working-class savings organizations declared to the committee of 1919 that an assured pension would stimulate savings, and held that the average worker was discouraged from saving for old age because of the patent impossibility of ever accumulating enough to provide both against the normal risks of working-class life, and for complete support after earning power ceases. The existence of a pension had, it was claimed, translated the hope of independence of public and private charitable relief out of the realm of the impossible into that of the possible and made saving worth while.[2]

Conclusion

What, then, can be said for the British pensions system? At first sight it appears so confused, by the existence of different acts under which, or by virtue of which, pensions can be claimed and by the complicated methods of finance, that the application of the word "system" seems almost an irony. Yet, as it is hoped this paper has shown, the fundamentals prove on analysis to be relatively simple. They comprise a system of contributory pensions payable to insured persons between the ages of sixty-five and seventy, plus a system of non-contributory, state-financed pensions after that age paid without further question to those who have contributed for pensions between sixty-five and seventy, and to other persons only on proof of the possession of a low income. It is possible that had the

[1] Some figures showing these increases are collected in Appendix V of the Report of the Colwyn Committee (*Cmd. 2800* of 1927). *Cf.* also the careful estimates of Carr-Saunders and Caradog Jones, who conclude: "There is no evidence that the advent of state schemes has led to a slackening of individual effort to provide against the chances and changes of life." *Social Structure of England,* pp. 165-67.

[2] Evidence of Mr. Stuart Bunning, in Answers nos. 3047, 3050; Mr. Marlow, Secretary of the National Conference of Friendly Societies, Answers nos. 2777-8, 2780, and others.

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contributory insurance technique been familiar in Great Britain in 1908 and the pension at sixty-five been introduced simultaneously with the pension at seventy, the whole system might have been placed on a unified contributory basis. It is doubtful, however, whether at the present time it would be possible for any government to take what would inevitably be regarded as the retrograde step of shifting to employers and workers a large part of the burden of the hitherto free pensions. This burden would at the present estimated cost of old-age pensions amount to a doubling of the weekly sums now paid under the existing pensions schemes for widows, orphans and persons between sixty-five and seventy, and would be bitterly opposed by employers and workers, who are already making heavy weekly payments for this and for health and unemployment insurance. Indeed, in this connection there is much to be said for the opinion expressed by Mr. J. M. Keynes [1] and long held by the Labour Party, that essential social services disturb the economic life of a community much less when they are financed out of general taxation than when they require what is in effect a tax on industry, imposing an unfair burden upon the employer who for technical reasons has a relatively large labor bill.

There are, moreover, some positive advantages of the pensions system as it now stands. It provides a method of financing pensions payable between sixty-five and seventy, where it might be difficult to justify state payment of the whole cost. By the twofold division of the recipients of free pensions at seventy it overcomes possible objections to an investigation of means in the case of all but a minority, for those receiving unconditional pensions are by definition those whose earnings during the working life have been low,[2] while at the same time the free pension is retained, subject to an income investigation as a method of dealing with cases of old-age destitution on the part of those not contributing under the acts of 1925-1929.

It has been shown in the course of this discussion that there

[1] *Political Quarterly*, January 1930, p. 110.

[2] I. e. contributors to the Contributory Pensions Acts, *cf. supra*, p. 196.

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are in Great Britain almost a million aged persons with an income of less than one-third of the wage of an unskilled laborer. This is a problem of poverty of great magnitude which cannot be solved by refusing to recognize its existence. Unless the policy be adopted of allowing the aged destitute to starve, the cost of maintaining them is distributed over the community in one form or another. It may be passed on to relatives or friends or charitable agencies; it may be borne by the community as a whole. The problem is not how the cost can be avoided but merely how it can be distributed. It is submitted that whether the British pensions system be judged by its effectiveness (the extent to which it satisfies existing needs) or by its economy (the extent to which it avoids unnecessary payments or unduly high administrative costs) or by its social desirability (its influence upon individual initiative and the will to save) this method of attacking the problem of old-age dependency has proved its value.

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THE AGRICULTURAL POLICY OF FRANCE I

I

FRANCE has what may be called a maritime climate. Temperatures are not subject to rapid change, rainfall is gentle and well-distributed[1] with an annual average above thirty inches, and winters are mild with some sixty days of frost. This description fits best that half of the country which lies northwest of a line drawn from Champagne to the Basque region of the Pyrenees. The territory southeast of this line would include the Vosges, the Ardennes, the French Alps from Switzerland to the Mediterranean, and the *Massif Central,* and, being so broken and elevated, is much less important for agriculture than the seaward plains. The exceptions are the valley of the Rhone, narrow in the center but broad at its upper (*Plaine de Bourgogne*) and lower (*Plaine de Languedoc*) ends; the valleys tributary to the Seine (Oise, Marne, Yonne), and the *Bassin d'Aquitaine* which is drained by the Garonne.[2]

On the gently rolling lowland plain between the Alps and the Atlantic, in what is, on the whole, a favorable climate, and with fairly amenable soils, agriculture is carried on in ways long-settled and traditional, by a peasantry notably resistant to influences from outside; they are independent, yet willing, when a clear advantage is visible, to coöperate with immediate neighbors. There has been no great alteration in the system of land organization or in fundamental ways of tillage since the changes which coincided roughly with the Revolution. There went on, during the first half of the nineteenth century, more and more division of holdings among the children of peasants, until in 1892 about 40 per cent of the holdings were

[1] Except in some parts of Provence, notably along the Riviera coast.

[2] For a good short description in English with maps, see L. G. Michael, *Agricultural Survey of Europe: France,* U. S. Dept. of Agriculture, Technical Bulletin 37, February, 1928. An agricultural map of France is also to be found at the last page in M. G. Welter, *La France d'aujourdhui.*

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less than one hectare, 46 per cent were from one to 10 hectares, and only 12.5 per cent from 10 to 40 hectares.[1] These are the last good figures which exist; in 1908-9 the Ministry of Agriculture carried on a rather unsatisfactory investigation which was believed to show that the average size had decreased still further. If it may be assumed that the trend of centuries has not been reversed in a few decades, one of the difficulties of the French peasant is clear on the surface of things.[2] At any rate, these are facts—however rough—which establish one condition of policy.[3]

It is true, on the whole, to say that France is a land of small farms, carefully tended, with a maximum expenditure of human effort and with a minimum of assistance from machines or even from draft animals or beasts of burden. Peasant proprietors of this sort develop ways of getting the most out of little and maintain their rule-of-thumb methods for generations; they do not easily adapt themselves to the requirements of a new technique, involving large initial outlays of capital, reorganization of the field system, and other similar changes. And the reason lies only partly in the peasant's own resistance to change; this element in the situation is easy to exaggerate.

[1] A hectare is 2.47 acres. Roughly, then, more than 85 per cent were below 25 acres.

[2] *Cf.* G. Welter, *op. cit.*, pp. 24 *et seq.*

[3] There are two mitigating circumstances by which these figures ought to be refined. In lower Provence, the terraced mountain sides are necessarily divided into extremely small holdings, since on such terrain even animals are usually not employed to assist in working the land. It is not unusual for a peasant family to spend the whole of the open winters in preparing surfaces with hand tools for spring planting. Strict costing would probably show most of this land to be yielding less than the cost of production, a condition of affairs which can persist only by the peasant's acquiescence in a standard of living which, by American standards, is incredibly low. Also, it must be remembered, much of France is given over to garden cultivation of an extremely intensive variety in which the size of the holding is necessarily small. But even if these allowances be made, the holdings of average size in the farming regions, as over against the horticultural districts, still are probably not so large as those in comparable regions of the United States. There are in the North and West, especially in the region just north of Paris, many large proprietors on whose lands can be seen the most advanced types of intensive, large-scale cultivation, but these are so few that they can be ignored in an assessment of French practice as a whole.

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Far more important are the physical conditions which surround his work.

Whatever the reason, however, the peasants themselves, being deeply rooted in a complex tradition, are not apt to press for a new governmental policy which might at length bring about a wholesale reorganization. Such changes lie too far in the future; they cannot easily be shown to contribute to immediate betterment; and they involve expenditures which would be reflected in taxation. The spirit of French policy, which seems to the foreign observer so volatile, is really persistent and unchanging, as though it were molded on the peasant character and traditions. It is rather slowly reflective than progressive. It also prefers, apparently, to deal with all matters piecemeal rather than in the large; it follows no theories, but adapts itself to what happens in agricultural life. The government intends no reorganization; but it intends also not to resist any impulses to change which may originate among the peasants. Since the peasants themselves are apt to be plodding rather than enterprising, and disposed to value what has been gained with difficulty rather than to look for easier ways of making gains, it may be observed in a preliminary way that we have to deal, here, with an agricultural situation which is relatively stable and unsurprising and a governmental policy whose chief uniqueness consists, perhaps, in reflecting the temper of its farmers, whether or not it happens to contribute to their progress or prosperity.[1]

These are generalizations which are supported, as will become clear, both by the history of French agriculture and by the record of the State's relation to it. What is to be recorded is less a history of expansion than of consolidation. Policies have deepened; but they have not notably widened during the century just past which has seen so many great changes in

[1] "Comme notre climat est tempéré, notre caractère est modéré. Plus raisonnables que sentimentaux, nous sommes pourtant plus artistes que commerçants. D'esprit délié, nous sommes moins entreprenants qu'ingénieux. Mais si nous n'aimons pas les risques, nous ne craignons pas le travail. Aussi, quand nous le voulons bien, nous savons utiliser les éléments divers de notre tempérament pour égaler ou même surpasser, dans presque tous les domaines de l'activité humaine, nos concurrents étrangers." G. Welter, *op. cit.*, pp. 7-8.

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America, or even in France's neighbor-nation, Germany. Yet it would not be true to say that France has been immune to forces which have affected agriculture elsewhere in the world. She has been less receptive, less inclined to modify her practice and policy; but, though more slowly and with less sweeping vigor, she has adopted better ways of cultivation and new crops (for instance, the sugar beet). She has, with some anguish, reduced her cereal production and increased her output of animal products. Use has been made of machinery or, at least, improved tools.[1] Moreover, as in so many other Western countries, her rural regions have latterly lost population to her cities.[2] These movements in agricultural practice and in the distribution of population have affected France in less degree than other nations of comparable age and civilization; no other has succeeded in maintaining nearly half its population in rural occupations; perhaps no other has cared to do so. The result is that with a population one-third as

[1] One of the most significant of any of the discernible trends is the change from predominantly cereal agriculture to one in which the husbandry of animals becomes the central activity. In spite of the continuous efforts in France to maintain a balanced system in which cereals sufficient for domestic purposes continue to be grown, their acreage has decreased steadily. France has had to follow the rest of Western Europe in this, though with characteristic reluctance. There seems to be a powerful evolutionary trend at work in this matter which has been somewhat further explored by the present author in an article called "Farm Relief and a Permanent Agriculture", in *The Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science* for March 1929. Mr. Michael summarizes the pre-war trend of agricultural evolution in France thus: (1) change from cereal to forage crops, (2) expansion of grasslands, (3) intensification of animal husbandry, (4) replacement of men by women on the farms. There are complexities and minor changes not recognized by such a summary, but these are the outstanding ones.

[2] In 1800 her population approximated 28 millions; in 1920 it was 39.2 millions, a gain of about 36 per cent. In the same period the populations of Germany and England nearly tripled. In the first twenty years of the century France lost about one million. Between 1921 and 1926 there was a gain of one and a half millions, but during this period there was a heavy influx of foreign workers—nearly two and a half millions. The population stands today at a little over 41 millions, but it is still being augmented by immigration. In 1891 the urban population was 37.4 per cent of the total; in 1921 it was 46.4 per cent; in 1929 it is freely estimated to be above 50 per cent. There are some four and a half million fewer inhabitants in the rural districts of France than there were sixty years ago.

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large as that of the United States France succeeds in raising within a territory one-fourteenth as large nearly enough food to supply all her domestic requirements; and not only enough, but of the major sorts on which she depends.[1] This is a situation which economists with a world-wide orientation may deplore; but it is a cardinal policy in France. In this respect there is no disposition at all to change; there is rather a pride in what has been done so far and a determination to become even more self-sufficient.[2]

The policy of the government is set, as it were, in a matrix of such physical facts and historic trends; and the impulses to a revolution in technique are much weaker than those to conservation of a traditional type of culture. A large proportion of small proprietors, land intensively used, a rural civilization relatively unchanging from one decade to another, products of a varied sort calculated to make the nation as nearly as may be independent—these are not only facts; they are matters for pride. As new knowledge is made available and new processes are developed, there cannot be complete immunity. But what is new is not welcomed; there is hesitation and scrutiny to discover whether what is suggested can be made to fit into the old scheme without great disturbance; it must be assimilated. So, for instance, the coöperative movement has grown into the rural economy slowly. It has made no obvious surface differences which are apparent to the eye. And so evolution in the types of cultures used has come slowly; cereals have decreased in acreage, but not so rapidly as to threaten a shortage of domestic supplies for bread. Even now it is only in poor wheat years that resort is had to importation; for the rise in yields per hectare has kept the total size of the crop constant—or nearly so, with normal variations.[3]

[1] In times of peace. National emergency has always made heavy demands on the peasant population, cut down agricultural production and caused resort to imports.

[2] For a further discussion of this see M. Auge-Laribe, *L'Agriculture pendant la guerre,* especially the introduction.

[3] The average acreage in 1881-1890 was 17,216,000. It had been about this since 1860. There was a gradual falling off to 13,872,000 in 1925, about the figure for the years preceding and since (excluding the period of the War).

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And there has been a very gradual turning to the more intensive cultures such as roots, garden crops and animal husbandry, especially this last.[1]

Everywhere in the literature which has to do with French farming—and it is immense—there is insistent stress on the idea that agriculture is an art and is to be valued as such, that peasant life has moral qualities the nation cannot afford to ignore or to lose,[2] and that the occupation of the peasant is a

During this time there was little general change in production. For the decade 1861-70, the average was 272,338,000 bushels. For 1909-13 the average was 325,644,000 bushels; that for 1919 was 253,274,000 bushels; the production in 1925 was 330,338,000 bushels. The contrast was, if anything, in favor of the later period. These figures are from official sources, apparently the same as were used in Mr. Michael's survey already referred to. It may be just as well, however, to state flatly that no official figures for French agriculture are to be trusted in detail. It is hoped to remedy this situation by a complete inventory in 1930, the period set for the world census by the International Institute of Agriculture. In the meantime official reports have to be checked by local observation and by statistics from private sources. The generally used official sources for such figures are the *Annuaire statistique* of the *Ministère du Travail,* the *Bulletin de la statistique générale de la France* of the same ministry and the *Statistique agricole* of the *Ministère de l'Agriculture.*

[1] It is interesting that the most advanced phase of agriculture should exhibit a return to animal husbandry, which characterized its primitive phase. It is not the same thing in both cases, however. Cattle are bred not only for their meat, but for their milk, from which the high-priced butters and cheeses of France are made; and breeding is much more carefully done. Fields, moreover, are not necessarily returned to wild grasses, but are also planted to highly productive forage crops.

[2] "Songeons d'abord à fortifier chez nos paysans les hautes qualités morales qui ont été fréquentes chez leurs ancêtres, à conserver en eux l'amour de la terre, seul force capable de les retenir dans un métier toujours pénible, souvent ingrat, et dont les caractères fortement trempés savent seuls apprécier les plaisirs austères." M. Auge-Laribe, *Les Cahiers du redressement français,* p. 12. There is no national literature more thoroughly infused with the appreciation of rural life and with the love of the soil itself than that of France. Every region, almost every locality, has its literary celebrant. Some of them are nationally known for other reasons; but Daudet, for instance, is as well known for *Lettres de mon moulin* as for any of his other works. Montaigne was as fond of drawing illustrations from his garden as from the classics. Everyone knows Mistral's debt to Provence; but even more interesting are some books almost unknown outside France, such as Joseph de Pesquidoux's *Chez nous: Travaux et jeux rustiques,* Charles Silvestre's *Le Voyage rustique,* Charles Maurras' *L'Étang de Berre* or Jean-Louis Vaudoyer's *Beautés de la Provence.* There are literally hundreds of others. The rural arts, indeed, seem to occupy a place in the national esteem which is somewhat comparable to that which we

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dignified way of life worthy of respect among others. The peasant home and the land are thought of as something to be worked for and preserved, ends in themselves, rather than instruments by which to rise to a higher estate in the world; and even statesmen talk in these terms as often as in terms of an exploitable occupation which owes food and other raw materials to the nation.[1] One who fails to see this cannot possibly understand the tendencies of French policy. To strengthen the rural home, to guard the peasant holding against violent change, to preserve the traditional agricultural arts, are as much national aims as is the supply of *matériel*. Perhaps, however, a distinction ought to be made between this literary and sentimental attitude and that which is to be found among those harder-headed persons who would be classed as agricultural experts. It might be gathered from literature that the backwardness of rural life is in itself desirable, because each physical embodiment of the old tradition encloses some part of the spirit which is so precious; those who have a more practical point of view evidently think it possible to make progress without serious sacrifice. These are gradually making headway against stubborn sentiment. Housing, for instance, is undoubtedly picturesque; but the usual rural home of France is, outside its picturesqueness, a serious menace to health and morale. There is a growing belief that something ought to be done, even if with care to preserve the amenities, for the correction of the worst of these difficulties.[2] There is

reserve for sports. There is no doubt that this sentiment for the soil and for what is traditional in man's relation to it significantly tempers the policy of the government. Reference here may be made to a general bibliography of the greatest interest to the student of social movements in France during the last century: *Bibliographie des sciences juridiques, politiques, économiques et sociales,* by A. Grandin, 1926, with two supplements, 1928 and 1929.

[1] Perhaps it might be noted that any substantial change in the balance of rural as against urban population means a change in potential military strength. The peasantry has always been the backbone of the army. Resistance to the depopulation of the countryside may owe something to recognition of this problem.

[2] "Les cultivateurs sont encore peu sensibles aux imperfections de leurs vieilles masures. Les jeunes femmes en souffrent davantage et, si elle demandent à partir pour la ville, c'est beaucoup parce que la maison est misérable, sans eau,

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talk, but little action, so far as the housing situation is concerned. More has been done in some other directions, as we shall have occasion to see later. The communications services of the state are being extended,[1] electric light and power are being made available,[2] and something is being done toward bringing some of the city amusements into the country.[3]

There is, then, not an impregnable determination to reject all that is new and to keep all that is old. But there is a desire to temper progress to the genius of France's rural traditions. M. Auge-Laribe, in discussing some of the disadvantages of rural as against urban life, expresses this very clearly:

> We may set down one first principle: industrial development ought not, with us, to be pursued at the expense of agriculture. We have always been essentially an agricultural country. We ought not to attempt to become a country essentially industrial. All the productive forces, all the natural dispositions, so numerous and varied, of France, would be difficult to use, if accidental and temporary circumstances were allowed to lead us into one profession to the exclusion of others. Our future and our tradition alike demand that we furnish to the world the example of a wise and harmonious balance. To ruin the culture of the soil for the purpose of making France over into an industrial nation—that would be folly.[4]

sans lumière, et qu'il semble, aux jours pluvieux de l'automne, s'enliser dans la boue noire et puante. L'homme comprend mal les plaintes qu'on lui adresse parce qu'il est tout le jour dehors." So writes M. Auge-Laribe, one of the ablest commentators on French agriculture, and, by reason of personality and official position, one of the most influential of contemporary statesmen. *Les Cahiers du redressement français,* no. 5, " L'Agriculture ".

[1] *Ibid.*

[2] M. Bitouzet, " L'Électricité en agriculture ", *ibid.*

[3] Budget Report, *No. 4886,* Chambre des Députés, 1927, p. 13.

[4] *Les Cahiers du redressement français,* p. 2. It cannot be too often insisted that agriculture is a matter of almost universal and jealous interest everywhere in France. There is an Academy of Agriculture, which functions as do the other learned bodies. There are very old associations, such as the Société Nationale d'Encouragement pour l'Agriculture and the Société des Agriculteurs de France. There is a Syndicat Central des Agriculteurs de France. There are many departmental and regional societies of a like sort. These have frequent meetings; and there is an annual Congress of Agricultural Associations. Agriculture is represented on the National Economic Council. Among the more

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II

In a situation such as has been described it is difficult to discover a set of stated intentions by which the results of any given period of policy can be measured. Yet France, like other countries, had a period of high hopes just after the war when it was thought that something of genuine importance might be done to strengthen agriculture as well as industry. Even before the war had ended, on March 15, 1918, there was presented to the Chamber of Deputies a report which was received as something in the nature of a guiding chart for the years to come. It was mostly interested in industry; but some references were made to agriculture. These are translated here. It would be desirable, it was said, to:

1. Modernize equipment, standardize types of tools, and improve technique and commercial organization, for the purpose of lowering the price of these necessary aids to industry and agriculture.
2. Induce the wider use of the new methods which had been introduced and had proved their worth in the war experience.
3. Spread technical information more widely and freely and improve apprenticeship.
4. Consolidate as much as possible the interests of employers and workers.
5. Develop further all means of transport and reduce their cost.

important journals there are: *La France Rurale, La Revue des Agriculteurs de France, La Grande Revue Agricole, Journal d'Agriculture Pratique, Le Bulletin Agricole, Le Petit Journal Agricole,* and others, including many small local papers of predominantly agricultural interest. All this mass of opinion and information from those who care, either sentimentally or for economic reasons, or both, what happens to agriculture, makes for constant concern on the part of the government. The agricultural budget is one of those which are most carefully prepared and most earnestly discussed in the Chamber. The budget report for agriculture alone, in 1926, ran to 233 pages; and that for 1927 ran to 304 pages. Subtraction of the discussions on agricultural matters from the *Journal Officiel* would reduce its bulk considerably. There are those who would say that France has no agricultural policy. It is impossible to conclude this; it is truer to say that agricultural points of view infuse all other matters. Policy does not have to be wise or forward-looking to be policy.

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6. Aid, by reducing imports, the domestic production of those products which now come from abroad.
7. Make immediate use of water-power resources.
8. Make available to farmers all the machines and tools and all the fertilizer which may be needed to bring the soil up to its maximum producing strength.
9. Make the nation self-supporting; and exploit, to their greatest possible extent, available foreign markets.

The ideas represented by these statements were prevalent in France at the end of the war. It was a time when customary procedures were at their weakest and when even the skeptically inclined were, for once, persuaded that great things might be made to happen. And, besides, the obvious lessons of industrial and agricultural experience during the war were not to be ignored. French self-sufficiency in the matter of food supplies had, under stress, proved to be largely mythical; and French manufacturing practice had clearly displayed its backwardness. There was shown, in industry, a fine sense of workmanship and an ability to make a few things beautifully to individual pattern; this was traditional. But war in the modern manner had intensified the trend in other countries toward the mass production of standardized goods. For industrial products as well as food France had suffered the humiliation of having to depend on outside sources. Only mass production could meet the destructive demands of war; it began, also, to be suspected that it would have to be depended on in peace. Something of the same sort was seen to be true of agriculture as well as industry. The more comprehensively planned farming effort in the countries to the north and east of France was amply shown to be superior to hand work, individually directed. The mere survival of the Central Powers through the years of the blockade was an object lesson. It was especially bitter to the French who had valued so highly their self-sufficiency and the nice balance between rural and urban occupations. Germany had come close to discovering what France had always talked about as peculiarly hers; and France had proved to be pitifully dependent in a crisis.

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Out of the general disturbance of traditional ideas from the impact of the hard lessons, a variety of new policies might have been elaborated. Statesmen might have judged it futile to continue to follow the will-o'-the-wisp of self-sufficiency in all things. It might have been argued that France had a genius for specialty operations, both in manufacturing and in agriculture, and that social policy ought to be directed toward developing these and exchanging their products in world markets for such mass-manufacturing products as cheap automobiles or such primitive agricultural goods as breadstuffs. There would have been good argument for this policy. Statesmen might have held that France was a relatively small nation with a stable or decreasing population and with a valuable tradition of workmanship—a whole civilization, in fact, which the world acknowledged as fine. It might, consequently, have been thought more worth while to preserve this than to chance competition with America and Germany in ways determined by their standards. To pattern France on them was to risk much under severe handicaps: late start, limited raw material resources, and ill-adapted industrial and agricultural organization. The program of the post-war years was, however, conceived, as we have seen, in almost precisely antithetical terms. It might quite as well have been written for America as for France.

Some points in the program seem to indicate peculiarities in policy which it will be interesting to follow in a résumé of post-war behavior. Omissions are as significant as inclusions. There is no mention, for instance, of any unusual disturbance in agriculture. The world-wide depression in that industry did not become acute, as a matter of fact, until later on, and it was not foreseen in France any more than it was elsewhere. There was not an immediately pressing problem, or any likelihood that one would develop; there was only a general conviction that somehow French farming had fallen behind in spite of the traditional steadiness of the French peasant and the careful quality of his produce. There is no mention of a need for controlled prices, of general marketing supervision, or, indeed, of any state interference in the minute direction of pro-

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duction. There is a prevailing optimism, a faith in traditional methods, modified only by the necessity of strengthening all along the line—in agriculture as well as in other industries. But it will be noticed that the ancient bias in favor of a rounded self-sufficiency comes out clearly. The method for achieving it is referred to also. It is the reduction of imports by the use of protective tariffs, the conservation of the home market for domestic producers. Only in a general sense were means other than tariffs thought of. Research and technical advice were to be intensified, transportation and marketing were to be regularized somehow so that their costs might be lowered; water-power was to be developed and the electrification of the country was to be attempted. Equipment and organization were to be improved and the soil made more productive by the generous use of fertilizers. These items, if a determined effort were made to effect them, might conceivably call for vast governmental activities and the use of huge funds. But no one took them in any such way. Everyone knew that the traditional rôle of the government in industrial affairs was not to be changed. All that the statement really meant, then, was that such ends were considered desirable, but that the government would use only the ordinary means at its disposal toward carrying them out. That such was the intention becomes increasingly clear in the light of the steps subsequently taken.

As time went on, there was to be discovered a vast difference between the efforts of reconstruction for agriculture and those for industry. This was partly due to the fact that the war had affected industry much more than it had agriculture. Perhaps two-fifths of French manufactures had formerly come from the devastated regions; important new territories were acquired where production was thoroughly Germanized; furthermore, industrial establishments, even in the remote and scattered factory districts of the center and the south, had to be readapted somehow to the making of peacetime goods. In short, drastic changes of some kind were necessary if industry were to proceed at all, particularly in the devastated regions. Reconstruction along modern lines could, therefore, be initiated with comparative ease. But no such differences be-

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tween war and peace existed in farming. The peasants could pick up their old tools and go on working as before. As a consequence the rationalization of agriculture presented far more serious difficulties than the rationalization of industry.

It is often said that French policy is dominated by the peasants. This is true in the sense that the opinions of rural constituents are usually influential on parliamentary representatives;[1] but peasants, no less than others, can be inept in shaping national affairs to their own advantage. It was never intended by the peasants, nor by any one else, to reconstruct agriculture as industry was to be reconstructed. It might seem so from the publications of agricultural leaders, but actual performance suggests the reverse—the peasants simply wanted more of what they already had achieved. They were not dissatisfied with themselves as the industrialists were; nor, for a considerable period after the war, were they dissatisfied with the returns from their occupation. In fact, except for a vague discontent here and there, the need for reconstruction in agriculture was scarcely recognized. Attention was rather concentrated on the revolution in industry and the new policies demanded by its transformation. It was all very well to say that agriculture needed strengthening; but it was quite another thing to find support for the activities which would be required for carrying out any extensive program, especially with national budgets so burdened by war expenses as were those of France.

The general policies for agriculture which were cheered in the Chamber in 1918 were not followed by any serious attempts to put them into effect. It is only fair to suggest that this failure may have been due to the significant contrast in position between post-war industry and agriculture which has been mentioned, coupled with the severe exigencies in the making of each annual budget—at least up to 1930. Funds scarcely sufficed to keep up the old services, to say nothing of assuming new ones. Industry could be rebuilt by reparation arrangements, and by the use of abnormal profits piled up during the

[1] Serious reservations are beginning to be necessary. Industrialists must be said, at present, to be rather more respectfully treated than are the peasants.

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war, without direct recourse to the national treasury. Agriculture was not so fortunate. Intentions, however wise, had slim results, so slim that in 1927, again, M. Queuille (the then minister of agriculture) published a new and carefully prepared comprehensive program covering nearly the same points as that of 1918. If the activities contemplated in the program of 1918 had been under way nine years later, such a new pronouncement, suggesting a reconstruction fund of a billion francs, would not have been necessary.[1]

The apportionment of the billion francs which it was proposed to make available over and above the ordinary budget reveals, again, something of intentions. One half was to be devoted to research, education and propaganda; the other half was to assist in modernizing production and the marketing services. Specifically, this latter share was to be used:

1. For buying agricultural machinery to be used collectively, such as threshers, harvesters, graders, tractors, cultivators, presses, etc.; concentrated foods for animals; breeding stock, etc.

[1] *Journal Officiel*, 24 March 1927. This report of M. Queuille was submitted to the Conseil National Économique. In the *Journal Officiel* for 15 September 1927 (pp. 824 *et seq.*) there is printed a memorandum presented by the secretary-general of the *Confédération Nationale des Associations Agricoles* supporting this program. This memorandum, prepared by M. Auge-Laribe, is an excellent argument in detail for enlarging national expenditures on agriculture. There is, in the same number (p. 827), the comment of the Conseil National Économique on these proposals. Its first two paragraphs are as follows: "The National Economic Council has taken cognizance of the program for the intensification of agriculture upon which the minister of agriculture has asked its opinion. The Council gives its complete assent to the establishment of a total program the realization of which would have the happiest consequences for the prosperity of farmers, for the betterment of conditions in the food services, and for national economic life. The means proposed, it seems to the Council, ought to be approved. But it is feared that the financial resources now within view will scarcely be sufficient for complete realization. Considering that the expense necessary to the enlarging of production among the smaller cultivators would have, with little delay, the happiest national consequences, the Council hopes that a considerable financial effort will be made to hasten this realization." It then goes on to argue for more attention to wheat-growing, for better education in agriculture, and especially for an entente between consumers' and producers' coöperatives, to which end it urges immediate legislative assistance.

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2. For the establishment of nurseries for forest and fruit trees, ornamental shrubs, etc.
3. For the organization of grading services for milk and butter.
4. For the reorganization of meat marketing by the building of model regional abattoirs, by the improvement of transport, and by the storage of slaughtered meat.
5. For the reforestation of hilly and other unproductive terrains, and for all agricultural improvements of a public nature.

Loans were to be made to available collectives—syndicates or coöperatives—with the expectation of repayment within ten years; interest was to be at the reasonable rate of four per cent. This proposal for an extraordinary effort toward reconstruction was not passed by the Chamber. It did not then seem—nor has it since seemed—possible. Its provisions do serve, however, to indicate something of intentions and of the means considered to be within the ordinary range of governmental activity.

The projected use of the other half of this billion has a similar significance. It shows what informed persons would like to see done. These millions were to be "devoted to the development or starting of research projects, scientific and educational; and of projects for popularizing agricultural knowledge":

1. For the training of agricultural experts to the extent of at least one per canton.
2. For the installation of laboratories where cultivators may obtain free analyses of soils, fertilizers, feeds, wines, milk and other products.
3. For the setting up of demonstration farms to the extent of at least one per canton.
4. For improved experimental farms where projects for improving soils, animals or plants can be carried out as well as the struggle against diseases of animals and plants.
5. For the creation of breeding farms for furnishing pure-bred stock to the farmers of each region.

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6. For the organization of annual excursions, in which cultivators designated by their syndicate may take part.

7. For the organization of study trips in urban centers for the benefit of the younger farmers; and, for remote regions, the organization of educative and recreative meetings with the assistance of qualified lecturers and artists. Subventions are to be provided for communes and syndicates in which it is wished to provide facilities for lectures and recreation.

8. For greatly increasing the subventions of the large centers of research in or attached to the establishments of higher study in agriculture.

9. For putting one chosen farm in each canton into a perfect state of production, of sanitation and of agreeableness.

10. For the foundation of a great organ of information and popularization intended to instruct, to inform and to divert the inhabitants of the countryside.[1]

It would be a mistake to take this or any other such statement too seriously. There is this about it, however, which is significant: the parliamentary discussions—and those in the press as well—made it clear that the objections which prevented its adoption had their origin not so much in a lack of interest in agricultural progress, or even in dissatisfaction with the remedies suggested, as in a feeling that the budget could bear no more. There was no chance of issuing bonds for any such purpose with the hope that the productivity of the project would enable them to be met at maturity out of profits. Agricultural progress is too diffused, if not too slow, to make such a hope legitimate. It was felt that even loans to coöperatives, intended for maturity at the end of a decade, and for specially defined purposes, were a serious risk to assume if their non-payment might in any way threaten loss to the treasury. Investment in such developmental enterprises, though informed persons are convinced of their necessity and of their ultimate productivity, are not likely to be undertaken by a nation already in severe financial straits. It was this feeling which prevented France from entering on serious agricultural reconstruction in 1928; and the budget for 1929 was

[1] Document *No. 4886*, Chambre des Députés, 1927, pp. 12 *et seq.*

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adopted under such peculiar political difficulties[1] as to make it seem unwise to risk the slightest criticism on the ground of extravagance.

In 1928, M. Queuille recognized the financial difficulties, yet he saw with despair that farming in France was not progressing as it was in neighboring nations. His proposal for a great effort was perhaps not expected to succeed; but it did at least call the agricultural situation forcefully to public attention. The budget report for 1928 looked backward and forward in asking for its billion francs, and said:

> It is with great melancholy that we realize how much time is required for translation into legislative action of the generous sentiments manifested by the deliberative assemblies. We are a country of hardy conception and impatient imagination. No anticipation shocks us. We admit the principle of profound transformations in method or arrangement. But, before these pass into execution, we find, with marvelous facility, clouds of reasons—each one of which would be sufficient—for retarding indefinitely the experiences which we claim to desire imperiously.

This may or may not have been a just estimate of the French character; it was at least prophetic, for no credits of an extraordinary nature were allowed.[2]

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[1] The government was actually forced to resign at one stage of the budget debates; and pressure was so great all through that extreme caution was exercised.

[2] This article will be continued in a future issue of the QUARTERLY.—ED.

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THE RECRUDESCENCE OF THE MONROE DOCTRINE

DURING the years preceding the outbreak of the World War there were signs which seemed to indicate that the Monroe Doctrine was tending to become obsolescent. For some time there had been little discussion of it[1] and few occasions for asserting or invoking its authority.[2] American patriots were not lacking who believed and hoped that since it had accomplished the objects for which it was enunciated, and since there was, so far as one could predict, little likelihood that its validity would ever again be challenged by any European or Asiatic Power, it was destined to pass into the limbo of a well-earned repose. This "era of good feeling", however, proved to be of short duration. Those who had hoped that the Monroe Doctrine was finished and that we would hear no more of it were destined to experience an almost rude disillusionment.

The years that have elapsed since the close of the war have seen a revival of discussion of it, a vigorous reassertion of its

[1] Except the flurry caused by the speech of Ambassador Walter H. Page in London on March 11, 1914, in the course of which he remarked in a half-humorous way that "the United States *prefers* that no land in the new world should be acquired by any European government." The language employed by the ambassador was seized upon by the anti-British element in the United States and construed as an intimation that we might not object in certain circumstances to the further acquisition by European Powers of territory on the Western Hemisphere. The Senate promptly passed a resolution calling on the secretary of state for a stenographic copy of the speech, which was duly furnished. The tempest in a teapot which the speech aroused subsided with its publication in the American press. Text of the speech in the *Congressional Record* for March 25, 1914 (63d Cong., 2d Ses., vol. LI, p. 5789). See also Hendrik, *Life and Letters of Walter H. Page*, vol. III, p. 258, for details of the incident.

[2] An exception of course was the Magdalena Bay resolution adopted by the Senate in 1912. During the World War there was also some discussion of the question whether a German invasion of Canada would be contrary to the Monroe Doctrine, a question upon which there was a division of opinion among those who discussed it.

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vitality and a succession of demands—most of them crowned with success—that the rest of the world should give formal and positive recognition of its validity in the international peace pacts and treaties of arbitration to which the United States was a party. Parallel with this development there has been a disposition to extend its scope to justify acts of intervention by the United States in Latin America and by means of it to reinforce the doctrine of the "moral mandate" of the North American republic to maintain peace and order in the turbulent countries of the Caribbean Sea and Central America. At the same time, the negative side of the Monroe Doctrine—the corollary of American non-intervention in the political affairs of Europe[1]—has been relied upon by the American government since the war as a justification or excuse for its policy of non-participation in the affairs of the world and its hesitation to coöperate in full measure with the other nations in common undertakings for the advancement of the cause of the general peace.[2] As is well known, one of the reasons for senatorial opposition to our entrance into the League of Nations was that, as Senator Lodge alleged, it would mean a surrender of the Monroe Doctrine[3] or, as Senator Borah put it, our ratification of the Covenant would be "an invitation to all the nations of Europe to fight us because we refused to submit the Monroe Doctrine to a tribunal or refused to give it up."[4] During the long debate on the question of the adherence of the United States to the protocol of the Permanent Court of International Justice, the shadow of Monroeism hung always over the Senate. Senators feared or professed to fear

[1] This corollary was stated in the reservation of the Senate to the World Court protocol, January 27, 1926, as one which forbids the United States from "intruding upon, interfering with or entangling itself in the political questions of policy or internal administration of any foreign state." Query: Is this really the traditional policy of the United States in respect to the states of Latin America?

[2] As to this see Garner, *American Foreign Policies*, pp. 133 *et seq.* See also Whitton, "L'Isolement des États Unis, principe caduc de la doctrine de Monroe", *Rev. Gén. de Droit Int. Pub.*, 3d ser., t. I (1927), pp. 45 *et seq.*

[3] Address of August 12, 1919, in the Senate. Lodge, *The Senate and the League of Nations*, pp. 380 *et seq.*

[4] Address of December 6, 1919.

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that in some way which they could not satisfactorily explain, American membership in the Court might involve the impairment of the right of the United States to be the sole judge and guarantor of the Monroe Doctrine, and the reservation with which the Senate finally gave its advice and consent, namely that the adherence of the United States should not be construed to imply a relinquishment of its "traditional attitude toward purely American questions", was not enough to remove the susceptibilities of some senators.

The post-war reassertions of the Monroe Doctrine appear to be based on the view that it can never become obsolete, that, indeed, it must not be allowed to sink into oblivion, that its vitality must be constantly affirmed and reaffirmed, and that the other nations must recognize it formally and solemnly in the multilateral conventions and even bilateral treaties of arbitration which they conclude with us, if indeed they do not render it the high homage to which some Americans believe it entitled in virtue of its majesty as an "institution" which, in the language of a Tammany orator, "has blessed and revivified the world"! This sentiment found its first expression after the war in the popular demand that the Covenant of the proposed League of Nations should contain a clause expressly mentioning it by name and recognizing its validity, if not as embodying a rule of international law, as enunciating at least a principle of American foreign policy of which the United States was unwilling to surrender a jot or tittle if it became a member of the League.

When the first draft of the Covenant, containing no reference to the Monroe Doctrine, was published in the United States, President Wilson was given to understand, in terms which he could not mistake, that without some provision intended to safeguard the Monroe Doctrine the Covenant would probably not be acceptable to the Senate.[1] On March 18 when

[1] See the letter of Senator Hitchcock to the President dated March 4, 1919 (Baker, *Woodrow Wilson and World Settlement*, vol. III, doc. 19), in which he suggested, among others, a "reservation of the Monroe doctrine" as "likely to influence votes". *Cf.* Mr. Taft's telegram of March 18 suggesting a similar reservation, and a dispatch in the same month from Mr. Lamont containing a summary of Mr. Root's views. Miller, *The Drafting of the Covenant*, vol. I,

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proposed changes in the draft were being discussed, the Monroe Doctrine was mentioned casually, when the President alluded to the fact that it had never been defined and that the Senate did not want it defined. It was finally agreed at this meeting that it would be impossible to put into the Covenant a reservation of the Monroe Doctrine without a similar reservation of an Asiatic doctrine for the Japanese, which would arouse the opposition of China.[1] At a meeting of the commission on April 11, however, President Wilson, feeling apparently little enthusiasm but yielding to the pressure from home, proposed the amendment which finally became Article 21. This article declares that "nothing in this Covenant shall be deemed to affect the validity of international engagements, such as treaties of arbitration or regional understandings like the Monroe Doctrine, for securing the maintenance of peace." The proposal was opposed by various members of the commission, especially the French members, who maintained that any specific mention of the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant was not only unnecessary but distinctly out of place. Lloyd George also opposed the proposal, first, because the British would be inclined to regard it as a concession to America, and second, because there was no place in the Covenant for specific reference to the foreign policy of a particular country which was applicable to only one part of the world. President Wilson defended the inclusion of a reference to the doctrine as being nothing more than a recognition of the fact that it was not inconsistent with the terms of the Covenant, to which one of the French members replied that if it was not inconsistent with the Covenant, there seemed

pp. 276, 279, 298, and Baker, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 324. On April 13 Mr. Taft and President Lowell sent him a cablegram saying that friends of the Covenant were seriously alarmed over the report that no amendment would be made "more specifically safeguarding the Monroe Doctrine", and adding that at a meeting of the executive committee of the League to Enforce Peace, with thirty members from eighteen states present, the unanimous opinion was expressed that without such an amendment, the Republican senators would defeat ratification and that they would be sustained by public opinion. Baker, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 325.

[1] Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. I, pp. 295, 336.

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to be no necessity for referring to it.[1] The opposition to the clause was not confined to the members of the commission which drafted it. Ex-President Bonilla of Honduras, delegate from that country, protested against it for the reason that it did not undertake to define the Monroe Doctrine and that consequently the nations which ratified the Covenant would be put in the position of sanctioning the validity of any policy upon which the United States might at any time choose to place the mantle of the illustrious President whose name it bore.[2] The government of Mexico went to the length of notifying all the Powers represented at the Peace Conference that it had never recognized and would not recognize the Monroe Doctrine, and it added that the sanctioning of it in an international convention would "set up and establish a tutelage of the United States over all the other nations of America".[3] Partly for this reason, Mexico has never joined the League. All the other Latin-American republics, however, except Ecuador, waived whatever objections they may have had to this or other provisions and became members of the League, although Brazil and Costa Rica subsequently withdrew. The protective advantages which the League seemed to offer them and the prospect of a certain prestige which would come from their participation, on a footing of equality with the European nations, in world affairs through the League organization, made a special appeal to the smaller Latin-American countries. Some of them were clearly reluctant, however, to ratify an international pact containing a formal recognition of the

[1] *Ibid.*, pp. 337, 442-47. The President at the final meeting of the commission stated that "the whole object of this mentioning of the Monroe Doctrine is to relieve a state of mind on the other side of the water; relieve the minds of certain conscientious public men in the United States who want to be assured that there is no intention in this League to interfere with the doctrine". *Ibid.*, p. 459.

[3] Text of Bonilla's remarks in Inman, *Problems in Pan Americanism*, pp. 182-83. See also the *New York Times*, June 14, 1919, and Scelle, *Le Pacte des nations*, p. 358.

[2] Thomas, *One Hundred Years of the Monroe Doctrine*, p. 395, and Blakeslee, *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States*, p. 87. See also Whitton, "La Doctrine de Monroe et la Société des Nations", *Rev. de Droit Int. et de Lég. Comparée*, 3d ser., t. VIII (1927), pp. 567 *et seq.*, who declares that Article 21 created throughout Latin America the "greatest consternation".

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validity of a particular foreign policy of the United States which, they asserted, was as elastic as gutta-percha and which might be interpreted by the United States at any time to justify North American imperialism, interventions in their internal affairs and a general hegemony of the United States over the weaker Latin-American republics. In these circumstances the government of Salvador, before ratifying the Covenant, undertook to obtain from the government of the United States a more precise definition of the thing which Article 21 of the Covenant referred to as the "Monroe Doctrine". It accordingly addressed a communication in December, 1919, to the Department of State, requesting it "to be good enough to give an authentic interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine as it is understood at the present historical moment and as to its future application by the United States." Such an interpretation, it was added, was desirable "not only for the development of the lofty purpose of Pan-Americanism, but in order that the doctrine may maintain its original purity and prestige." To this communication the Department returned a reply in which it merely referred the Salvadorean government to the pronouncements of various presidents of the United States, and particularly to the address of President Wilson before the Second Pan-American Scientific Congress in January, 1916, in which he asserted that "the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on her own authority" and that "it has always been maintained and always will be maintained upon her own responsibility."[1]

In 1928, Costa Rica, which had joined the League but had

[1] See the *New York Times*, Dec. 22, 1919, March 2, 1920, and March 9, 1920. Many have regretted that the President should have felt called upon to make the assertion contained in the latter part of the statement quoted. It hardly seems consistent with his fine pronouncement on Pan-Americanism in his address to Congress of December 7, 1915, in which he declared that there was no thought in our minds of "a claim of guardianship, but, instead, a free and honorable association as of partners between ourselves and our neighbors, in the interest of all America, North and South." This address struck a responsive chord in the hearts of South Americans and aroused high hopes that we were ready to make the Monroe Doctrine a partnership affair. See the résumé of Latin-American press opinion by W. S. Robertson in *The Nation* of June 15, 1918, pp. 703-705.

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subsequently withdrawn, being convinced as a result of the failure of Salvador's efforts that it would be useless to endeavor to secure from the United States a more precise and definite statement of the Monroe Doctrine, addressed itself to the Council of the League of Nations in the hope of obtaining a pronouncement from that body of what in its opinion was the scope and meaning of the doctrine which had received the sanction of Article 21 of the Covenant. The request was made in response to an appeal addressed by the Council of the League to Costa Rica to return to the League, and it was supported by the Colombian representative on the Council. But the Council declined to comply with the request on the ground that it had no jurisdiction to interpret the Covenant, that power belonging solely to the Assembly. Furthermore, assuming the Monroe Doctrine to be a unilateral policy of the United States, the government of that country alone was competent to interpret it. The Council, however, in its reply added by way of a certain assurance to Costa Rica that Article 21 of the Covenant did not recognize the Monroe Doctrine as having any meaning or validity which it did not previously possess; that is to say, the sanction of the Covenant would not cover subsequent extensions of the doctrine through interpretations or constructions by the government of the United States, which might render it inconsistent with the Covenant. The Council also pointed out that at the time President Wilson requested the Peace Conference to give its sanction to the Monroe Doctrine, a Brazilian delegate proposed that Article 21 should be so phrased that the recognition of the validity of the doctrine would apply only so long as it was not contrary to the provisions of the Covenant. Whereupon President Wilson, wishing to obtain an unconditional recognition of the doctrine, gave assurance that there was nothing in it, as it had been interpreted in the past or as it was likely to be interpreted in the future, that would be incompatible with the obligations of the United States as a member of the League.[1]

[1] See the President's statement in Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 459. As to the Council's reply, see League of Nations, *Monthly Summary*, Sept. 15, 1928. Also *Journal de Genève*, Sept. 2 and 4, 1928.

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In February, 1928, the Argentine member of the League Committee on Arbitration and Security criticized Article 21 on the ground that it had reference merely to a unilateral policy of the United States, one which at the time it was enunciated and by a fortunate coincidence had been of great service to the Latin-American republics but which as subsequently extended had never received their explicit approval. It has been intimated by Señor J. L. Suarez, an Argentine publicist, that the objection to Article 21 is one of the reasons why Argentina has not actively participated in the affairs of the League since 1920.[1]

It is clear that the inclusion of the reference to the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant was effected in the face of considerable opposition from both European and Latin-American sources. If one considers objectively the nature and purposes of both the Covenant and the Monroe Doctrine, it is not easy to see the interrelation between them and therefore the reason or necessity for the sanction, by reference, of the Monroe Doctrine by the Covenant. If the Monroe Doctrine is merely a national policy of defense for the United States, as its most authoritative expositors such as Hughes and Root have asserted, it did not need the sanction of the Covenant to give it validity. As Mr. Kellogg correctly asserted in his correspondence relative to the Kellogg Pact, national self-defense is an inherent right and is not therefore dependent upon the sanction of treaties.[2] No interpretation of the Covenant which would have impaired or destroyed this right, even in the absence of Article 21, would have been admissible. Logically it is hard to see why Great Britain might not have demanded with equal reason a reservation covering her somewhat analogous policy in Egypt, Italy hers in the Mediterranean, France hers in northern Africa and Japan hers in the western Pacific. In fact the commission at its meeting on March 18 agreed, as stated above, that it would be impossible to put into the Cov-

[1] Haring, *South America Looks at the United States,* p. 125.

[2] See his note of June 23, 1928, in Shotwell, *War as an Instrument of National Policy,* p. 297; also his address before the American Society of International Law, 1928, *Proceedings,* p. 143.

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enant a reservation of the Monroe Doctrine without making a similar reservation of an Asiatic doctrine of the Japanese.[1] That this latter should not be done, was insisted upon by Mr. Koo, the Chinese delegate, although he was quite willing to vote for the inclusion of a reference to the Monroe Doctrine.[2] Why did not the Caribbean and Central American states which are similarly circumstanced, so far as their geographical relation to the United States is concerned, have an equal right and for the same reason to oppose the United States' reservation of the Monroe Doctrine?

As everyone knows, the European and Latin-American opposition to the Monroe Doctrine reservation was waived and Article 21 accepted because it was believed to be a condition *sine qua non* of the membership of the United States in the League—something which was earnestly desired and regarded as highly essential by the other nations. This concession to American susceptibilities was the price which they were willing to pay to obtain the adherence and collaboration of the United States in a great enterprise in which her coöperation seemed indispensable.[3] But the concession failed to accomplish the object intended. The United States declined to become a member of the League and there seems to be no indication that it will do so in the near future. In view of this prospect, a demand is now being made in certain quarters of Europe and Latin America that Article 21 be withdrawn from the Covenant by the procedure of amendment. Such a proposal was advocated at the International Congress of the League of Nations Associations at Madrid in May, 1929, by the delegates of Argentina, Italy, Poland, Spain and Yugoslavia.[4] Their contention was that whereas the article was

[1] Miller, *op. cit.*, vol. I, p. 295.

[2] *Ibid.*, p. 448.

[3] The Senate, as is well known, was not satisfied with Article 21 as a safeguard for the Monroe Doctrine, and among the reservations to the Treaty of Versailles which it voted was one to the effect that the United States would not submit to arbitration or inquiry by the League any question relating to the Monroe Doctrine, such questions being reserved for its own decision since they lay wholly outside the jurisdiction of the League of Nations.

[4] This statement is based on the report of the proceedings of the Congress as published in the Madrid and Paris newspapers.

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incorporated in the Covenant solely for the purpose of obtaining American adherence, the United States not only seems definitely to have rejected the League but also enjoys the advantage of being in a position, while outside the League, to capitalize the value of the international sanction which the Covenant places upon the doctrine, and particularly of being in a position to invoke the doctrine against the intervention of the League in disputes between Latin-American members and for the enforcement upon covenant-breaking Latin-American states of performance of their League obligations. On the other hand, Lord Robert Cecil, a delegate to the Congress of Madrid, opposed the proposal and expressed the opinion that the recognition of the validity of the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant possessed certain advantages although he did not state what they were. He also asserted that no Latin-American state which was a member of the League had ever officially protested against it. He might have added that the withdrawal of Article 21 from the Covenant would have the effect of closing the door of the League forever to the United States in case the latter should at some future time desire to become a member. The feeling exists, however, that the recognition accorded the Monroe Doctrine in the Covenant was given under a condition which the United States has not met and consequently should be withdrawn. Undoubtedly the presence of Article 21 in the Covenant, to which the United States was expected to become a party, constitutes an anomaly. As it is, the Covenant recognizes the validity of and thereby sanctions a policy of which a non-member of the League is the sole and exclusive interpreter, although that policy affects the rights and interests of many members of the League.

A more recent assertion of the Monroe Doctrine as a principle which limits the effect of multilateral conventions to which the United States is a party is found in what is in effect, if not technically, the reservation of the United States to the Kellogg Pact. When the Pact was submitted to the Senate for ratification, the objection which we now expect as a matter of course was raised, namely, that there was nothing in the text to safeguard the Monroe Doctrine. As

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with the Covenant, the defect must be cured by a reservation. The Committee on Foreign Relations accordingly submitted with its recommendation in favor of ratification an interpretative report embodying its understanding of the purpose and effect of the Pact and likewise its view of the Monroe Doctrine as a policy of national security and defense for the United States. As evidence of what the Monroe Doctrine is and how it has always been regarded, the committee quoted extracts from Monroe's message of December 2, 1823, from Cleveland's message of December 17, 1895, from Elihu Root's address before the American Society of International Law in 1914, and from an address of Professor Theodore Woolsey in June of the same year. The conclusion of the committee was to the effect, although not expressly so stated, that the Monroe Doctrine being a policy of national defense, the right of the United States to wage war for its maintenance would not be inconsistent with its obligations as a party to the Pact. It is significant, however, that the committee took care to add that the Monroe Doctrine "called no new rights into existence; therefore whenever it oversteps the principle of self-defense, reasonably interpreted, the right disappears and the policy is questionable, because it then violates the rights of others."[1] Thus while the right of the United States to go to war for the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine is reserved, it can be legally exercised only when in a war of self-defense. A war, therefore, to uphold some of the recent interpretations of the Monroe Doctrine which really had no relation to our national security or defense would not be legitimate under the terms of the Pact as thus interpreted. This restrictive but sensible interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine was doubtless due to the insistence of the Chairman of the Senate Committee on Foreign Affairs, who feels that some of the recent interpretations which have been placed upon the Monroe Doctrine have been distortions of its original meaning, and that reliance upon it, in part, to justify such interventions as that in Nicaragua in 1927 was quite unjustifiable.

[1] The text of the report may be conveniently found in *The Advocate of Peace* for February, 1929, pp. 90-91; a French translation in *L'Esprit International*, 1929, pp. 296-97.

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Since the report of the committee was never voted upon by the Senate nor any reservation attached to the instrument of ratification, it might be argued that it is not binding upon the United States or the other signatories. Technically this may be correct, but there is little doubt that the "understandings" set forth in the report will always be regarded as in effect a reservation and will be invoked by the United States in case it should have occasion to plead the Monroe Doctrine as a defense to the charge of having violated the Pact.[1] Ratification by the other signatories without reservation in respect to the American understandings is tantamount to an admission that such a plea would be valid. But in case a war were waged by the United States on the pretext that it was for the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine when it was not really a war of self-defense, the other belligerent as well as the neutral signatories would be justified, on the basis of the restrictive interpretation which the committee placed upon the Monroe Doctrine, in regarding the war as being in violation of the Pact. In short, since the Senate interposed no objection to the committee's interpretation and gave its consent to the ratification of the Pact as thus interpreted, the ratification will be deemed to have included approval of the committee's understanding of the Monroe Doctrine, and this understanding will constitute a binding obligation of the United States. Americans who believe in a saner and more sensible interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine should be grateful for the approval by the Senate, even if it was only by acquiescence, of a view of the Monroe Doctrine which restricts its scope to self-defense and admits the principle that a war in support of it would be in violation of the "rights of others" and of the Kellogg Pact, if its object were anything else than the national defense and security.[2]

[1] Compare to this effect a Washington dispatch to the London *Times* of January 6, 1929. The legal effect of the report was the subject of some discussion in the Senate. Senator Robinson of Indiana stated that in his opinion it would have the effect of a reservation but "not such a reservation as would need to be submitted to the other signatories".

[2] This is said notwithstanding the fact that the committee in other parts of its report did its best to reduce the pact to the terms of a pious wish. Compare

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The Latin-American republics which have clamored for a more precise definition of the Monroe Doctrine ought likewise to be grateful for the restrictive interpretation of the committee even if it does not go to the length which they desire. In fact most of them have ratified the Pact or indicated their intention of doing so. Two of the most important, however, Brazil and Argentina, have done neither and it is reported that one reason for their hesitation or refusal is the United States' reservation of the Monroe Doctrine; this reservation, it is alleged, leaves the United States free to engage in any war which it may claim to be in defense of the Monroe Doctrine, of which it is the sole and exclusive interpreter.[1]

It might be argued that since any war which the United States is likely to wage in defense of the Monroe Doctrine would necessarily be with a European or Asiatic Power, it would be to the interest of the Latin-American republics to leave their northern neighbor free to engage in such a war because, as a result of a coincidence of interests, it would be a war for their protection as well as that of the United States, against the aggression of a non-American Power. But to this argument the Latin Americans would reply that in late years the United States has occasionally relied upon the Monroe Doctrine as justification for occupying their territory, seizing their ports, intervening in their domestic affairs, and sometimes establishing virtual if temporary protectorates over them without their consent. In short, the Monroe Doctrine has been transformed from an instrument for the protection of

the observations as to this of George W. Wickersham in *Foreign Affairs*, 1929, p. 367. But it is worth remarking that while the Senate identified the Monroe Doctrine with "self-defense", that term is susceptible of very wide interpretation and the United States will be the judge in each particular case of what is self-defense. There is no reason why it cannot, as it has in fact done, regard the most extreme extension of the Monroe Doctrine as falling under the category of self-defense. It is possible therefore that the restrictive interpretation of the Senate report may not prove to be a real limitation on the freedom of the United States to fight for the Monroe Doctrine.

[1] When the announcement of the signing of the Pact was made, the Argentine press advised the Latin-American republics to defer action upon it until it was known whether the Senate of the United States would attach a Monroe Doctrine reservation to its own ratification.

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the American republics against non-American aggression to an instrument to justify on occasions intervention by the United States in the affairs of her sister republics. In several instances in which this was done the intervention took the form of war, in a material sense, even if it was not such in legal contemplation. The recent intervention in Nicaragua was criticized for this reason by various senators, notably Borah, Blaine, Norris and Wheeler, on the ground that the Constitution vests the war-making power in Congress and not in the president. The conclusion of the Latin-American critics, therefore, was that if the Senate reservation left the United States free to invoke the Monroe Doctrine as a justification, wholly or in part, for armed intervention in their countries—interventions which in effect sometimes amounted to war—the protection which the Kellogg Pact was intended to afford its Latin-American signatories would be materially weakened. Furthermore, the Kellogg Pact by its very terms proposes to outlaw certain types of "war" only; consequently it places no restriction upon the right of the United States or any other signatory to have recourse to measures of intervention or other steps involving the use of armed forces so long as such measures do not fall within the legal category of "war". However, notwithstanding this skepticism, most Latin-American governments have, as stated above, either ratified the Pact or given notice of their intention of doing so.[1] It is well to remember that the restrictive interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine approved by the Senate, if scrupulously observed by the United States in its relations with the Latin-American republics, will remove, in part at least, the cause of their apprehension.

Until very recently the United States had been content to limit its reservations of the Monroe Doctrine to multilateral conventions. Since January 1, 1928, however, it has concluded twenty-four bilateral arbitration treaties each of which contains a provision for "safeguarding" the Monroe Doctrine

[1] It may be remarked, however, in this connection that the Senate of Colombia approved adherence to the Pact subject to the reservation that it condemned not only "war" but also measures of force such as military occupation and armed intervention by one state in the internal affairs of another.

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by expressly reserving for the United States the right to be its sole judge and executioner. Each of these treaties contains a clause to the effect that its provisions shall not be invoked in respect to any dispute the subject matter of which "depends upon or involves the maintenance of the traditional attitude of the United States concerning American questions, commonly described as the Monroe Doctrine." The effect of this reservation is, of course, to relieve the United States of an obligation to arbitrate with another party to the treaty any difference which in its opinion involves the Monroe Doctrine in any way. As to all such disputes the United States will be its own judge both as to the nature of the dispute, that is, as to whether it involves the Monroe Doctrine or not, and in case of an affirmative judgment, as to the mode of settlement. It might therefore claim the right to resort to war or other non-pacific measures against any signatory with which it has a dispute involving or depending upon the Monroe Doctrine as it is understood and interpreted by the American government at the time.

Many Americans themselves regret that the Department of State should have inserted this reservation in the new arbitration treaties, considering that the Monroe Doctrine means whatever any particular president or even any secretary of state interprets it to mean, and that there seems to have been no real necessity for it at this time. It may be remarked in this connection that never before had such a reservation in a bilateral arbitration treaty been insisted upon by the United States. However, if the other parties freely enter into treaties with the United States containing such a reservation, they at any rate can hardly complain. Seventeen European states, among them France, Germany, Austria and Hungary have already signed and ratified such treaties. But seven have not, including Belgium and Italy. It may be remarked also that no such treaty has been concluded with Great Britain. This is reported to be due, in part, to the unwillingness of the Dominion governments to accept the reservation relative to the Monroe Doctrine, which, it is maintained, would have the effect of relieving the United States from an obligation to arbi-

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trate any dispute arising out of its policy in the Western Hemisphere whenever in its opinion the Monroe Doctrine was involved. It is also significant that no such treaty has been concluded with Japan. If, however, the treaties are finally ratified by all the governments which have signed them, and if similar treaties are concluded with Great Britain and Japan, it will certainly constitute another and very important victory for the Monroe Doctrine.

It may be remarked that among the new bilateral treaties there is not one with any Latin-American republic. It is significant also that the multilateral Inter-American Arbitration Treaty signed at Washington on January 5, 1929, by the representatives of twenty of the twenty-one American republics contains no reservation relative to the Monroe Doctrine. The delegates of the United States did not insist upon it because it was said that there is no place in an arbitration treaty between American republics for a reservation covering the Monroe Doctrine, since the purpose of that doctrine, as repeatedly declared by official spokesmen in the United States, is the defense of the United States, and incidentally of the Latin-American republics, against aggression or interference on the part of non-American states. Consequently disputes involving the doctrine can arise only between the United States and non-American states. But in late years there have been complaints in Latin America that the United States has extended the scope of the Monroe Doctrine and employed it for purposes which lie beyond legitimate defense and in disregard of their rights of sovereignty and independence. It is quite conceivable, therefore, that serious disputes may arise between the United States and those republics, relative to the interpretation and application of the Monroe Doctrine. It is quite possible—indeed it seems not improbable—that in the future such disputes will be more common than those between the United States and non-American Powers. It is almost certain that in view of the increasing opposition in Latin America to the Monroe Doctrine as it is now interpreted in the United States, insistence by the United States representatives at the Washington Conference on a reservation similar to that in the

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bilateral treaties with non-American states would have led to the rejection of the treaty by the Latin-American delegates, or at least by most of them. What, therefore, is the effect of the omission from the Inter-American treaty of a reservation "safeguarding" the Monroe Doctrine? Will the Senate of the United States give its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty without such a reservation? In view of the principle frequently asserted in the United States by those who are in a position to speak with authority, that the Monroe Doctrine was proclaimed by the United States on its own authority and will always be maintained on its own responsibility, and that as a consequence, the United States is the sole and final interpreter of its scope and meaning (a fact of which the Latin Americans are fully cognizant), the Senate may regard as unnecessary a formal reservation reaffirming, in effect, this principle. In short, the right of the United States to decide for itself all disputes involving the Monroe Doctrine might be regarded as an implied reservation to every treaty of arbitration to which it is a party, without any necessity for its formal incorporation in the text of the treaty. But if this view be adopted by the Senate, would it not be equally applicable to disputes between the United States and non-American states, involving the Monroe Doctrine? In that case there would seem to be no more reason why the United States should have insisted on a reservation to the new bilateral treaties referred to above, with non-American states, than to the multilateral treaty with the Latin-American republics. On the other hand, if the Senate should give its advice and consent to the ratification of the latter treaty, subject to an express reservation that the United States be relieved from the obligation to arbitrate disputes with them involving the Monroe Doctrine—and this is by no means improbable—it is almost certain that some at least of the Latin-American republics will decline to ratify it.[1] Although more than a year has passed since the signing of the treaty, the Senate has taken no action on it.

It may be argued, and in fact has been maintained in the

[1] Several Latin-American states have ratified it.

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United States, that although the Inter-American arbitration treaty contains no express reservation relieving the United States of an obligation to submit to arbitration disputes with Latin-American republics involving the Monroe Doctrine, there are other provisions in the treaty which, by implication, do have this effect. Thus Article 2, the authorship of which is attributed to Mr. Hughes, excepts from the stipulations of the treaty controversies which "affect the interest or refer to the action of a State not a party to this treaty." This clause, it has been said, "skillfully and impliedly exempts the Monroe Doctrine without mentioning the name" and thus avoids offending the susceptibilities of the Latin Americans.[1] Under this provision, if a dispute, for example, should arise between the United States and Venezuela relative to action by Great Britain which the United States considered to be in violation of the Monroe Doctrine, the United States would be under no obligation to arbitrate it. Nor would Latin-American states be under an obligation to arbitrate it. Latin-American states would probably not object to relieving the United States of the arbitral obligation in a case of this kind.

But suppose the dispute between the United States and Venezuela should relate, not to an interest claimed or action taken by Great Britain or some other non-American state, but to the right of the United States to intervene in some form in the affairs of that republic, on the ground that its purpose was the maintenance of the Monroe Doctrine (e.g. its duty, under the Coolidge interpretation, to protect British or Italian nationals therein or, under the Roosevelt corollary, to deal with a situation resulting from wrongdoing or impotence). Suppose also that according to the Venezuelan interpretation the doctrine was not really involved, but was being invoked by the United States to justify action in violation of the rights and interests of Venezuela? Here we would have a clear case of a dispute between the United States and a Latin-American republic relative to the Monroe Doctrine—a dispute to which

[1] James Brown Scott, 23 *Amer. Jour. of Int. Law* 146. *Cf.* also Murdock, 23 *ibid.* 283, and Mr. Hughes' comments on Art. 3, Provisional Minutes of the Conference, pp. 15, 17.

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no non-American state is a party. Since there is no express reservation in the Inter-American treaty exempting the United States from an obligation to submit the dispute to arbitration, could Venezuela demand arbitration? Americans are not lacking who will deny the obligation of the United States to arbitrate in such cases and they will invoke the authority of Article 1 of the treaty, which binds the signatories to submit to arbitration only differences that are "juridical in their nature by reason of being susceptible of decision by the application of the principles of law." Now the Monroe Doctrine is not regarded as a principle of international law, but as a rule of American foreign policy. The fact that its validity has been recognized by all states which are parties to the Covenant of the League of Nations, by those which have ratified the Kellogg Pact with the Senate "understanding" of its obligations, and by those which have ratified the recent bilateral treaties of arbitration with the United States, does not give it the character of a rule of international law in the sense in which the Drago Doctrine, in so far as it is embodied in the Porter Convention of 1907, is a rule of international law. The United States has insisted upon and obtained this recognition, but apparently does not desire that the doctrine should be considered as a principle of international law and probably would not admit it to be such in case it were so regarded by other nations. During the debates in 1926 on the question of the adherence of the United States to the Permanent Court of International Justice protocol, Senator Reed of Missouri offered a reservation to the effect that the Monroe Doctrine should be acknowledged by the other signatories to be a rule of international law, but Senator Swanson promptly objected on the ground that the doctrine was a unilateral policy of the United States and that "we were not willing to have it incorporated in the body of international law". Senator Lenroot agreed with him. In short, the effect of such a reservation would have been a virtual surrender to the World Court of the right of the United States to be the sole interpreter in all such cases.

It may and doubtless will be maintained, therefore, in the

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United States, if a case arises, that a dispute with a Latin-American republic involving the Monroe Doctrine is not a "juridical" question in the sense of Article 1, because it is not susceptible of decision by an arbitral tribunal through the application of "principles of law". The question as to whether the article would have such an effect does not appear to have been raised at the Washington Conference which formulated the treaty, and none of the reservations made by the Latin-American delegates at the time of signature relate to the matter. But it is altogether probable that when the treaty comes up for discussion by the ratifying authorities of the Latin-American states the effect of Article 1 will receive attention, and if it is clear that the effect will be to withdraw from arbitration all questions in which, in the opinion of the government of the United States, the Monroe Doctrine is involved, it is not improbable that the treaty will be rejected by certain of them or ratified with reservations embodying their understanding of the purpose and effect of the article.

If, however, they all ratify it without reservations as to its effect on the Monroe Doctrine and especially with full knowledge that it is understood in the United States as excluding disputes involving the doctrine, it will amount to recognition by them of the claim of the United States to be the sole interpreter and to settle in its own way disputes involving the doctrine. In the present state of public opinion it does not seem likely that the United States will consent to surrender this claim and it is by no means improbable that the Senate will give its advice and consent to the ratification of the treaty, with a reservation designed to remove the uncertainty which now exists in consequence of the omission from the treaty of all reference to the Monroe Doctrine.

The assertion of the late Senator Knox that "it was given us in Providence to state and interpret the Monroe Doctrine" may be lacking in proof, but whatever may be the facts as to the divine source of the gift, there seems at present little disposition in the United States to share it with our Latin-American sisters. On the theory that the doctrine was proclaimed as a measure of defense for the United States, and not for the

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protection of the Latin-American republics, our claim to be its exclusive judge and guarantor may be logical, but since they are in fact equal beneficiaries with the United States, at least where the doctrine is interpreted and applied in its original sense, to tell them in effect that it is none of their business, is not calculated to evoke from them expressions of devotion for it.

Parallel with the insistence on the part of the United States that its claim to be the sole judge of the Monroe Doctrine shall be recognized by other nations through formal treaty stipulations, has gone, as stated above, a steady tendency to extend the scope of the doctrine beyond its original conception and even beyond the interpretations placed upon it during the formative stages of its development. Down to the opening of the present century, the interpretation and application of the Monroe Doctrine by the United States had, in general, been in accord with the original understanding of its scope and purpose and in few or no instances had it involved any claim of the United States to a hegemony or tutelage over Latin-American republics or any encroachment upon their independence or sovereignty. Since that time, however, the people of Latin America complain that it has undergone a series of extensions which have converted it from a policy of national defense for the United States of which they were at the same time the equal if not the chief beneficiaries, into a policy of control and interference in their affairs. They decline to accept the official view of the United States that these recent interpretations are not extensions of the original policy enunciated by Monroe, but merely corollaries or adaptations of that policy to new and originally unforeseen situations, and the assertion is made that some of these adaptations, at least, have had no relation whatever to the causes which called forth Monroe's declaration nor were they based upon any consideration involving the defense or protection of the United States.

The first extension which aroused criticism throughout Latin America was that of President Roosevelt (1901-04), who declared that in the case of "wrong-doing or impotence" by a Latin-American republic, the doctrine would justify the

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United States in exercising over such republic an "international police power."[1] In short, he converted the Monroe Doctrine from an instrument of protection against European intervention to an instrument which may at times oblige the United States to intervene in the affairs of Latin-American states. This new view of the doctrine was applied in the subsequent intervention of the United States in Haiti and Santo Domingo. In both cases the intervention was justified partly on the ground of the right of the United States to forestall the threatened intervention of European powers, which would have been a violation of the Monroe Doctrine, since it might have led to the permanent occupation of territory by the intervening power.[2] Criticism was directed not so much against this claim of right as against the method and character of the intervention, which, it was asserted, went beyond what any legitimate consideration of self-defense required.

Demands for further extensions are not lacking. Recently Mr. Owen D. Young was reported to have suggested that the principle of the Monroe Doctrine might well be extended to apply to radio communication in the Western Hemisphere, thus giving the Radio Corporation of America the "effective leadership".[3] It has also been suggested that it might be invoked against the claim of Canada to the territories lying between the Dominion and the North Pole, on the theory that Canada, being a European power, is debarred by the Monroe Doctrine from acquiring additional territory in the Western Hemisphere.[4] On the theory held by some that the

[1] See especially his annual message to Congress in December 1904. *For. Rels.*, 1904, p. 441.

[2] It may be remarked that while the Senate Committee which investigated affairs in Haiti justified the intervention of the United States on the ground that "threatened intervention of the German government and the actual landing of French forces, all imperilled the Monroe Doctrine", a committee of distinguished representatives of the Foreign Policy Association who presented to Secretary Hughes a vigorous protest against the intervention of the United States told him that the American intervention was in violation of the Monroe Doctrine. *New York Times*, April 28, 1922. This incident is a good illustration of the fact that Americans themselves are not agreed as to what the Monroe Doctrine requires or forbids.

[3] Quoted by Culbertson, *International Commercial Policies*, p. 539.

[4] See the comments of David Hunter Miller respecting this claim, *Foreign*

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Monroe Doctrine confers on the United States a sort of moral mandate to preserve the peace of this continent, certain newspapers in the winter and spring of 1925-26 suggested that the United States conduct a plebiscite in Arica, in case Chile were unwilling to coöperate, and impose the decision of the electorate upon both parties, presumably by force if necessary. Again, in the same year, when it was reported that a British syndicate was negotiating for a large rubber, oil and mineral concession in Bolivia, the exploitation of which would have involved the planting of a British "colony" in that country, the question was discussed in the United States whether this would not be a violation of the Monroe Doctrine.[1] It is by no means improbable that the doctrine will be invoked against the intervention of the League of Nations in Latin America for the enforcement of the obligations of the Covenant among the American members of the League, should such intervention be attempted, especially if it should involve recourse to military sanctions, and possibly even economic sanctions.[2]

The disposition in the United States to invoke the Monroe Doctrine as a justification, in part at least, for its intervention policy in Latin America was manifested by the recent intervention in Nicaragua, when certain newspaper editors, writers and members of Congress maintained that the doctrine was involved.[3] But as Senator Borah in his criticism of the in-

Affairs, October 1925, pp. 50 *et seq.* A similar line of reasoning has been suggested as a bar to British territorial claims in the region of the South Pole. See the London *Times,* April 6, 1929.

[1] Haring, *South America Looks at the United States,* p. 103.

[2] Curiously enough, Chile in 1921, apropos of a complaint by Bolivia, invoked the Monroe Doctrine against the intervention of the League in "questions exclusively affecting countries of the New World". *Bolivia's Claim Against Chile for the Revision of the Treaty of Peace of 1904,* Geneva, 1921, p. 3. The whole question of the bearing of the Monroe Doctrine on intervention by the League in disputes among the Latin-American states is discussed in Foreign Policy Association, *Information Service,* vol. IV, no. 20 (Dec. 7, 1928), pp. 403 *et seq.* The late Professor Archibald Coolidge expressed the opinion that "the United States in its present mood will regard even the most peaceful interventions, not only of individual European States but of the League of Nations, as contrary to the Monroe Doctrine". *Foreign Affairs,* Mar. 1924, p. 387.

[3] See, for example, an article in the *Advocate of Peace* (July 1928, p. 432) by Carl W. Meyer, who so argues.

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tervention correctly pointed out, the Monroe Doctrine was not at all involved. "There is at this time", he said, "no non-American power seeking to acquire territory in Central America or in Nicaragua. There is no non-American power seeking in any way to overthrow the government of Nicaragua. I do not see in the entire situation any facts or circumstances which would justify an appeal to the Monroe Doctrine."[1] But the President, interpreting the Monroe Doctrine as imposing on the United States the duty of protecting British, Italian and other European nationals in Nicaragua—a view which represents the latest and one of the most far-reaching extensions of the doctrine—considered American intervention necessary to forestall the possible intervention of Great Britain and perhaps of other European powers. When it became known that Great Britain was contemplating the dispatch of a warship to Nicaraguan waters, certain journalists and politicians were aroused at what they appear to have suspected as an attempt to challenge or overthrow the Monroe Doctrine. Their anxiety quickly subsided, however, when the British government announced that the vessel which it contemplated sending to Nicaragua was intended to serve merely as a refuge for British nationals who might wish to escape from that country, and that there was no intention to land marines.[2] This new extension of the Monroe Doctrine (those who defend it regard it merely as a "corollary" of the original principle) will impose on the United States a difficult and delicate task, and it is certain to be attacked in Latin America, as it has been criticized in the United States, on the ground that it may be employed by the United States to justify intervention whenever in the opinion of the president or of the secretary of state there exists a possibility, however remote, that some non-American power may intervene for the protection of its own nationals. It appears to be an advance upon the Roosevelt doctrine that European governments might intervene in Latin America for the protection of their nationals so long as occupation of territory was not involved.

[1] *New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1927.

[2] *Ibid.*, Feb. 23 and 27, 1927.

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One who from the outside studies our foreign policy during the recent years might easily conclude from the vociferousness with which the vitality of the Monroe Doctrine has been asserted and the effort we have made to induce other nations to recognize formally and solemnly our exclusive right to interpret and enforce it, that we were living in constant danger of a conspiracy to undermine or overthrow it. He might also conclude that the chief object of our foreign policy in these late years has been the preservation of the doctrine in its one-hundred-per-cent purity and integrity. We cannot coöperate, it would appear, with our partners in the family of nations in any undertaking for the advancement of common interests if there is any likelihood, immediate or remote, that our collaboration may imperil or weaken in any way this sacrosanct tradition. Everything, even the advancement of the general peace and good will of the nations, must yield to its majesty.

It is hard for an impartial student to avoid the conviction that we are overworking what, reasonably interpreted, is a perfectly sound and defensible principle of our foreign policy, attributing to it a rôle out of all proportion to its actual importance and exalting it to a point which is tending to give it the character of a national obsession, if not a cult.[1] Having

[1] The great majority of American scholars and jurists who have written books or articles about it in recent years have criticized in varying degree the official attitude of the United States toward the doctrine. Among them may be mentioned the following: Blakeslee, *The Recent Foreign Policy of the United States*, chs. ii–iii; Burgess, "Pseudo-Monroeism", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. XI, pp. 44 *et seq.*; Catt, "The Monroe Doctrine and our Latin-American Relations", Foreign Policy Assoc., *Information Service*, no. 21; Chapman, "A Monroe Doctrine Divided", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. XXXVII, pp. 75 *et seq.*; C., "The Future of the Monroe Doctrine", *Foreign Affairs*, vol. II, pp. 373 *et seq.*; Hall, *The Monroe Doctrine and the Great War*, ch. vii; Haring, *South America Looks at the United States*, ch. vi; Henderson, *American Diplomatic Questions*, pp. 446 *et seq.*; Hull, *The Monroe Doctrine*, ch. ii; Inman, *Problems in Pan-Americanism*, ch. v; Moon, *Imperialism and World Politics*, ch. xvi; Page, *The Monroe Doctrine and World Peace*; Rippy, *Latin America in World Politics*, pp. 265 *et seq.*; Rowe, "Misconceptions and Limitations of the Monroe Doctrine", *Proceedings Amer. Soc. Int. Law*, 1914, pp. 126 *et seq.*; Shepherd, "The Monroe Doctrine Reconsidered", POLITICAL SCIENCE QUARTERLY, vol. XXXIX, pp. 35 *et seq.*; Shuster, "Is There a Sound American Foreign Policy?", *Century Magazine*, vol. LXV, pp. 233 *et seq.*; Stuart, *Latin America and the United States*, ch. ii; Thomas, *One Hundred Years of the*

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successfully insisted upon recognition of it in the Covenant of the League and having in our ratification of the Kellogg Pact reserved the right to fight for the maintenance of it, we are now demanding that whenever we enter into an arbitration treaty with a non-American country we must reserve the right to decide for ourselves any dispute upon which we may choose to spread the mantle of James Monroe, and it is by no means improbable that when the Senate comes to consider the Inter-American arbitration treaty of January 5, 1929, it will insist that the same reservation shall be applied to arbitration engagements with the Latin-American countries.

In these circumstances it is a fair question to raise, where is this movement to end? Will the next step be a demand that homage shall be rendered it in the preambles of all treaties which we conclude in the future somewhat as in the preambles of early treaties the parties began by an appeal to the Deity? To put on record the citizen who goes abroad and who may be exposed to the danger of having his faith in it shaken, it might be desirable to require applicants for passports to take an oath of allegiance to it. To insure the loyalty to it of our foreign-born citizens, applicants for naturalization might be required to take a similar oath. Finally, the president might in his annual Thanksgiving proclamation call on the nation to render it homage and express their gratitude for the blessings which it has conferred upon us!

That the Monroe Doctrine was a wise and justifiable policy and that it may have saved Latin America from European aggression no one will deny. But all the signs indicate that its objects have already been accomplished—that its chief contribution lies in the past, not in the future. The occasions when it may be legitimately invoked by the United States in

Monroe Doctrine, especially ch. xxv; Whitton, "L'Isolement des États Unis, principe caduc de la doctrine de Monroe", *Rev. Gén. de Droit Int. Pub.,* 3d ser., t. I (1927), pp. 45 *et seq.*; Woolsey, *America's Foreign Policy,* pp. 223 *et seq.*—J. W. G.

The *Memorandum on the Monroe Doctrine* prepared by J. Reuben Clark, undersecretary of state, and published by the Government Printing Office, Washington, 1930, was not made available until after this article was written. —ED.

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the future—that is, for defense and security against European or Asiatic aggression—are likely to be few, if any.

The Holy Alliance against which it was directed has long since disappeared and nothing comparable to it exists in Europe or Asia today. The European monarchical "system" to which Monroe adverted in his message has been replaced by a variety of "systems", most of them democratic in form and in spirit. There is probably no country in Europe or Asia that will ever again challenge the Monroe Doctrine, certainly so long as it is interpreted by the United States as a policy of protection and defense—and its authoritative expositors have repeatedly denied that it has any other object. The more powerful republics of South America, while disclaiming any further need of its protection (they cannot understand, they say, why Uncle Sam insists on holding an umbrella over them when there is not even a cloud from the east), have no objection to its assertion by the United States as a policy for its own defense.

They do not ask us to abandon it; they acclaimed its pronouncement with enthusiasm, they have often expressed their gratitude to the great nation which was responsible for it and paid glowing tributes to the memory of the illustrious President whose name it bears. They regarded it as a guarantee, in the days of their infancy and weakness, of the independence which they had won by force of arms and which the United States was the first to recognize.

What they do complain of is the insistence on the part of the United States to be the sole and exclusive judge of what it means, and of the extensions which have been given it—extensions which they feel, rightly or wrongly, have transformed it from a policy of national defense for the United States into an instrument of North American tutelage and hegemony over them.

If the United States is unwilling to give them a consultative voice in the interpretation of the Monroe Doctrine when their own rights and interests are effected, it might at least, they insist, reformulate the doctrine or restate it more precisely as we on our part understand it today, so as to render it less

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susceptible of elastic interpretation by succeeding presidents and secretaries of state.[1]

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[1] It was reported in a press dispatch from Washington in April, 1929, that President Hoover was convinced that there was some basis at least for the Latin-American complaints and that it was his desire to do something to remove their cause. The dispatch stated that the President and the Secretary of State were working upon a reformulation and restatement of the Monroe Doctrine which it was hoped might remove this important cause of Latin-American criticism. It was further stated that the restatement was being undertaken at the suggestion of Senator Borah, who felt that in recent years "constructions" had been placed upon the doctrine which gave it a meaning far beyond its original purpose or its present necessity. I am informed by the Senator that he was not aware of the intention which this press dispatch attributed to the President. He confirms, however, the opinion which the dispatch attributed to himself. The Monroe Doctrine, he says, has been "most erroneously construed" in a way that has necessarily made it offensive to the South American countries. "It has always seemed to me," he says, "that we ought to make it plain to the people of South America and to the people of the world that we claim nothing under the Monroe Doctrine not plainly implied in its original terms", and he adds that reliance upon it to justify our interventions in the domestic affairs of the Latin-American states is "wholly unjustified". Senator Borah's views are elaborated in a speech made in the Senate on Jan. 11, 1927. (See *New York Times*, Jan. 12, 1927.) In this speech he said: "Those who believe in the Monroe Doctrine and think it of vital importance to this country are doing it a great disservice by undertaking to invoke it in aid of any kind of interference in the countries of Central and South America".

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RECENT BOOKS ON THE PACIFIC AREA

NOT so many years ago it was the fashion to speak of the westward trend of civilization from the eastern to the western Mediterranean, then to the Atlantic Ocean, and, in a future epoch, to the Pacific area. At the special session of the American Historical Association in San Francisco, in connection with the Pan-Pacific International Exposition, Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Morse Stevens spoke of the Pacific as the scene of momentous future developments. Events, however, have not yet fulfilled such anticipations, and the beginning of the expected Pacific Episode in history seems to have become merged in a world movement.

The Pacific, indeed, has been spanned by radio and traversed by aircraft. Its immense space, yielding to science, is becoming just a part of the new world order. The " Pacific area ", therefore, cannot be considered apart from other world problems. The lands bordering the greatest ocean have their several problems, to be sure, but they are in contact with the rest of the world and their difficulties as well as their hopes are intimately related to the changing world order. In particular the adoption of the Kellogg Pact and the recent progress in international agreements and international practice have signally changed the Pacific situation. This must be borne in mind as we discuss the books now under review.

One group of books is significant because it represents the rapid development of coöperative research and conference. Believing that Pacific problems might fruitfully be studied by round table methods, a group with its nucleus in Honolulu evolved a project which materialized in the Institute of Pacific Relations. The Institute's first session in Honolulu in the summer of 1925, attended by delegates from most of the countries bordering on the Pacific, was intended not only to establish personal contacts between leaders, but also to promote the dissemination of information in all the countries represented. For the latter purpose, the report of the conference was edited, largely by Dr. Herbert E. Gregory of the Bishop Museum, and was published as a working manual for those who had attended the conference.[1] It is still of value and has no small interest as an indication of the status of opinions in 1925.

[1] *Institute of Pacific Relations.* Published by the Institute of Pacific Relations, Honolulu, Hawaii, 1925.—210 pp.

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The first session of the Institute discovered the need of research. To meet the felt need of accurate information, a research program was set up, and the delegations from various countries (European nations being now included) prepared careful statements as a basis for the discussions at the second session. These statements make up the first sixty-five pages of the second report of the Institute of Pacific Relations.[1] The report, issued in attractive book form, includes also a reasonably successful summary of round table discussions, some thirty-three documents, eight maps, a report of the conference, and a list showing the documentary material distributed to members. Considered as a whole the volume is of substantial permanent value. The topics treated range from Progessor Gregory's paper on the geography of the Pacific to Herbert Croly's discussion of "The Human Potential in Pacific Politics".

The success of the Institute of Pacific Relations was one of the circumstances which led a group of public-minded men in Los Angeles to organize a similar institute, the Institute of International Relations, in 1926. This new organization, under the capable leadership of Dr. R. B. von Kleinsmid, president of the University of Southern California, has held five sessions since its first meeting at Riverside, California, and has succeeded in drawing the universities, colleges and various other institutions of the western part of the United States into more effective collaboration on Pacific problems. Its reports,[2] issued in book form, are much more than records of the trend of opinion. Many of the articles are of lasting value. The number and range of such contributions, however, would discourage any attempt at detailed criticism.

The value of the conference method as a stimulus to useful research may be illustrated by the monograph prepared by Dr. Eliot Grinnell Mears, discussed at the Institute of Pacific Relations at

[1] *Problems of the Pacific.* Edited by J. B. Condliffe. Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1928.—615 pp. $3.00.

[2] *Proceedings of the Institute of International Relations. Volume I.* Edited by Karl C. Leebrick and J. Eugene Harley. Los Angeles, University of Southern California, 1927.—181 pp. $4.00. *Volume II.* Edited by J. Eugene Harley. Los Angeles, University of Southern California, 1928.—211 pp. *The Pacific Area.* Edited by Charles E. Martin and K. C. Leebrick. Seattle, The University of Washington Press, 1929.—xi, 401 pp. *Proceedings of the Institute of International Relations.* Edited by Rufus B. von Kleinsmid and Herbert Wynford Hill. Los Angeles, University of Southern California, 1929.—240 pp. $4.00.

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Honolulu, and subsequently presented in book form.[1] As Dr. Mears' work has been subjected to the acid test of searching criticism, it may be safely described as authoritative. The body of the book is a well written discussion of the legal and economic problems of resident Orientals in the western part of the United States. The charts and compilations and the documents supplementing the text are exceedingly valuable.

Similar in origin and of equal value is the excellent little volume on *Oriental Exclusion*,[2] by Dr. R. D. McKenzie. After an able presentation of the social as well as the legal and political aspects of the question, the author reaches the conclusion that the solution of the immigration problem is not impossible. "Human emigration", he writes, "must be controlled. In our modern world of high fluidity there is too much random movement. To allow human beings to migrate at will from one part of the world to another is to invite waste and to precipitate conflict. On the other hand, it must be remembered that in a dynamic highly specialized world migration seems to be the only feasible way of maintaining economic equilibrium and of exploiting the resources of undeveloped regions. There is need at present as never before of a sound and rational immigration policy acceptable to all nations concerned". This little volume will long remain a standard book of reference on the question of Oriental exclusion.

An example of the type of research and writing done on the Pacific Coast in preparation for Institute meetings is to be found in a small volume entitled *Problems in International Understanding*,[3] edited by Dr. Martin and Miss Dobie, and containing five papers on problem of the Pacific area, an equal number on the International Mind, and four on International Technique. These papers were first presented as lectures at the University of Washington and proved so popular that they were printed for more general distribution. They make a useful and very readable contribution to a general understanding of the situation in the Pacific.

Several of the volumes recently published for the use of college

[1] *Resident Orientals on the American Pacific Coast.* By Eliot Grinnell Mears. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1928.—xix, 528 pp. $3.00.

[2] *Oriental Exclusion.* By R. D. McKenzie. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1928.—xv, 200 pp. $2.00.

[3] *Problems in International Understanding.* By H. H. Gowen, R. D. McKenzie and others. Seattle, University of Washington Book Store, 1928.—199 pp.

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classes are actually much more than textbooks. They are in effect exceedingly readable and comprehensive surveys, written by seasoned scholars. Dr. Gowen's *Outline History of Japan*[1] was intended as a college text for American students of Japanese history, but it is also available to the general reader who desires an interesting interpretation of Japan by an author long resident in that country and intimately in contact with its leaders. While he made specific use of few sources in the Japanese language, Dr. Gowen has had the collaboration of competent Japanese scholars and is a master of the literature of the subject. Perhaps he is too readily inclined to regard the Japanese movement as being similar to those of western democracies and too optimistic in his portrayal of popular movements for liberty. If he errs in this direction, the fault is a kindly one.

Another text whose appeal reaches beyond academic halls is *A Short History of China* by Dr. E. T. Williams.[2] This fine piece of bookmaking, delightfully illustrated in black and white, brings to the reader the rich fruits of a life spent in official service in China and in scholarly study of Chinese annals. Dr. Williams has long been known as one of the most careful students of Chinese history and politics. He was so intimately acquainted with Chinese aspirations at the Paris Peace Conference and at the Washington Conference that the pages on the post-war period must be considered as primary sources. The final chapter is an attempt to evaluate the rapidly moving panorama of a nation undergoing revolution, and was somewhat out of date when it came off the press, so rapidly have events moved. This necessary shortcoming is a small defect in a book the bulk of which is devoted to giving a short but scholarly interpretation of China's long history prior to 1900. The reviewer happens to be more interested in the final third of the volume, and less capable of judging the value of the earlier two-thirds, readable and well arranged as they are.

Without doubt the best general text on the Far East as a whole has been written by Dr. Treat.[3] This admirable volume is a result of more than twenty years of teaching, travel and study by a capable

[1] *An Outline History of Japan.* By Herbert H. Gowen. New York and London, D. Appleton and Company, 1927.—448 pp. $4.00.

[2] *A Short History of China.* By Edward Thomas Williams. New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1928.—xxii, 652 pp. $4.00.

[3] *The Far East.* By Payson J. Treat. New York and London, Harper and Brothers, 1928.—xlii, 529 pp. $5.00.

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and painstaking student. Guy Stanton Ford justly remarks in the editorial foreword that the author has not only "sought to know the peoples he writes about and to master the sources made available in increasing volume recently for the diplomatic history of the Pacific powers", but he has also, as a teacher, tested the presentation now made available to the public. The subject matter is divided into three parts. The first, covering Chinese history from the earliest times to 1895, is necessarily condensed, but progressive and clear. In Part 2, on "Japan to 1895", one feels that the author is treading more familiar ground, where he enjoys the advantage of long study and writing on Japanese affairs. The viewpoint for Part 3 ("The Far East, 1895-1927") is indicated by the opening chapter, "The United States Becomes an Asiatic Power". The problems of adjustment created by imperialism afford a meaningful background, just now, for an understanding of the policies of Russia, Japan, and China in the development of their hinterlands. The events described in the chapter on the "Far East in the World War" are frequently overlooked at the present time. Likewise the chapter on "Recent Politics" makes interesting reading in light of still more recent events and bears testimony to the accuracy of the observation of the author and to his keenness of judgment. When such broad subjects are dealt with in so limited a space, there is naturally much opportunity for difference of opinion on certain disputed points, notably in the chapters on "Japan and Korea" and "The United States and the Philippines", or other chapters depending upon the special interest of the reader. The final chapter on "Orientals in the United States" is almost too brief to be of much value but at least has the merit of bringing the matter into consideration in such a review of Far Eastern problems as this valuable text endeavors to present. The bibliographies at the ends of the chapters and the eleven pages of bibliographical notes at the end of the volume are particularly excellent.

G. C. Allen's *Modern Japan and Its Problems*[1] is a well written book by an excellent observer who is concerned to substitute realistic descriptive studies for unsound opinion about Japan. The "Fiction of the Yellow Peril" is as sanely avoided as the "Cherry Blossoms Delusion". Mr. Allen shows marked insight into the social and economic practices current in Japan and into the social life of the Japanese people. His treatment of Japanese character, especially

[1] *Modern Japan and Its Problems.* By G. C. Allen. New York, E. P. Dutton and Company, 1927.—ix, 222 pp. $3.00.

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as regards honesty, is a welcome corrective for a misunderstanding which has been difficult to correct. Many readers will be surprised to learn that the efficiency of Japanese culture in promoting social solidarity has cost heavily in the stifling of genius, of criticism and of innovation.

The position and function of the Emperor and of the Elder Statesmen and the apparent augmentation of the Privy Council's powers are set forth in simple terms. The incommensurability of these with Occidental institutions is indicated. The East cannot be expected to work the machinery of Western political systems satisfactorily in an unsympathetic atmosphere. Oriental institutions, in fact, have their own laws of development, which may be very different from those of Europe, and progress lies, not in slavishly copying what may be quite unsuited to the temperament and social organization of the race, but in the discovery of those laws and in obedience to them.

The educational system and the unique character and life of the student class are described by one who obviously knows them at first hand. The efficiency of that system in producing capable servants of the state, and its inefficiency in producing independent thinkers, are analyzed succinctly.

The author himself is, apparently, an economist, and his chapters on "The Rise of Industry", "The Present Economic Structure", "Banking and Finance" and "The Population Problem", though in non-technical form, are authoritative. The omission from Japanese industrial development of a stage based on "*laissez-faire*" individualism, and the speedy, government-facilitated organization of large industrial units in harmony with the prevailing tendency in the West, may be contrasted with the failure of the banking system to become centralized in similar fashion. The distinction between industries which serve the special demands of the Japanese public itself, which have remained on a small-production, decentralized, pre-mechanized basis, and those that cater to the demands of export trade or of new tastes and processes developed through the partial Westernization of Japan, which latter industries have developed along highly mechanized "modern" lines, is excellently drawn, and is fundamental to an understanding of Japan's economic life, perhaps of her entire cultural life.

The discussion of the present economic system corrects the impression, left by a survey of Japan's recent economic history, "that the economic structure of the country had already assumed a form

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identical with that of the West. . . . Perhaps the most interesting of Japan's economic problems are those which have arisen from the attempt of an Oriental society, based on groups, to work an economic system which had been created by the individualistic West" (p. 137). This situation shows itself, among other ways, in the relation between the family system, the character of Japanese consumption, and the typical course of business depressions.

If Japanese civilization could be adequately portrayed by a description of the agencies governing the channels of public information, the case for Japan would be sorry indeed. The real values of Japanese civilization, which lie elsewhere, are too often obscured by the guileful labors of Japan's chauvinist propagandists. Harry Emerson Wildes, a former professor of economics at Keio University, has written a book[1] which affords an antidote for propaganda. Although he seems careful to quote mainly from pro-Japanese sources so as to avoid affront to Japanese sentiment, his work is for the most part scientific and dispassionate. Residents of the Far East can amply corroborate his main contentions. His title, *Social Currents in Japan,* seems not well chosen. Only incidentally and partially does Mr. Wildes deal with that subject. He does present, however, a valuable study of the sources, distribution and publication of news in Japan and about Japan in other lands. The book is of particular value to students of the press and of public opinion. Among other topics it presents: the history of the press in Japan; an analysis of the "peculiar status" of the press under a government of almost theological omnipotence and omniscience, operative in ways far more subtle and effective than the visible threat of the censor; the relation of press and government and the latter's attempts to "clarify and filter" the news; the maliciously anti-foreign activities of the press; the attitude of "misunderstood Japan"; the English-language press and its unusual situation and influence in Japan. There are invaluable chapters on the personnel and mechanism of Japanese propaganda abroad, propaganda that strangely combines wholesome service to international understanding with skilful misleading and perversion of foreign public opinion.

By way of contrast, we turn to a "pleasing travel book", Douglas Haring's *The Land of Gods and Earthquakes*,[2] beautifully printed

[1] *Social Currents in Japan.* By Harry Emerson Wildes. Chicago, University of Chicago Press, 1927.—xiii, 375 pp. $3.00.

[2] *The Land of Gods and Earthquakes.* By Douglas Haring. New York, Columbia University Press, 1929.—203 pp. $3.50.

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by the Columbia University Press and embellished with illustrations which are almost like prints. The book is just what it claims to be, an interestingly written description by one who through long residence has learned to understand and admire Japan without losing his critical judgment or becoming an apologist. There are occasional touches of humor and many epigrammatical statements that delight even the most casual reader. The chapter on "Signs" is a delight. Without being too critical, one cannot but wonder at the brevity of the little chapters on "Drumming Up Religion" and "Militarism". Perhaps if these topics were dealt with at greater length, the book would become other than it is—a pleasing reading journey into certain places in Japan and an exploration of Japanese characteristics.

When one picks up *The Restless Pacific*,[1] particularly if one knows Mr. Roosevelt's other books, he anticipates an essay on some phase of preparedness necessitated by a clash of international interests. In a sense, he is pleasantly disappointed. The book ably emphasizes the legal and economic fundamentals and aims to give the reader "a sense of the unity of the Pacific area, and a realization of the interrelation between the politics of Europe and eastern Asia and their effect on America's interests". Mr. Roosevelt, unlike the reviewer, believes that "the theatre of world-events has shifted from the Atlantic to the Pacific".

This volume is attractively printed and makes interesting and stimulating reading. One is grateful to Mr. Roosevelt whether one agrees with his point of view or not. In some measure the book is an indictment of Japan. Still Mr. Roosevelt tries to be fair. For instance, on page 109 he states, "In Japan, as elsewhere, the imperialists have never remained long enough in power to carry through all their plans. Policy has rarely been consistent." And on the following page, "It is only fair to Japan to point out that this policy of aggrandizement was not motivated solely by lust of conquest. There were, to be sure, important strategic considerations. The control of Korea, for example, was deemed essential to protect Japan from invasion by Russia."

In the same chapter he does not hesitate to indict the United States, as on page 120, "No greater diplomatic blunder has been made by the American Government than the effort to bring about the internationalization of the South Manchurian Railway. The plan

[1] *The Restless Pacific*. By Nicholas Roosevelt. New York and London, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1928.—xx, 283 pp. $3.00.

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was a gratuitous slap at Japan. It impugned her good faith and her efficiency." In chapter 10, the author reviews the Russian program and flatly accuses Russia of imperialistic policies. Speaking of the change from the Czar's government to that of the Soviet, he says: "But the objective remained the same, and it is a safe prediction that if a democratic or other government replaces the Soviets, its foreign policy will differ from that of its predecessors only in method, not in ultimate aims" (p. 123). "Nothing less than the mastery of Asia was—and is—at stake. Russia, the great continental power, European in origin but Asiatic by destiny, dreams of restoring the empire of the Mongol Khans, and, her strength based on the wealth of old Asia, taking her place as leader in world affairs" (p. 126).

His point of view toward Great Britain is given in the title of chapter 11, "Britain, the Conservator". He says that Great Britain is gradually receding from her present position in the Far East and there have been indications in recent years that Great Britain is slowly falling back on Singapore as the last outpost in eastern Asia (p. 144). That he guessed wrongly at the time of writing is indicated by the statement on page 147 that "it is not impossible that Britain's proverbial partiality for compromise will in time result in support for the division of China into North and South, the former under Japanese, the latter under British nominal guardianship". This quotation also, I think, more than any other, indicates that Mr. Roosevelt sees "The Restless Pacific" only through the eyes of one interested in the political and military angles.

It would be difficult to find in short compass a better general statement of the interests of the minor European powers in Asia than that contained in chapter 13, which he has named "The Rest of Europe in Asia".

Some Americans will agree and others will smile at Mr. Roosevelt's statement that "the United States has been peculiarly free from ulterior political motives in her China policy" (p. 181), and "Furthermore, the United States has never been partial to military intervention leading toward the seizure or policing of portions of Chinese territory", but nevertheless this contention can be stoutly maintained.

America's general position in the Far East is discussed in chapter 15. Here he takes the viewpoint of another writer and criticizes the United States for not improving her opportunities in the Philippines. On pages 194 and 195 he states: "This, despite the American genius for organization and mass production, we have failed to do during

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the last quarter-century. In fact, we have even gone so far as to prevent ourselves by act of Congress from developing the islands. It was the Americans and not the Filipinos who restricted the holdings of agricultural lands by corporations to 2,560 acres of owned and another 2,560 acres of leased public lands. It is the Americans who are to blame for the continued unstable political conditions in the islands." One is glad to see him careful in his statement of the importance of rubber potentialities, but even so he leaves the wrong impression that rubber is, or is sure to be, a real economic factor in the Philippines.

The real purpose of the book appears in section VI, "The Balance of Power in the Pacific". Chapter 19, "The Naval Arm of Diplomacy", takes the point of view that "A direct relation exists between naval strength and foreign policy." Mr. Roosevelt is an apt pupil of Admiral Mahan. He is also somewhat of an alarmist. Although he takes pains to state that "Today, fortunately, the likelihood of war between the United States and Japan seems almost negligible" (p. 266), a little later (p. 269) he complains bitterly that at the Washington Conference the United States sacrificed naval supremacy in exchange for "the acclaim of the sentimentalists of all countries and of the 'hard-boiled' in England and Japan".

In the final pages of his book Mr. Roosevelt reaches the conclusion: "Although America is destined by her wealth and strength to have a preponderant share in the affairs of the Pacific, her influence will be continually subjected to the counterplays of European policies and ambitions" (p. 282). "America must be prepared to throw her weight against any nation which threatens to disrupt world peace. She is not, nor ever has been, 'isolated'. But it is to her advantage to preserve complete freedom of action, so that she may the better carry out the policy of co-operation without commitments, of independence without isolation, which has been hers since the founding of the Republic" (p. 283).

From a very different standpoint Scott Nearing has attempted to forecast the future of eastern Asia.[1] To the question inscribed on the titlepage, *Whither China?*, Mr. Nearing answers "into the arms of Russia". Starting out with the supposition that "it is impossible for journalists and scholars who regard capitalist society as an end-product to fathom the changes that are now taking place in Asia", Mr. Nearing valiantly attempted "to apply the yardstick of

[1] *Whither China?* By Scott Nearing. New York, International Publishers, 1927.—vi, 216 pp. $1.75.

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modern social science to recent events and present tendencies in Asia". In preparation for his task, he visited China, but he took with him so much in the way of prejudice and preconception that he might almost as well have remained at home. His brief review of historical events, full of misstatements and misinterpretations of fact, is intended to support the thesis that China has already "crumpled the cutting edge of imperialism" and will play a leading part in the movement against capitalistic imperialism. "A new social form is emerging in Eurasia under the spiritual leadership of the U. S. S. R., but with the material resources and the business capacity of the Chinese as the main driving power". It may be noted that as a guide to certain trends of opinion, Mr. Nearing's footnote citations of periodical literature are quite as interesting as his text.

A clearer and kindlier atmosphere pervades Dr. Paul Monroe's readable, well illustrated and well informed book on *China, a Nation in Evolution*.[1] Dr. Monroe is a keen critic and an expert observer, and has made numerous visits to China. His book is written "for the average American, puzzled by the complexity of the problem, by the strangeness of the names of places and of people; confused by the contradictory character of the news; yet earnestly desirous of understanding". He has more than succeeded in his modest intention of affording his readers glimpses through "the opaque walls" separating two great peoples. The Chinese proverb, "He who would understand both the past and the present must read five cartloads of books", is quoted by Dr. Monroe in apology for "a book for laymen by a layman". His own work would at least be one of the most interesting in the five cartloads. Particularly illuminating are the chapters on "Institutions and Social Background", "Sun Yat Sen, the People's Nationalist Party, and the Nationalist Movement" and "Modern Education and the Student Movement". The last, together with the following chapter on "Christianity and Mission Work", may be considered the best part of the volume, for in educational matters Dr. Monroe writes with unquestioned authority. An interesting chapter on "The Chinese Puzzle—from Inside Looking Out" attempts to take the Chinese viewpoint in evaluating recent movements. His closing sentences are coupled with an appeal: "Not until these antiquated conceptions and conditions are modernized and based on justice, efficiency, and good will, will the problem of China be solved. Then China will enter another stage of her

[1] *China, a Nation in Evolution.* By Paul Monroe. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928.—xiv, 432 pp. $3.50.

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long, slow, painful evolution into a modern nationality and an assured place in the world of modern nations. Shall not America say with the great humanitarian of a century ago: 'We take our stand with those who are struggling out of darkness into light.'"

If Arthur Ransome in his entertaining little book on *The Chinese Puzzle*[1] contributes little to a solution of the puzzle, it is perhaps because he holds that "it is something that primarily concerns the Chinese". Addressing his warning to his fellow-countrymen in England, he continues, "the problem of our relations with China, while it compels us to watch with the closest interest the attempt of the Chinese to solve their puzzle, does not compel us to join in that rather uproarious puzzle-solving". In genial temper, therefore, Mr. Ransome is able to pause in his discussion of political and diplomatic questions while he draws graphic character sketches of men like Eugene Chen, that remarkable man who "knows English, if anything, too well"; or Borodin, who was in effect "a good gramophone", sent by the Soviets with one record to play for Cantonese ears. Chinese generals climb to power by skill, energy and rapacity. Mr. Ransome concludes that in the face of present difficulties, England should "think of her relations with China in the next century". As a Chinese proverb puts it, "A rich man thinks of the future, a poor man of the present". Lloyd George, in an introduction, sums up the thought of the author in characteristic blunt sentences: "Our interests and China's interests are identical. We both want peace and we both want trade. If we continue to insult and exasperate each other we are likely before long to have neither."

China and the Occident,[2] by George Nye Steiger, is an informing book under a misleading title. As indicated in the preface, the manuscript was "originally submitted to the Faculty of Harvard University in partial satisfaction of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy, and this study of the Boxer Movement has since been entirely rewritten with the addition of much new material. It is now offered to the reading public in the hope that it may contribute to a clearer appreciation of the modern problems of China and the West" (p. xiii). It would have been better if the title, "The Boxer Movement", had been used even for the revision, as can be seen by merely listing the chapters: "The Chinese State and

[1] *The Chinese Puzzle*. By Arthur Ransome. Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1927.—189 pp. $2.00.

[2] *China and the Occident*. By George Nye Steiger. New Haven, Yale University Press, 1927.—xiii, 333 pp. $3.50.

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the Opening of Western Relations", "The Opening of China", "Consequences of Shimonoseki", "The 'Battle of Concessions' and the 'Hundred Days'", "The Empress Dowager and Conservative Reform", "Foreign Relations after the Coup d'Etat", "The Boxers: 'I-ho Chuan' or 'I-ho Tuan'", "The Boxers in Shantung and Chihli", "Diplomatic Pressure at Peking", "The Crisis: May 28—June 20, 1900", "The I-ho Chuan in the Provinces", "The Reckoning", "Conclusion". The appendices make available certain documents which throw light upon this troublous epoch of Chinese history. The book is of value as a careful monograph on the Boxer period.

Chi Li, author of *The Formation of the Chinese People*,[1] also received his Ph.D. from Harvard University and one suspects that this book, like Dr. Steiger's, has a close relationship to a doctor's thesis. The opening sentences of Dr. Li's preface adequately indicate the nature of this volume: "In preparing this book I have tried to combine the zoological and the genetic methods. At present, there are hardly enough facts for a thorough study of this problem; yet, by making use of both the historical material and the anthropometrical data, one sees this problem in a different light and finds a new angle of approach. It is not merely an attempt to make a compromise between the ways of the older school of the Chinese historians, who rely almost entirely on past records for their work, and those of the Western anthropologists, who have frequently oversimplified the problem." Only scholars well versed in anthropology and ethnology will be competent to appreciate the intensive research which has gone into the making of this book.

The Development of Extraterritoriality in China[2] by G. W. Keeton will bring joy to all scholars and teachers who deal with the difficult question of extraterritoriality. Mr. Keeton has produced an authoritative work, well written, and printed with a minimum of evident errors. I turn to the author himself for a statement of his aim. "The present work", he says, "is not a history of foreign jurisdiction in China. It is something less, and (it is hoped) something more. The author's aim has been to present an explanation of extraterritoriality—to show the difficulties existing in early European intercourse at Canton, arising on the one hand from the uncer-

[1] *The Formation of the Chinese People.* By Chi Li. Cambridge, Harvard University Press, 1928.—viii, 283 pp. $5.00.

[2] *The Development of Extraterritoriality in China.* By G. W. Keeton. 2 vols. New York, Longmans, Green and Company, 1928.—xi, 405, 402 pp. $15.00.

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tain attitude of the Chinese officials towards the jurisdiction issue, and, on the other, from the insufficient authority over their nationals with which the great European monopolist trading companies were invested; to demonstrate why it was impossible to admit the Chinese claim to jurisdiction over foreigners; and then to describe the system which was erected upon the inadequate foundation of the treaties, and to show how it operates in practice" (p. v). Mr. Keeton's two volumes not only reach these objectives; they constitute a veritable encyclopedia. More than 225 pages of appendices add to the value of this comprehensive treatment. The author has so well summarized his own conclusions that the reviewer need do no more than quote: "The system is not an ideal one, and its defects have not been overlooked; but it is submitted that a study of China's foreign relations in the last two centuries proves extraterritoriality to have been an inevitable condition of intercourse. That it is a temporary condition, the recent report of the Extraterritoriality Commission sufficiently shows; but it is a condition which must remain until a single government, whose authority is recognized in every Chinese province, is established. Chinese statesmen, indeed, admit as much, and the Western sympathizer with China's struggle towards full nationhood can only regret that the efforts of those statesmen—evidenced, amongst many other things, by such solid achievements as the new Law Codes—have hitherto not been permitted to reach their logical conclusion."

In concluding this composite review the writer realizes that it has been impossible to give in such small compass adequate reviews of so many books. Not as an oracle, but simply as one interested in this field of study, he undertook the task suggested to him in the hope that a broad survey of recent literature on the problems of the Pacific might have a modest utility if in some small measure it helped the people of the Occident to understand the people of the Orient.

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LAW AND ACCIDENT IN HISTORY

SOONER or later the historical practitioner, if philosophically minded, pauses in his professional labors to meditate upon the processes of history. The result is likely to be an interpretative essay or an occasional academic address. In the case of Mr. John Buchan, it is the Rede Lecture for 1929, delivered by him at Cambridge and since published.[1] Though very brief—it can be read from cover to cover in a quarter of an hour—this is distinctly not negligible. It invites reflection upon two different ways of thinking about the past. There are historians who look upon historical development as subject to what they regard as controlling laws. Others are impressed with what seem to have been chance occurrences and their momentous consequences.

A great deal of history, from first to last, has been written in the shadow of St. Augustine and the theological doctrine of predestination. Events have been viewed as taking place under an overruling Providence; the historic process has been seen as an unfolding of the changeless Will of God. St. Augustine is not one of the patrons of our modern historical guilds, and no great amount of history is written nowadays avowedly from the predestinarian premise. But it would be rash to deny that habits of thought formed when Theology was the Queen of Sciences have contributed to the attitude of some modern historians who profess that their point of view is purely scientific. The following extract from Professor Cheyney's *Law in History and Other Essays* illustrates this attitude:

> Examined closely, weighed and measured carefully, set in true perspective, the personal, the casual, the individual influences in history sink in significance and great cyclical forces loom up. Events come of themselves, so to speak; that is, they come so consistently and unavoidably as to rule out as causes not only physical phenomena, but voluntary human action. . . . Providence, fate, destiny, law, has controlled the affairs of man, as it has of men, as it controls all things. . . . Human history, like the stars, has been controlled by immutable, self-existent law, by what Mr. Gladstone in his sonorous eloquence once described in Parliament as "those great social forces which move on in their might and majesty, and which the tumult of our debates does not for a moment impede or disturb."

[1] *The Causal and the Casual in History.* Cambridge, Cambridge University Press, 1929; 46 pp.

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The other point of view was thus clearly expressed by Seeley in his *Expansion of England*:

> Historians are sometimes ridiculed for indulging in conjectures about what would have followed in history if some one event had fallen out differently. "So gloriously unpractical!" we exclaim. Now it is not for the sake of practice, but for the sake of theory that such conjectures are hazarded, and I think historians should deal in them much more than they do. It is an illusion to suppose that great public events, because they are on a grander scale, have something more fatally necessary about them than ordinary private events; and this illusion enslaves the judgment. To form any opinion or estimate of a great national policy is impossible so long as you refuse even to imagine any other policy pursued.

The first historian whom I have quoted proceeds, with all due modesty and without any pretense to finality, to formulate certain tendencies which he sees at work in history and which he thinks of as laws of history, "to be reckoned with, much as are the laws of gravitation, or of chemical affinity, or of organic evolution, or of human psychology." We need not concern ourselves here with these particular tendencies, but rather with the reasoning which seems to him to afford justification for regarding them as laws.

> On the morning of the tenth of August, 1588 [he writes], the last and most eventful day of the running fight of the English fleet with the Spanish Armada, the wind blew steadily from the southwest. As the day wore on it rose to the force of a gale; the Spanish ships as they emerged from the harbor of Calais, unmanageable and harried by the English, drove northward before the wind, past the mouth of the Scheldt, for which they were bound, and through the North Sea, till after a long and stormy course around Scotland and Ireland, broken and scattered, they regained the Spanish and Portuguese harbors. If the wind on that critical day had blown from some other quarter, the Invincible Armada might have justified its name and effected the invasion of England. What an overwhelming influence on the course of events to be exercised by a mere vagary of the weather! . . . Although the wind blew from the southwest on the tenth of August, 1588, it did not blow adversely for the Spaniards through the whole eighteen years of the Elizabethan war. Yet Spain never successfully invaded England. Moreover, as we compare the two countries it becomes doubtful whether, even if Spanish troops had landed on the shores of England, any serious influence would have been exerted on the general course of the history of the two countries. Spain, overstrained by too ambitious undertakings, unsupported by adequate economic resources, deficient in statesmanship, was an anæmic giant, holding her predominance in Europe with a constantly slackening hand. England, of youthful vigor, hardening Protestantism, rapidly increasing

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wealth, an exhilarating sense of her own nationality, was of almost unlimited, if undisciplined, powers, and was especially resistant to all forms of foreign control. Whether a Spanish or an English wind blew on a certain day really made little difference. England was bound to remain independent of Spain.

It will be remarked, in the foregoing, that the southwest wind of August tenth, 1588, is considered to be the decisive cause of the failure of the Armada to reach England. Assuming that this opinion is correct, we are not concerned with the blowing of the wind during the following years. What actually prevented the Duke of Parma's veterans from coming to grips with the English militia was that southwest wind, and the causes of this were wholly unrelated to "great cyclical forces". It is not asserted that there was Design in that wind, but merely that it was immaterial to the final result, which was determined by historic law. England, we are asked to believe, was "bound" to remain independent of Spain as the planets are "bound" to remain in their orbits.

Now with regard to the planets, they do not remain in their orbits because of the law of gravitation. The non-scientific mind is perhaps disposed to look upon natural law with undue reverence. For the scientist, who is more familiar with its character, it has no coercive power over phenomena; it is not a mandate which they *must obey*. For him it is nothing other than a generalized statement or description of what is observed to happen. It is provisional truth, not ultimate truth. As a scientist he is not concerned with ultimate truth, which he leaves to those (perhaps including himself in his non-scientific moments) who believe that it is possible to transcend the world of sensory experience. The Newtonian law of gravitation is, in essence, a generalized description, in terms of mechanics, of how the planets appear to move, based upon the observed regularity of their motions.

But there is no such regularity in the course of historical phenomena. The investigator cannot recall the antecedents of an historic event and make them exist again, and it cannot, therefore, be established by observation even that identical conditions, if they could be made to recur, would lead to identical results. Laws analogous to those of astronomy or physics cannot be induced from the historian's data. The test of a natural law is its reliability as a basis for prediction. The historian detects what seem to him to be general tendencies, but general tendencies are not natural laws, and nothing but confusion comes from regarding the two as identical.

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Newton's first law of motion runs as follows: "Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon." Suppose that it read in this wise: "Bodies at rest show, as a rule, a strong tendency to remain at rest, or nearly at rest, and bodies in motion normally continue in motion, usually without marked change of velocity or striking deviation from a rectilinear path, unless acted upon by some force or other influence." The law would then be as definite as so-called laws of history, but it would be worthless for purposes of accurate prediction.

Even if the historian could be as sure of his facts as the natural scientist is of the events that he records in his laboratory, it would remain true that every historical happening has a complex of antecedents that might have been effective in causing it, and there is no means by which it can be determined which ones had decisive influence. "The defeat of Blaine", writes Professor Muzzey, "was attributed to various causes — the Mugwump revolt, the Burchard incident, the Mulligan letters, the last flicker of Stalwart revenge in Conkling's refusal to support his old rival, the commercial depression and 'panic' of 1884 and the bad weather on election day." Let us assume for present purposes that this is an exhaustive list of the antecedents of the defeat of Blaine, though of course it is not. How can we measure their relative influence and compare the effects, say, of commercial depression with those of the partisan indiscretion of an overzealous clergyman? We cannot reset the stage, call back the actors and reproduce the election of 1884, eliminating one antecedent and then another, and recording the difference in the outcome. We have no right to say that the Mugwump revolt was a more *fundamental* or a more *decisive* or even a more *important* cause of the defeat of Blaine than the rain was. The only clear causal advantage that it seems to have over the weather is that it is a better talking point.

> In the kaleidoscope of the past [says Mr. Buchan] we cannot, as a rule, sort out effects and causes with any precision, nor can we weigh events in the meticulous scales which science demands. Even when causes are reasonably plain, their classification eludes us. We cannot tell which is the *causa causans*, which are proximate, or efficient, or final. We must be content with generalisations which are only generalisations and not laws, with broad effects and massed colours.

If our champion of historical law was thinking teleologically, his opinion that England would have developed as it has, if the wind had blown from a different quarter on that August day, would imply

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that some Final Cause, presumably the Will of God, has preordained the course of events as they have actually taken place—in which case speculation as to what would have happened, if something had occurred which did not occur, becomes an impertinence if not something worse. But if, as is probably the case, his opinion was based on the belief that at the time in question other influences were in operation which, in the aggregate, would have counteracted any results of a Spanish landing on English soil, it is an unconfirmable opinion, grounded upon nothing more solid than a weighing of conjectural probabilities. In this event, such speculation is entirely legitimate and may even be profitable. If there *are* crucial situations in history, conjecture about "might have beens" will stimulate keener appreciation of their critical character. The student of history is in a better frame of mind for understanding the panic in some of our northern cities in the early summer of 1863 if he thinks of what might have happened if Lee had won at Gettysburg than if he thinks in terms of controlling historic law. Lee himself said, and he was not given to winning battles by conversation, that the Confederates would have won if Stonewall Jackson, who had been *accidentally* shot by his own men two months before, had been at Gettysburg. "To reflect how easily the course of things might have been different", says Mr. Buchan, "is to learn perspective and humility."

In days gone by excessive claims were made for the "great man" theory of history, and at present it is badly discredited. Few of us, certainly, would agree with Carlyle that everything which has been accomplished is the realization and embodiment of the thoughts of great men. The content of history as written has been vastly enlarged since Carlyle's time, and his interpretation seems more cramped and more extravagant to us than it did to his contemporaries. The common man in history is now having his inning. But it does not follow that the great man has really been of no account, as might be supposed from much recent historical literature. He is, however, as Mr. Buchan observes, "a terrible nuisance to the lover of dapper generalities". The embarrassed exponent of law in history is driven to ignore him, or deflate him to the stature of surrounding mediocrity, or submerge him in "movements" and "forces". A judicious historian of our day puts the case for the great man thus:

> It is true that no individual, no matter how vast his apparent historic importance, can alter the historic process in *any* direction he might choose; but because he cannot make himself felt unless he is in harmony with the social forces of his time, are we to assume offhand that

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> those forces accomplished everything and that the influence of the "great man" is wholly negligible? May he not give just the deflection at any given time which may set those forces in a direction which they would not otherwise have taken, with incalculable results?

Mr. Buchan's emphasis of the casual and the accidental in history is probably to be accounted for, in part at least, by the fact that he is a military historian. To judge from recent historical textbooks, military history seems to be under about as dark a cloud as the great man theory. It was overdone, no doubt, in the older manuals, which gave insufficient attention to economic, social and cultural history, and it is not strange that a reaction set in. But it may be suspected that one reason for the present studied neglect of military history is that it does not offer hopeful prospects for historical interpretation in terms of Mr. Gladstone's "great social forces". The most *Zeitgeist*-ridden historian would find difficulty in persuading his readers that General Desaix *had* to arrive on the field of Marengo just in time to turn into a victory for Napoleon what had every appearance of imminent irretrievable disaster. It is easier to leave Marengo out, though there is excellent reason for regarding it as critical in Napoleon's career.

What has been said should not be taken to imply the opinion that historians ought to concentrate upon what look like accidents and personal influences, neglecting the effects upon historical development of such factors as geography, climate, race, economic conditions, social habits, religious beliefs and philosophical systems. But nothing takes place until all its antecedents have occurred, and among these are events that it seems impossible to account for as even probable results of *their* known antecedents. The student of history should realize that "trends" and "tendencies" in history are generalizations, based necessarily upon a selection of facts, and that a different selection would often support a different generalization. It is well that he should be skeptical of such expressions as "fundamental cause", "irrepressible conflict" and "inevitable result". He may ponder to advantage over Sainte-Beuve's words, which Mr. Buchan quotes:

> History seen from a distance undergoes a strange metamorphosis; it produces the illusion—most dangerous of all—that it is rational. The perversities, the follies, the ambitions, the thousand queer accidents which compose it, all these disappear. Every accident becomes a necessity . . . Such history is far too logical to be true.

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REVIEWS

British Documents on the Origins of the War, 1898–1914. Edited by G. P. Gooch and Harold Temperley. Volume III: *The Testing of the Entente, 1904-1906* (1928; xlii, 487 pp. $3.00). Volume IV: *The Anglo-Russian Rapprochement, 1903-1907* (1929; lii, 656 pp. $3.50). Volume V: *The Near East, the Macedonian Problem and the Annexation of Bosnia, 1903-1909* (1928; lxix, 886 pp. $5.50). London, His Majesty's Stationery Office; New York, British Library of Information.

These latest volumes of the British collection are substantially larger than the first three that were published. In all three volumes together there are 1,871 documents, covering the period from 1903 to 1909. Taken by and large, there is very little in these three volumes that could upset the judgments already formed by the leading scholars on the basis of material previously published. The value of these documents lies chiefly in the fact that they corroborate views which hitherto could not be supported by official evidence, but this does not mean that they do not illuminate various obscure points or that they do not help to explain the attitude and psychology of the directors of British policy.

Volume III begins where volume II left off. The Anglo-French Entente, which was based primarily on the exchange of a free hand for France in Morocco against a free hand for England in Egypt, had already been concluded, and Delcassé was free to continue his efforts to realize on the Moroccan situation. It becomes clear from chapter xvii that the earlier negotiations between France and Spain (in 1902) had never been completed because of the insistence of the Spaniards that the English should be initiated and because of the fear of the French that the Madrid government would draw the German government into its confidence. The Spaniards were profoundly dissatisfied with the Anglo-French settlement, but in the end were obliged to content themselves with far less extensive concessions than those which had been offered them in 1902.

In the meantime the negotiations between Paris and Madrid were watched with great uneasiness in Berlin (nos. 48, 61). It may well

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be that the French efforts to draw the Spaniards into the Moroccan bargain had something to do with the change of German attitude in the autumn of 1904. The Germans began to doubt whether German commerce would be given fair treatment by the French (no. 62). Added to this was unquestionably a pronounced misgiving about the Anglo-French friendship. As early as December, 1904, Bülow was referring in conversation with the English ambassador to the apprehension in Germany lest the British were planning to *Copenhagen* the infant German fleet (no. 65). There followed reports of the activities of the French mission in Fez, to the effect that France was claiming a European mandate to introduce reforms. The Germans had a good legal case, as they had not even been officially informed of the Anglo-French agreement. Sir Arthur Nicolson himself admitted that the German demand to be consulted was a "perfectly legitimate one" (no. 66). But the clumsiness of the German policy was inexcusable. The Kaiser's visit to Tangier, the demand for a conference, the pressure brought to bear to effect Delcassé's downfall were confusing and misleading. Neither Delcassé nor his successor, Rouvier, was able to make out just what the Germans wanted.

Because of the general uncertainty rumors were soon afloat that the Germans aimed at the acquisition of a port on the Moroccan coast and that they were bent primarily on driving a wedge into the Anglo-French entente. In this way the English were brought upon the scene. There is no evidence in these volumes to show that King Edward or any British minister ever offered to support France with armed forces, but Lord Lansdowne took the initiative in suggesting that the two governments "should continue to treat one another with the most absolute confidence, should keep one another fully informed of everything which came to their knowledge and should, so far as possible, discuss in advance any contingencies by which they might in the course of events find themselves confronted" (no. 94, May 17, 1905). M. Cambon took this suggestion very seriously, and though it did not amount to an offer of offensive and defensive alliance, as the Germans supposed (no. 97), it seems likely that the readiness of the English to "discuss in advance any contingencies" by which the two governments might find themselves confronted led the French to reckon so strongly on British support that later it was felt that England could not leave the French in the lurch in any trouble that might arise from the Moroccan question.

There is no need to follow the negotiations of the summer of 1905, as the documents do not add materially to our previous knowledge.

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It is interesting to note, however, that before the end of June the British representative in Paris reported the reawakening of the spirit of *revanche* (no. 134). The Germans missed an excellent opportunity to negotiate a settlement with Rouvier, who became disillusioned and quite ready to return to the policy of Delcassé. The English, who appear to have watched the discussions between the French and the Germans with some misgiving, were only too glad to promise him "unreserved support" at the conference (no. 204). Even before the meeting of the conference the German policy was defeated, for it was reasonably clear that not only England, but Spain and Italy would support the French view.

In Paris it was feared that the unfavorable position of the Germans would drive them to take desperate measures, and from these apprehensions arose the well-known French demand for a promise of English armed support. These documents add little to what has already been known from the Grey memoirs in regard to this matter. No definite engagement was taken, but Grey assured Cambon that in his opinion "the force of circumstances bringing England and France together is stronger than any assurance in words which could be given at this moment" (no. 219). Conversations between the military and naval authorities were sanctioned, and the extensive negotiations between Barnardiston and the Belgian chief of staff, General Ducarne, were initiated. This correspondence is printed at length in this volume, and makes highly interesting reading. Even the finest details were entered into by the English authorities.

The material on the Algeciras Conference is very full, but makes dreary reading. The important contribution on this point is the evidence of British consistency in backing the French view, especially in respect to the knotty police question. Grey realized to the full all that this involved. In a memorandum of February 20 (no. 299) he envisages the possibility of a breakdown, and points out that the French were firm in the belief that England would support them to the limit. If disappointed they would never forgive the London government. The United States would despise England, Russia would be unwilling to come to an agreement with so perfidious a power, and Japan would look elsewhere for support. All of which shows how easily Grey slipped into the attitude that France must be supported for England's own good. England was, in fact, already committed in a way. When Grey took the stand that the French would be blamed if they rejected the Austrian compromise the French took umbrage and the English minister had to give assurance that

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"cordial coöperation with France in all parts of the world remains a cardinal point of British policy" (no. 357). "In some respects," he adds in writing to the British ambassador at Paris, "we have carried it further than the late government here were required to do."

Volume III ends with an interesting chapter on Anglo-German relations after Algeciras. In Germany there was a pronounced desire for a *rapprochement,* and it was the Kaiser who invited Haldane to pay his visit to Berlin. The abstracts from the Haldane diary (no. 435) are quite fascinating. Bülow explained the German naval policy and pointed out that an Anglo-German conflict would be a *fearful calamity,* a long-drawn struggle from which the United States would derive the benefit. Haldane on his part defended the two-power standard, which was regarded in England as "sacred as the Gospel". The relations between Germany, chastened by her Moroccan experience, and England, frightened by a look over the precipice, were certainly more cordial than they had been for some time. But the long memorandum by Eyre Crowe, dated January 1, 1907, shows that his distrust was hardly diminished. This memorandum is easily the most interesting document in the volume, and must be read to be appreciated. Crowe notes that the idea of securing "greater freedom in regulating their general foreign relations" can hardly have been absent from the minds of the French and English statesmen who concluded the entente. Crowe is firmly convinced that the German Moroccan policy was designed to break the entente and that the German interests in Morocco were simply meant to serve as a "stalking horse". But Germany overreached herself and failed to reach an agreement with Rouvier when this would have been easy. Germany's great mistake was that she underestimated the strength of English feeling. The upshot was that the Moroccan crisis had given the entente a new significance: "there had emerged an element of common resistance to outside dictation and aggression, a unity of special interests tending to develop into active co-operation against a third Power". Lord Sanderson, when consulted, disagreed with much of Crowe's argument, and thought that there could be no doubt "that M. Delcassé was steadily pursuing a series of manœuvres for the purpose of isolating Germany and weakening her alliances", but it is clear from the minutes of other members of the foreign office, and, for that matter, from Grey's memoirs, that Crowe's interpretation was generally accepted as correct and continued to influence the English view.

The fourth volume is the most valuable and informing of all those

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published to date, for it deals with the Anglo-Russian *rapprochement,* on which there has been very little authentic information available. The earlier chapters of the volume take up the Dogger Bank incident, and show how serious the situation was at one time, when the British ships were ordered to Gibraltar. Another section centers about the Straits question during the Russian-Japanese War, and includes a very interesting memorandum of Sir Charles Hardinge reviewing the problem historically. In this connection there is a citation from a report of the Defence Committee dated February, 1903, which shows that the admiralty set little store by the maintenance of the existing arrangements. Freedom of exit for the Russian warships, it was stated at that time, "would not fundamentally alter the present strategic position in the Mediterranean" (no. 55). The chapters on the conclusion of peace between Russia and Japan and on the renewal of the Anglo-Japanese Alliance are of great importance, and add materially to what has been hitherto known. Roosevelt's activity is set in high relief, and it is interesting to note that the Japanese raised the question of the possibility of including the United States in the renewed Anglo-Japanese pact (no. 111).

But the backbone of the volume is the correspondence between England and Russia that led to the agreement of August, 1907. It appears that negotiations were opened in November, 1903, and the general outlines of an agreement sketched. By mutual consent the discussions were postponed during the Russian-Japanese struggle, though Edward VII continued to stress the desirability of a settlement (no. 184). Both Lamsdorff and Benckendorff seem to have been sincerely desirous of coming to terms as soon as conditions would permit. But after the Peace of Portsmouth Count Witte, who was the Kaiser's guest in his passage through Germany, became a convert to the idea of an understanding with Germany and the formation of a Franco-Russian-German bloc to counterbalance the Anglo-Japanese combination (nos. 193, 195). It was evidently at his instigation that the French were approached in this matter, but Lamsdorff's heart does not appear to have been in the business and the refusal of the French to consider such a policy was probably anticipated (nos. 198, 201, 203).

At any rate the discussion of an agreement with England was taken up again almost immediately after the war, and already in January, 1906, Benckendorff was hinting at the desirability of an arrangement in regard to the Straits question (no. 208). Actual negotiations began in May, but the domestic crisis in Russia made the Eng-

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lish cautious. Grey himself wrote: "I cannot see how things are to come right in Russia till the present organization and machinery of Government is broken up, and that can only be done by Revolution" (no. 227). In spite of this sound view he was, however, ready to go on as soon as circumstances permitted. It was Izvolski who proceeded with circumspection. All through he showed the greatest anxiety not to estrange Germany and not to commit himself too far. The French ambassador thought him "*très fuyant*" and very careful about making definite statements, while Nicolson considered him "nervous, somewhat timorous of responsibility, and most susceptible to criticism" (nos. 243, 312). It was clear that the court circles and the military men were not in favor of the agreement and that they had little use for the abandonment of any part of Persia to English influence. It was evidently in order to help matters along that Grey took advantage of a hint dropped by Benckendorff in February, 1907, to dangle before the Russians the prospect of concessions in the Straits question if a satisfactory arrangement were made in regard to Asia (nos. 250, 257 *et seq.*). Izvolski "beamed with pleasure" when he got news of the English attitude, and while he was obliged to agree that it would not do to settle an international question *à deux,* he pinned down the English by a memorandum (no. 275).

The rest of the volume is taken up with the correspondence in regard to the three points in the agreement, Tibet, Persia and Afghanistan. The negotiations in respect to the first and third of these points may be gone over here, as being of relatively minor importance, but the material on the Persian settlement is of great interest. The parts of the Curzon despatch of September, 1899, which had not yet been published, open the series (no. 319). Here one finds the suggestion that spheres of influence should be established by agreement with Russia. But the Russians were not disposed to accept the suggestion and the English decided, in the end, to consider even the possibility of including in the Russian sphere a part of the Persian Gulf coast (no. 347). Apparently the Russians gave up their objections to the division of the country into spheres when the negotiations were resumed after the war with Japan, though Izvolski rejected the English suggestion that the Persian government should be induced to agree not to grant concessions to third powers in the Russian and English spheres (nos. 370, 388). This, he insisted, would amount to closing the door, and would lead to German opposition. The dread of German action was clearly a

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strong consideration throughout the negotiations, especially on the Russian side. Even after the settlement had been reached Izvolski was apprehensive of the German attitude (nos. 546, 548), though Grey was well satisfied: "Ten years hence", he wrote to Nicolson on February 24, 1908, "a combination of Britain, Russia and France may be able to dominate Near Eastern policy; and within that time events will probably make it more and more clear that it is to the interest of Russia and us to work together: but we must go slowly" (no. 550). This is the last document in the series, and indicates that the Anglo-Russian agreement, too, was regarded in London as a program for the future as well as a liquidation of the past.

Although it cannot be said that the bulky fifth volume of this series contains any "revelations" of prime importance, it is certainly one of the most interesting volumes to read, because it cuts into one of the key problems of pre-war diplomacy and supplies the student with authentic material on British policy, material which has been sadly lacking to date. The whole first part of the volume is taken up with documents which review the Near Eastern situation in the years prior to the Young Turk Revolution. The annual reports on Turkey for 1906 and 1907 are crammed with valuable information about Turkish statesmen, and about the press, the educational system, the administration, the army and navy, and the general international relations of the empire. There follow several sections dealing with the Macedonian problem, from which the student can derive a vivid picture of the Bulgarian, Serbian and Greek activities and the connivance of the Balkan governments.

With the section taking up the Reval meeting of June, 1908, the reader is brought to the eve of the Young Turk Revolution. There is nothing in this section, however, that adds much to what has been known from Grey's memoirs and from the Lee biography of Edward VII. It is interesting to note that Lord Fitzmaurice shared an opinion that was widely held that this meeting precipitated the revolution in Turkey (no. 210). The account of the Young Turk movement itself is very instructive and indicates that the English statesmen appreciated keenly its implications. Lowther doubted whether the Young Turks would live up to their slogans, and Fitzmaurice predicted that the movement would lead to an increase of aggressive nationalism on the part of the Turks (nos. 205, 210). Grey, however, was more impressed with the Anglophilism of the new régime and almost from the start promised it full diplomatic support (no. 204).

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The documents bearing on the famous Bosnian annexation crisis are very numerous and full, but they do not add much to our knowledge of Austrian, Russian or German policy. The evidence concerning the Buchlau interview, for example, simply confirms the prevalent opinion that both Aehrenthal and Izvolski were cryptic in their utterances and evasive and that Izvolski labored under the erroneous impression that Aehrenthal would wait with the proclamation of the annexation until his Russian colleague had had time to square the other powers in the matter of the Straits. There is sufficient evidence in this volume to show that the English statesmen from the beginning had no exaggerated idea of Izvolski's veracity and that they took it for granted that he had given his approval of the annexation either directly or indirectly. It is interesting to note that the Austrian ambassador at London informed Hardinge unofficially on October 3 of the coming annexation, that is, on the very day that the premature announcement was made to the French president (no. 287). As for the English attitude, Grey's stand was taken from the very start. On October 5 he told the Turkish ambassador that England would support a Turkish claim for compensation (no. 296). But this policy did not rest upon approval of Izvolski's tactics or upon faith in the justice of the Russian cause. Grey's attitude throughout was determined by his desire to save the new Turkish régime and give it all possible support. This comes out most clearly in the course of the negotiations between Grey and Izvolski in London, which turned on the question of a conference and the Russian desire to secure a change in the Straits regulations. The numerous documents bearing upon these discussions are among the most valuable in the volume. They show that Grey was ready enough to make concessions, but that the cabinet insisted on something like reciprocity, if only for "shop window ware", and that Grey himself was unwilling to do anything contrary to the desire of the Turks. Since the Turks insisted that they were dead opposed to any change, the notes exchanged between Izvolski and Grey were of purely theoretical value (nos. 358 *et seq.*). In this whole matter the French government carefully avoided any open opposition to Izvolski and allowed the English to take the lead, so that the old legend of Clemenceau and Pichon wrecking the Russian plans should at last be laid to rest.

To the reviewer it seems that the most important part of the long chapter dealing with the Austro-Serbian dispute is that which reveals the negotiations between the Serbs and the Turks and the various projects advanced in the autumn of 1908 for the formation

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of a Balkan League to include Turkey, to serve as a bulwark against the Austrian *Drang nach Osten*. On this important episode we have had no material of value to date. It now appears from these British papers that the English government, while deprecating the idea of an offensive pact, thoroughly approved of the formation of a defensive league, urged it upon the governments concerned and enjoyed the full confidence of the Serbian government in this matter. After months of discussion the pourparlers ran out, but the subject is of sufficient importance to warrant a detailed examination by students of pre-war diplomacy.

Of the English attitude toward the Austrian-Serbian dispute it need only be said that Grey had no sympathy with the Serbian stand: "I have not, myself, much sympathy with the clamor of Servia and Montenegro for territorial compensation. . . . But I do not want to cold-shoulder Isvolsky on the Servian question, if the Russians are keen about it, and I will do my best to support him" (no. 412). He warned the Serbs not to provoke Austria, but it was generally felt in London that Russia must take the lead and that England could not afford to deny her support. It was made clear to Izvolski, however, that the English could not go beyond diplomatic support in any case. If the Russian minister had been wise, he would have executed a graceful retreat, for he was certain that the Germans would stand behind the Austrians to the end. Instead of that, he more or less encouraged the Serbs and contented himself with bemoaning the cool attitude of the French, who, he claimed, had gone over bag and baggage to the Austrians (no. 612). Under the circumstances an acute crisis was inevitable, and the Serbs replied to the Austrians in what the English considered an insolent manner (no. 683). The difficulty was finally solved by the famous German note to Russia on March 23, which Izvolski described as a "diplomatic ultimatum" and to which he promptly yielded. The English were indignant about this deplorable "capitulation" and put no stock in Izvolski's claim that the Germans and Austrians were under one cover and that a refusal on Russia's part would have led to the immediate invasion of Serbia. There would at least have been time to consult Paris and London, and Izvolski could have made his acceptance of the annexation conditional upon the Austrian acceptance of the Serbian assurances, as the English did: "Had he [Izvolski] given a reply such as we gave to Metternich it would have been impossible for the Germans to base an ultimatum upon it", wrote Hardinge to Nicolson (nos. 807, 823). Cartwright's explanation

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of the affair was that the Russian minister "collapsed not before the threat of war, but before the threat of the publication of his own letters" by Aehrenthal (no. 829). Later on, after Izvolski had come to see that the incident was not much to his credit, he denied everything and pictured himself as the "innocent lamb who had been destroyed by the wicked wolf". In regard to the German note he maintained that "nothing approaching an ultimatum" had been presented to him. On the contrary, Pourtalès had come "like a cooing dove bearing a message of peace" (no. 870). All of which does not serve to put Izvolski in a more favorable light. The fact is that he knew Russia could not go to war, that France could not be counted upon and that England would not go beyond diplomatic support, while the Germans made no secret of their determination to support their ally to the utmost. Yet he allowed the crisis to develop and exposed not only himself, but his friends, to a serious diplomatic defeat.

WILLIAM L. LANGER

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The Tragic Era: The Revolution After Lincoln. By CLAUDE G. BOWERS. Cambridge, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929.—xxiv, 567 pp. $5.00.

For many years writers dealing with the subject of the reconstruction of the so-called rebel states following the Civil War have regarded that episode in our national history as at best a mistake and at worst a tragedy. There has been no unanimity, however, in placing responsibility for the blunder. Older writers of the period 1880 to 1905, such as Rhodes and Burgess, to say nothing of such partisans as Sherman and Blaine, castigated Andrew Johnson and the southern leaders who would not accept the Fourteenth Amendment as a "magnanimous offer of a generous nation". Southern writers, many of whom prepared monographs upon some phase of the subject under the supervision of the late Professor William A. Dunning, tended to vent their wrath upon the heads of the carpet-baggers and scalawags. And now comes a group of writers who in the main place the whole blame upon the radical Republican leaders in Congress by whom the reconstruction legislation was enacted. At the same time they present Johnson as a martyr in the sacred cause of constitutional consistency.

Of these recent books, *The Tragic Era* by Claude G. Bowers is

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most noteworthy, because of its inherent excellence and the standing of its author as a journalist, publicist and historian. Mr. Bowers wields a facile pen with little of that restraint which characterizes the historian who has gone through the mill of a modern university graduate school. With zestful forthrightness he belabors the radical senators, representatives, carpet-baggers, scalawags and "smart niggers" of the 'sixties and 'seventies until hardly a head remains uncovered with gore.

While confessing to a keen enjoyment of Mr. Bowers' arraignment of the radicals both in Washington and in the southern state capitals, the reviewer does not find himself in entire accord with the major thesis. Mr. Bowers, like many of his forerunners, is at some pains to point out that in all its essentials Johnson's policy was merely a continuation of that of Lincoln. Therefore it was good. But was it? To answer this question, it is necessary to subject Lincoln's policy to brief scrutiny. Every nation must have its Bayard *sans peur et sans reproche*. Lincoln is our Bayard. But as Aristotle pointed out long ago, a good man is not necessarily a good statesman. It is not here suggested that Lincoln was not for the most part a good statesman as well as a good man, and indeed it is with no little hesitancy that the wisdom of his reconstruction policy is brought into question. Yet candor compels an honest critic to submit that the attitude of Lincoln toward the status of the seceded states was metaphysical if not quixotic, while his policy of reconstruction was inept if not unconstitutional.

As is well known, Lincoln adopted at the beginning and maintained to the last the theory that the eleven seceded states were not out of the Union; that certain illegal combinations of persons within their borders were preventing the real states from functioning in their proper relation to the Union; that the war was not in fact a war at all but a rather sizeable riot; that as soon as the rioters were dispersed the real states could resume their proper relation to the Union again, but only in such manner as the executive, not the legislative, branch of the federal government should dictate. If the first and third of these assumptions could be maintained by metaphysical or legalistic disregard of practical reality, the second was surely contrary to fact, for secession had been ordained by legally elected state officials. A reconstruction policy based on such premises was bound to be both illogical and inept. When President Lincoln instructed the military governors of Louisiana, Arkansas and Tennessee to call constitutional conventions which should establish civil gov-

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ernments when ten per cent of the voters of 1860 had taken the oath of allegiance, he violated every principle of democracy which he professed to believe. Despite the failure of these ten-per-cent governments to attract popular support, Lincoln's undue solicitude for them led him into the colossal blunder of vetoing the Wade-Davis bill for reconstruction.

Johnson, therefore, inherited a policy without congressional sanction. With the termination of the war, he could not even claim the vaguely defined "war powers" of the presidency as justification for continuing Lincoln's course of executive reconstruction. His persistence was disastrous.

Had Johnson asked Congress in 1865 to legislate on the subject, it is quite conceivable that reconstruction might have been more expeditious and less bitter. What is perhaps more important, there might have been a less enduring sectional antagonism to obstruct the development of the Republican and Democratic parties along different lines, the former as a business men's party, the latter as the champion of farmer and labor. And Mr. Bowers would not have been under the necessity of penning the following epitome, pregnant with justice and wisdom:

> The party purpose avowed by Thaddeus Stevens had been served (1877), and the dominant party no longer required the negro vote or the South. Power had passed, during the revolution, from the agriculturist to the industrialist and the financier, and these, more powerful than the politicians, had become the party's working allies. A degree of centralization not dreamed of in other days had been realized. State rights were to be denounced for forty years as the equivalent of treason. A new order had been established, built upon the ruins of the old. The Jeffersonian Republic that came in with the revolution of 1800 gave way to the Hamiltonian Republic brought in by the counter-revolution of 1865-76 (p. 538).

In presenting the foregoing views the writer has not wished to condone the excesses committed by the radical Republican leaders during the years following their break with Andrew Johnson. The intention has been to suggest that their actions were made possible if not dictated by the exigencies of what in the first place was a justifiable determination on the part of Congress to call into question the overgrown pretensions of the executive. It does not appear that Mr. Bowers and the other recent writers have made out their case for the acquittal of Andrew Johnson. The fact that many of Johnson's contemporary calumniators were themselves narrow-minded, vulgar,

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hypocritical, malevolent and frequently downright dishonest, should be pointed out, and the cause of historical truth has been well served in performing that unhappy task. But this should not obscure the more important fact that, in the last analysis, the many unfortunate consequences of reconstruction to the nation in general and to the South in particular, had their origin in the mistaken policy of two well-meaning presidents who at a critical period in the nation's history attempted to overstep the legitimate bounds of executive authority.

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Trade Associations: The Legal Aspects. By BENJAMIN S. KIRSH. New York, Central Book Company, 1928.—271 pp. $5.00.

Most of the literature in regard to trade associations deals with their economic rather than with their legal aspects. This makes Mr. Kirsh's book particularly timely and useful. As a former assistant to the United States Attorney in New York prosecuting anti-trust cases, and as member of a firm specializing on trade association practice, he is well qualified not only to describe the development and present status of the law but to tell other practitioners just what they would wish to know about the trend and significance of the decisions on different phases of trade association activities. In his initial chapter on Trade Association Law he traces the growing liberality of the courts, which began by condemning *all* combinations in restraint of trade as unlawful but since 1911 have condemned only those in *unreasonable* restraint, the test being, as so clearly stated by Justice Brandeis, "whether the restraint imposed is such as merely regulates and perhaps thereby promotes competition or whether it is such as may suppress and even destroy competition" (page 18). His citations from decisions fully warrant the author's conclusion that "the latest Supreme Court opinions evidence a judicial attitude founded on sympathy and understanding rather than on suspicion, hostility and negativity" (page 12).

Following this general survey, Mr. Kirsh discusses in successive chapters the legal aspects of the major activities of trade associations — collecting statistics, installing uniform cost-accounting systems, maintaining credit bureaus, pooling patents, promoting foreign trade, establishing basing points, joint purchasing, standardization, improving trade relations and regulating the channels of commodity

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distribution. Each chapter, after describing the activity to be discussed, reviews the important cases relating to it and formulates conclusions as to what is permissible and what is prohibited. For example, chapter iii on Uniform Cost Accounting Methods, after emphasizing the importance of comparable cost data and the necessity of uniform methods of accounting as a means of securing them, concludes with a clear and useful summary of the methods that have received judicial sanction. The chief points are that the statistics must be accurate; they must be informative and free from any implied recommendation or criticism; they must be made available to the trade, buyers as well as sellers, and not kept secret; they must not be given out in a way that will identify the individual firms supplying them; they must be supplied freely and not because of penalties suggesting restraint or compulsion. Finally, there should not be a system of spying on members, but the arrangement should rest upon good faith. As this summary shows, the discussion is concrete and leads up to conclusions sure to be helpful to those concerned with shaping the policies of trade associations.

Valuable as is this book to those for whom it is primarily intended, it is less critical and incisive in its treatment of cases than students of the development of the law could wish. For example, in the discussion of the four most famous trade association cases, the *Hardwood, Linseed, Maple Flooring* and *Cement* cases (chapter ii), the sharp diversity of view that prevails touching the cogency of the opinions submitted is scarcely indicated. The reader would have to seek elsewhere to learn that in the opinion of another able student of these cases "it is futile to attempt any rational reconciliation" of them (Professor M. W. Watkins in Supplement to *American Economic Review,* March, 1926), and that underlying them was a change from a period of rising prices to a period of falling prices that greatly influenced the views of the justices. This is not a reflection on Mr. Kirsh. It is intended rather to emphasize the fact that to clarify our anti-trust laws and give them an interpretation at once logically defensible and calculated to advance the public interest, much critical analysis is still called for on the part of both the judges and their critics. The book under review attempts merely to expound the law applying to trade association activities as it is laid down in the latest decisions. It does this not only competently but with a wealth of apt citations and a literary skill unfortunately rare in American books on legal subjects.

HENRY R. SEAGER

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The Consumption of Wealth. By ELISABETH ELLIS HOYT. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928.—xiv, 344 pp. $2.00.

The literature of consumption is not only growing but developing. The present volume is broadly conceived, bringing out the many-sidedness of the subject and showing a sense of balance in the attention paid to different aspects. Place is found for the cultural forces expressing themselves in standards of living (to which Miss Kyrk's earlier book devoted much attention), also for the analysis of budgets and of the distribution of purchasing power; for the technical problems of guidance whereby the consumer may get what he wants (so vigorously grappled with by Chase and Schlink); and for the deeper problem of what to want—treated under the "science of consumption for welfare" and the "art" of consumption as distinguished from the "technology". The author has made a distinct advance in the process of feeling out the scope of the field and organizing its variegated parts. Numerous writers must probably contribute before there emerges something like a generally accepted treatment. If one feels that the goal is not yet reached, that is not a criticism of the writers but rather a recognition that the pioneering period has as yet been too short.

To mention one specific point: the chapter on "Aggressive Methods of Sales-Making" certainly does not belong under "Factors Unconsciously Affecting Consumption", nor are sumptuary laws (p. 215) examples of "Consumption Deliberately Controlled by the Consumer". These two generic headings leave no clear logical place for some of the most significant material: namely, deliberate action by agencies external to the consumer himself. Here belong chapters x, xix and xx, and also the material on "standards" and "guidance". Again, the fact that the sociology of culture appears in Parts II and III and again in Part V may or may not be just ground for criticism. An explorer must cross his own previous trails, though he may try to minimize this when guiding parties of settlers. There does, further, seem to be a need for closer relation between chapter x on aggressive salesmanship and chapter xvii on the "technology" of market choices.

Aside from the excellent descriptive material, the things which are likely to remain with the reader are a catholic view of the relative worth of different cultural standards, a keen sense of inadequacies in the present machinery of consumers' choices, and a discriminating and analytical approach to the resulting problem, with a hopeful

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view of available agencies of improvement. Doctrinaire individualism is conspicuous by its absence; but slight traces may perhaps be seen in the passage which blames the consumer for his ills (pp. 109-10). After all, how much could he accomplish under present conditions if he "used his head" to the utmost, as an unaided individual? The list of factors beyond his personal control seems somewhat inadequate, as does the suggested way out of the wastes and perversions of salesmanship. But different readers will doubtless disagree on different points. The book bristles with questions challenging further analysis and inquiry, and this may constitute its greatest value, as a step in the exploitation of this very fruitful field.

J. M. CLARK

The Cambridge History of India. Volume III. *Turks and Afghans.* Edited by SIR WOLSELEY HAIG. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1928.—xxxii, 752 pp. $11.00.

This volume differs from all others that have appeared in the Cambridge series in the extent to which it was written by one man. Sir Wolseley Haig is responsible for sixteen of the twenty chapters. Only the history of Gujarat and Khandash by Sir E. Denison Ross, of the Hindu states in Southern India by Professor S. K. Ayyangar, of Burma by G. E. Harvey, and of Ceylon by Don M. de Z. Wickremasinghe, and the final chapter on "The Monuments of Muslim India" by Sir John Marshall, are exceptions. Approximately the first half of the book presents the direct story of the Moslems in India from the first successful invasion by Muhammad Ibn Qasim in 711 to the death of Ibrahim Lodi at Panipat in 1526. As is indicated by the subtitle, the leading personalities in this varied story were Turks and Afghans. Chapters xv, xvi and xvii follow the story of the Deccan from 1347 to 1599. Nine maps, of which the last is a folding map in pocket, showing British India at the present time, supplement the text. Fifty-one plates, each containing from one to three pictures, amply illustrate the final chapter. Careful bibliographies are appended, as is usual in the Cambridge series. The total of references is, however, very much less than in the average volume. Twenty-three pages of chronology summarize the important events, and twenty-nine pages are devoted to dynastic lists and chronological tables. The transliteration falls somewhere between a liberal use of Anglicization and a rigid adherence to the system of transliteration

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used officially by the Government of India and followed in the *Imperial Gazetteer* of India.

This story has been told briefly but admirably by Stanley Lane-Poole in his *Medieval India* and by Vincent Smith in his *Oxford History of India*. The fuller account, by greater fidelity to the record, loses something as regards perspective and dramatic interest in comparison with the shorter and more selective writings. This greater fidelity to fact leads to a certain monotony of war, rebellion, parricide and fratricide, cruelty and treachery, "battle, murder, and sudden death". The picture is relieved at intervals by descriptions of the evolving methods of government, summaries of character, and comparatively brief intervals of peace and progress. The Christian reader can with difficulty feel the thrill of victory over the idolatrous Hindu and the joy of despoiling him through the splendid triumphs of Moslem arms. Nor can he readily rejoice in the occasional recovery of authority and control by well-organized Hindus. He can find, however, numerous instances of bravery, loyalty, devotion and sacrifice to admire. True prototypes exist here for innumerable tales of adventure, love and success. Sir John Marshall's description of the monuments is somewhat matter-of-fact and clothed with rather technical architectural language. If read carefully in connection with the numerous illustrations, it leaves a profound impression of infinite effort and achievement on the part of builders inspired by the Moslem body of ideas.

ALBERT H. LYBYER

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Stresemann, The Man and the Statesman. By ROCHUS VON RHEINBABEN. New York, D. Appleton and Company, 1929.—322 pp. $3.00.

Gustav Stresemann as portrayed by Baron von Rheinbaben was a very typical German and so is his biographer. Their minds, in Wilson's famous phrase, "run willingly" with each other. When Stresemann is not quoting Goethe, Baron von Rheinbaben is doing so, and both had a sentimental reverence for Frederick and Bismarck and the glories of the Prussian crown undisturbed by modern historical muckraking. Both, one infers, would have liked to retain the old monarchy, provided it could have been made parliamentary in the English fashion, and both accepted the naïve, sentimental interpretation of the Great War current in Germany in 1914—French revenge,

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Russian ambition and British jealousy, with England as the star conspirator (pp. 99-101); and as usual the musty old article in the *Saturday Review* of 1897 is trotted out as evidence of British policy. We cannot accept the author's high opinion of Stresemann's insight into foreign policy during the war. He favored unrestricted submarine warfare, minimized the military danger from the United States (pp. 128-29), and steered a rather vague, indefinite course between the advocates and the opponents of peace with conquest. He maintained a somewhat blind optimism as to the prospects of victory in the last months of the war and, with no clear alternative policy, advocated the rejection of the peace treaty (p. 176).

All this is said with no thought of discrediting one of the most useful of modern statesmen. Rather it is the more creditable that the path to peace for Europe and liberty for Germany should have been directed in recent years by a man essentially conservative and even, in a sober and prosaic manner, imperialistic. Aristocratic and middle-class Germany would hardly have accepted the Stresemann policies from another type of man, just as German royalists could never have been reconciled to the republic by another man than Hindenburg. Stresemann was successful because he was trusted; he spoke no alien socialistic jargon, no accent of Russian, French or Hebrew revolutionism was there to offend the German ear. He was equally remote from the shrill, hysterical note of Ludendorff and his fellow-chauvinists. In Stresemann's round, heavy face; his plain, prosaic mind; his straightforward, candid, uneloquent public pronouncements, the typical German business man found his arch-embodiment.

There is something very refreshing in Stresemann's level vision. Though carried away by the war fever he showed no worse symptom than an excessive optimism, an optimism shared, it may be added, by nearly everyone else in Germany. There is no accent of hate. Though he regarded England as largely to blame for the war he dared to express in the strongest possible terms his admiration of the British war energy. Himself an administrator of the ablest kind, he spoke of Lloyd George as "one of the greatest organizers in this world struggle . . . who has given us many a hard nut to crack" (pp. 102-103). He denounced the stifling censorship, pointed out the importance of world public opinion, and criticized with great ability the ineptitudes of German diplomacy. In this ability to look facts in the face regardless of prejudice Stresemann reminds one of Bismarck at his best. And in one important respect he excels even

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Bismarck, in his sense of the urgent necessity for liberalizing the political structure of the Empire. It should be remembered that although he was never an advocate of revolution, his praises of the Hohenzollern régime were sounded after it had fallen; while Wilhelm II was still in power he never hesitated to be a severe critic. He saw and pointed out what perhaps no other German conservative let himself see during the war, that under the test of battle democracy was proving itself a sounder political system than autocracy (pp. 122-23).

Stresemann's achievements since the war are more familiar to American readers, but the man was the same. When monarchy became a hopelessly lost cause, he put his anti-revolutionary scruples aside and served the republic. Though still convinced that Germany ought to have won the war and should not have surrendered to such terms of peace, he made the best of a bad situation and negotiated without a trace of rancor with the statesmen who wrought Germany's defeat. As a sound business man, he helped restore a valid currency. As a patriot, he worked for the freedom of the Rhineland. As a realist, he accepted the reparations conditions embodied in the Dawes Plan, though at the cost of all his popularity with the reactionary parties. As a good European, finally, he strove for an enduring peace at Locarno and Geneva. The book is fairly well printed and translated. "Gneisenau" on pages 304 and 305 should doubtless have been "Gneisenau".

PRESTON SLOSSON

UNIVERSITY OF MICHIGAN

Europe Since 1914. By F. LEE BENNS. New York, F. S. Crofts and Company, 1930.—xii, 671 pp. $5.00.

The author of this volume has set himself to write a "brief, clearly-written, well-organized" narrative, suitable for the general reader as well as for the class-room. In view of the vastness of the subject, a book of more than six hundred pages in small type may perhaps pass as "brief"; that it is clearly written and well organized there can be no doubt. For all-round excellence and for content it is almost alone in its field. *Twentieth Century Europe* by Preston Slosson and *Europe: A History of Ten Years* by Raymond L. Buell roughly parallel Benns' work, but the one covers more, the other less.

Part One comprises six chapters and is entitled "War and Revolution"; it discusses admirably the origins and history of the war

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and describes the disintegration of Russia, Austria and Germany. Part Two, on "Peace and Liquidation", contains five chapters devoted to the peace treaties, the League, reparations, and the revolt of the East. Some may wonder that Asiatic problems are included in a history of Europe, but there can be little doubt of the wisdom of including them. Geographically the countries of the Orient may be far removed from the states of Europe, but politically they are bedfellows, albeit not always entirely congenial ones. Part Three, "National Reconstruction", comprises ten chapters and in the judgment of the reviewer is the best in the book. We have plenty of treatises on the war, and a goodly number on the peace settlements; but there are few well organized and satisfactory summaries of the years since 1920. Germany, France, England, Italy, the U. S. S. R., the succession states and the Balkans pass in review before our eyes. Out of the kaleidoscope of events emerges something that is orderly and understandable.

The author writes with straightforward vigor. Occasionally he adds zest to his pages by lively characterizations such as that of Rasputin, a "long-haired, illiterate scoundrel, charlatan, and reputed monk".

It is interesting to note the unavoidable compression of many events which bulk large in our memories. For instance, the Teschen dispute draws one line and a footnote on page 194, and is mentioned as a name on page 508. So it is with a hundred other matters which have seemed so vital to many who have lived through them. Already the historian is cutting and pruning, and many a beloved detail is ruthlessly thrown out.

Another reflection suggested by reading this volume concerns the impossibility of keeping up to date a book on modern European history. The ink is barely dry on Benns' pages. Stresemann's death is noted and MacDonald's visit to the United States is mentioned. But since then another notable, Clemenceau, has died, and the London Naval Conference has passed from intention into history. The strictures on the Paris Pact given on page 374 are no doubt in part justified; but already leaders are striving to close the gap which Benns notes—witness the article by Levinson in *The Christian Century* for December 25, 1929. Excellent as is chapter xvii on Soviet Russia, it could well be supplemented by a careful reading of the recent series in the *Nation* wherein Oswald Garrison Villard treats of even more recent developments there. For other passages that have already become partially incomplete see pages 299, 300, 441, 455.

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There are few errors; none of any importance was noted. The illustrations, nine in number, are good; the maps and other illustrative material are fair. The bibliography is very complete and useful; the index is good; the two appendices, giving World War statistics and the Covenant of the League, will prove helpful.

DUANE SQUIRES

STATE TEACHERS COLLEGE
MAYVILLE, NORTH DAKOTA

From the Physical to the Social Sciences. By JACQUES RUEFF. Translated by Herman Green. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1929.—xxxiv, 159 pp. $2.00.

This book is one which all political scientists and students of political theory would do well to read, mark, learn and inwardly digest, particularly those in England and not least those brought up in the baneful Bosanquetian tradition or those (such people exist although Bosanquet was not one of them) who regard psychology as a "fashion", apparently on the strength of the recollection of a perusal of the writings of Dr. McDougall. With Mr. Rueff's insistence that the definition of the subject matter of a social science—of any science—is crucial, the present reviewer is in hearty agreement. It will not, however, meet with more than scant support either from those who are accustomed to forget the map of science in examining the hedges and ditches of history and anecdote, or from those who demand that no book on political science shall be more exacting than a readable brochure on educational civics. With Mr. Rueff's philosophical contention that truth is discovered by the coherency of propositions in accordance with the principles of identity and causality; that this systematic or scientific truth, whether in geometry or ethics, is relative to some standard of reference dictated by the circumstances of a given time and place; and that "causes" are constructed as explanations or rationalizations of phenomena, being indeed not "facts" or absolutes but hypotheses liable to supersession when they cease to explain—to all this there seems to be little to which exception can reasonably be taken. From this Mr. Rueff most rightly concludes that the "so called physical sciences" and the "so called social sciences" are both alike built up by the use of one common method and are equally and precisely (in terms of this hypothetical or cause-finding method) sciences. That the hypothetical conditions, which have to be fulfilled if a law is to operate, are

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less often fulfilled, because historically more complicated, in the case of the social sciences, is pointed out to be an irrelevant objection.

Mr. Rueff, however, steers into more troubled waters when he attempts to make out a case for treating ethics as a science on the ground that there are constant relations (which can be made the bases for laws) between certain acts and certain lines of conduct. Thus the act of murder has such consequences that we are, under the empirical conditions of our present civilization (unlike the Thugs), unanimous in condemning it. Hence we can construct a hypothetical situation (including these cultural factors) and state a law of moral condemnation and retributive conduct. It is here that Mr. Rueff's book interests the members of the legal faculty of the Johns Hopkins University, who cordially sponsor the volume. No one who has read Hobhouse's *Evolution of Morals* will take exception to Mr. Rueff's point of departure in the empirical relations between moral conduct and the conditions of given civilizations. But are these empirical relations so constant and persistent that there is any profit in styling them "laws"? Is there any profit in telling a conscientious objector that the moral law (based on "cause-finding" to explain empirical experience) is that "not to kill an enemy in time of war is socially evil" and then, when the fellow persists, to add "but you yourself are, of course, an interesting phenomenon indicating the supersession of the empirical conditions upon the hypothetical existence of which this law is based . . ."?

It is all indeed a matter of the higher expediency. For psychology and economics, owing to the breadth and general applicability of the hypotheses laid down, Mr. Rueff may be right, and the present reviewer would be the last to deny that his contention holds true for politics. (The author's tacking of "the art of politics" on to "mathematical political economy" seems to involve confusion—perhaps due to that unhappy and fortunately obsolescent title given to economics by Antoyne de Montchrétien.) But, in the case of ethics, it is surely true that more precise definition of the subject matter will be required unless we are to land ourselves into outlining laws for every temporary relation of custom and for *alle Dinge überhaupt*. Attention should perhaps be called to the important contradiction between the statement on page 150 that "our ideas and our theories *may be factors* in the evolution of our universe" and the statement on page 155 that "moral theories no more *determine* the form of our society than the Kinetic theory determines the properties of gases"—which, unless it is due to ambiguity in the use of

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the word "determine", is surely an unjustifiable bit of philosophizing. It may be suggested, more cautiously, that the lawyers (instead of reasoning from immemorial, if obsolete, maxims) might gain assistance from a more mature science of human conduct (ethics if one will—ethics on its economic as distinct from its valuational side), laying down, by the aid of psychology and especially of medicine, the inevitable reactions of human beings to given psychological or bodily stimuli, *under certain hypothetical conditions* frequently fulfilled adequately enough for pragmatic purposes. The consequences of a little rational formulation of research in this direction would probably heavily modify our present pre-scientific laws on suicide, censorship, marriage and drugs—to mention only a few instances at random. Indubitably a most important and significant book which shows the way thought is tending.

GEORGE E. G. CATLIN

CORNELL UNIVERSITY

The Netherlands and the World War. Volume III. *The Effect of the War upon the Colonies.* By J. H. CARPENTIER ALTING and W. DE COCK BUNING. Published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by the Yale University Press, New Haven, 1928.—ix, 140 pp. $2.25.

The Netherlands and the World War. Volume IV. *The Effect of the War upon Banking and Currency.* By G. VISSERING and J. WESTERMAN HOLSTIJN. *War Finances in the Netherlands 1918-1922: The Costs of the War.* By H. W. C. BORDEWIJK. Published by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by the Yale University Press, New Haven, 1928.—x, 226 pp. $3.00.

The first of the two new Dutch volumes of the Carnegie History of the World War come right in the midst of what seems to be the most intense discussion of colonial policy in the Netherlands since the advent of Multatuli, now almost seventy years ago. The influence of the war, which isolated the colonies, accentuated the already present tendency of a liberal government toward "ethical" standards, and led to experimentation with popular representation on a limited scale in 1916 (Volksraad). Further developments in 1918 revealed the general tendency to all concerned, and since then the growing native organizations have asked for continued development of the concessions of the war period, while the capitalists in the islands have exerted a restraining influence. The fundamental issue,

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whether the natives should participate in a new system of organically developed, individual island governments or in the present wholly artificial conception of a united "Indonesia", is still unsettled. The present study gives a most interesting sketch of the underlying social and economic factors. It is also the first presentation in English of the political organization of the Dutch East Indies. There is a short chapter on the West Indies at the end of the book.

The second of these volumes covers more familiar ground. Although Dr. Vissering's official position tends to give an authoritative character to his opinions on this subject, students of the problem will remember his acute controversy with practically every Dutch economist of standing concerning the gold question and will seek in vain in this book for an objective presentation of the "other side". In fact there is a curious contrast within the covers of this one volume between Professor Bordewijk's incidental references to this aspect of the Netherlands Bank policy and Dr. Vissering's rather summary treatment of it. With this exception, Dr. Vissering's work is of characteristic thoroughness. His review of the foreign exchange policy of the Netherlands Bank during the war furnishes an interesting comparison with the movements of the dollar before and after 1917.

In justice to those who controlled official policy during and after the war, it should perhaps be added that the authors of these monographs almost invariably write from the standpoint of the old individualist type of economics and therefore find themselves out of sympathy with the enormous increases in budgetary requirements for social legislation, housing, etc., which were so characteristic of the period. Mobilization of the army through the four years of the war, and the demand for labor caused by the isolation from foreign sources of supply, tended to give the unions a stronger bargaining position, of which they took undoubted advantage. Much of this legislation was not only retained after the war but strength developed and extended. The charges were heavy, particularly when added to the expenses of the mobilization, the special relief measures, etc., and errors were undoubtedly made in the experimentation with unemployment schemes and other advanced legislation. Bordewijk's criticism generally seems to assume a pre-war condition of static "normalcy" which is belied by the impressive record of social legislation during the two decades preceding the war. The financial study is technically very competent, but the spirit of the new tendency has escaped the author rather completely.

The closing chapter on the economic effects of the war in the

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Netherlands will dispel many a popular delusion. The enormous losses in Austrian and Russian securities, the expenses of the army and navy, the huge losses in shipping and transit trade are still felt and leave no doubt as to the final outcome when set off against the gains of some of the industries.

HARRY D. GIDEONSE

RUTGERS UNIVERSITY

The Privy Council of England in the Seventeenth and Eighteenth Centuries. Volume II. By EDWARD RAYMOND TURNER. Baltimore, The Johns Hopkins Press, 1928.—xi, 507 pp. $7.50.

The study of a declining institution cannot be as vigorous and attractive as a study of origins or of maturity; and the Privy Council grew old and died, as a vital political organ, in the two centuries covered by this and the preceding volume. We have long known the Council in its growth and prime through Baldwin's notable *The King's Council in England during the Middle Ages.* Professor Turner intended the present work to be a sort of negative background for his studies on the Cabinet and other features of the central administration in the same period—studies which it is believed he left nearly completed.

There were attempts to rehabilitate the Council, especially in 1679 and in the Act of Settlement, and after the Star Chamber statute of 1641 no destructive statute touched it; yet it continued to go the way of decadent institutions and it is interesting to notice, as in other such cases, how puzzled contemporaries were as to just what was happening. Modern departments of administration (with the exception of the Cabinet) have not come from the Council or Council committees. Rather, they had their beginnings in sundry commissions, subordinate councils, or boards; and the two secretaries of state grew steadily in importance in this time. Council committees tended to merge: they moved away from, rather than toward, specialization. Much space is given to these committees, and they were of astonishing number and variety. Early in the seventeenth century they were important and were of two general classes, standing and temporary. There were elaborate attempts at division of labor in the assignment of business. But it became as hard to get people to attend committee meetings as meetings of the whole Council. Certain interested and efficient ones came; also some whose

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high offices imposed special responsibility. And there was a stage when such were named on several committees. Then came gradually the elusive committee of the whole Council, a sort of running together of numerous earlier committees which were more and more composed of substantially the same men. This meant little more than that a great variety of business—but especially Irish, colonial and local—was being assigned for preliminary consideration to competent officials and administrators, who were at the same time as a matter of course Privy Councillors.

In this shadowy later life of the Privy Council the shadow is nevertheless nearly a life-size shadow of the old institution. The substance is gone; that is, the real work, the vital decisions in public affairs are elsewhere. But the shadow is wholly recognizable to one familiar with the Council of former centuries: the royal attendance, honor of membership, mixture of important and petty business, judicial work (now mostly in appeals from colonial courts), the royal overriding equity, the oath, the informal, incomplete record of the work done. But the Council had in reality become largely two things: the curious committee of the whole, which actually was not the Council at all, and a ceremonial assembly for purposes of attestation and announcement.

These two volumes could have been compressed to great advantage. Large portions are little more than a calendaring of the Privy Council records, with a combined topical and chronological arrangement of the calendars; and too many pages are filled with lists of committee members which have already been printed elsewhere. The writing might have been more interpretative and attractive while losing nothing in scholarship.

ALBERT B. WHITE

UNIVERSITY OF MINNESOTA

America Challenged. By LEWIS F. CARR. New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929.—322 pp. $3.50.

A popular book in the field of agricultural economics, *America Challenged*, marks a second stage in the development of this important field, in which few popular books have yet appeared. The books on agricultural economics have been written by research workers who have patiently dug for new material and pondered long over abstruse problems. Here is a book written to be read. The materials are drawn from reliable, available sources.

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The author's contribution is in presenting these materials in a form attractive to the layman. This book relates first of all to the present agricultural situation, to the agricultural depression from which the farmers have suffered for more than eight years, and to the dangers which lie ahead for city people as well as for country people if something is not done to bring about a better balance between incomes on the farm and in the city.

The graphs and charts in this book present a clear exhibit of the facts regarding the agricultural depression. It is made clear that farmers are more efficient in production than at any time in the history of mankind, and yet their profits are very low because the prices they pay for the materials and instruments of production and for consumption goods are very high in comparison with the prices received for the products of the farm.

It is pointed out that an unsound monetary system which makes possible the violent fluctuations in the value of money and an unsound tariff system which gives to those who have and takes away from those who have not are aggravating features in the situation.

This book should be read by business men and other dwellers in the cities who consume farm products and who have enjoyed unusual prosperity in recent years in a considerable measure at the expense of the farmers. The author throws up a number of danger signals intended to warn city people of the grief ahead if a more favorable distribution of wealth between country and city is not brought about. The impending conflict between country and city might be avoided if an "Uncle Tom's Cabin" of agriculture could be written which would grip the city dwellers of America and make them want fair play for the farmers. Carr's book is not all that might be desired but it is the best book the reviewer has seen in this class. It has taken seven or eight years to convince the nation that something should be done for agriculture and it may take equally long to convince them that the making of political gestures will not solve the problem. In the meantime, this book should help in preparing the way for better understanding.

It is unfortunate that the author did not find room for a few chapters discussing the contrast in the way in which farmers compete with each other to drive down prices and the way in which city industries and occupations have learned to limit competition and thus maintain prices.

H. C. TAYLOR

BURLINGTON, VERMONT

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BOOK NOTES

In a volume entitled *Until Philosophers Are Kings*, by Roger Chance (New York, Oxford University Press, 1929; xvi, 293 pp. $4.00), we have an addition to the many volumes treating of the political theory of Plato and Aristotle. The author, as Professor Laski explains in his foreword, undertook this study "seeking relief in the inspiration of political philosophy from the grim experience of war", and the title-page shows that he combines a military decoration with academic degrees. It cannot be said that the work offers any new interpretation of the *Republic* or the *Politics*, but it is a sympathetic and understanding account of the classical doctrines and of the conditions under which they were conceived, in which good use is made of the chief modern writings on the subject of the state. In a final chapter the author seeks to show how far the principles of the great Greek theorists are applicable to the state of today, but it is difficult to build a bridge of doctrine between the city-state and the nation-state. The point of view of the writer may perhaps be summed up in his quotation from A. E. Russell: "Politics is a profane science only because it has not yet discovered it has roots in sacred and spiritual things and must deal with them".—R. M. MacIver.

In a booklet of 120 pages — *Essais sur les groupements sociaux* (Paris, Félix Alcan, 1929; 120 pp.). — Professor René Maunier of the University of Paris offers a survey and characterization of the main types of social groups. Obvious and useful as such a task is, for some reason it does not seem to appeal to American sociologists, and I do not know any similar work published in this country. Professor Maunier's study is of an introductory character, being a series of lectures in which the great variety of groups is classified under three main headings, according as kinship, locality or specific function is the general basis of organization. The description of these main categories and their subdivisions is selective rather than exhaustive. It is admirably lucid and clear-cut, and the author uses to good effect as illustrative material his own anthropological researches in Northern Africa. Occasionally the treatment is rather slight and hardly adequate to bring out the social significance of a particular form of organization, as in respect of the

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economic corporation. And it seems curious that the modern type of family is not described at all, as distinct from the kindred group. But the little work should prove of very distinct service to those who are seeking an introduction to the subject. We have a plethora of sociological works dealing with "social processes" but scarcely any dealing with social structures, though the latter provide a simpler and clearer approach to an orderly arrangement of the multiplicity of social phenomena.—R. M. MACIVER.

Professor Charles E. Merriam is directing a number of studies into the types and results of civic education. The aim of the series, "Studies in the Making of Citizens", is to collate information regarding the practices in many countries and varied cultures and to see whether general results or principles can be discerned. Miss Elizabeth A. Weber is contributing to the series a study of that special aspect of training for civil life centering around the initiation ceremonies and the formal inductions into the status of manhood and citizenship. The title of her work, *The Duk-Duks: Primitive and Historic Types of Citizenship* (New York, The Macmillan Company, 1929; xix, 142 pp. $3.00) derives from the Melanesian Duk-Duks, one of the many tribal communities brought under survey. In addition to the formal ritualistic instruction and discipline whereby the boys, and in many cases also the girls, of savage society are prepared for adult duties and responsibilities, the author describes the conditions leading to the ephebic oath in Athens and the *toga virilis* in Rome and the *adoubement* (knighthood) ceremonies of feudal Europe. The psychological and the sociological phases of the various customs are well portrayed and the rôle of ceremonialism in civic education briefly analyzed. Finally the author sets forth in a few paragraphs some of the difficulties of introducing into our own society ceremonies of adulthood which would have meaning and deep emotional value. Perhaps this is a sign of the passing of the age of romance and mysticism.—F. H. HANKINS, Smith College.

In a volume entitled *An Introduction to Social Research* (New York, Henry Holt and Company, 1929; xiv, 488 pp. $4.00) Howard W. Odum and his co-worker Katharine Jocher present a survey and analysis of certain aspects of the research now progressing in the field of the social sciences. The monograph, however, is in no way a compendium of research projects; it is rather a consideration of the various modes of approach to the subject matter of the science and a critique of the methodology which has thus far been devised in the subdivisions of the field. Although one would hesitate to say

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that the work here presented is in any way an outstanding contribution to the literature of the social sciences, it is nevertheless a useful handbook which may well be called to the attention of the graduate student.—SCHUYLER C. WALLACE, Columbia University.

The last word in historical workmanship is, no doubt, the scholarly volume that also "gets over" with the general public. Michel Vaucaire's biography of Bolívar—*Bolívar, the Liberator*, translated from the French by Margaret Reed (Boston and New York, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929; xi, 205 pp. $3.50)—has one of these requisites, for it is intensely interesting. It is not, however, a first-rate work of history. Rather, it is of the "book of the month" type, and, as such, a great success, but unreliable in content and wholly lacking in the paraphernalia of scholarship. Jumping into episodes without even a sentence in the way of preparation or transition, Vaucaire tells a vivid and gripping story. It is an idealization of Bolívar, composed in staccato style. As an American littérateur might write of George Washington and the cherry-tree, so Vaucaire deals with Bolívar, but in a thoroughly Latin way. There is no painful, puritanical moralizing. On the contrary the Bolívar-ordered massacres and the Bolivarian mistresses run through the pages in kaleidoscopic succession. Fascinating pen pictures of others as well as of Bolívar are drawn—of Miranda, Boves, Páez, and Sucre, for example. But the facts! Bolívar's connection with the betrayal of Miranda is so lightly touched upon that it may hardly be said to have been confirmed or denied. The casual reader would not realize there ever was a controversy on this point. And San Martín is made to welcome Bolívar's approach to Peru *because* he himself was ardently longing for Bolívar to succeed him! Vaucaire gives no hint of any controversy. Less fundamental errors have also crept into the account—such, for example, as that Spain retained the port of "Callao" until 1826, but, following its capture in that year, "Chile was definitely free." Accents sometimes appear, sometimes not—never in "Bolívar." There is no bibliography and no footnotes, but there is an index. Chapters are short, averaging less than four pages; there is one of a single page. The translation from the French is exceedingly well done. Since the average intelligence is not capable of absorbing anything better, the reviewer recommends this book as admirably adapted to supplementary reading requirements in undergraduate university courses, and especially for freshmen and sophomores.—CHARLES E. CHAPMAN, University of California.

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The story of Anglo-American expansion into that part of the old Spanish domain which is now the state of Texas is concisely and convincingly told in *Mexico and Texas, 1821-1835* (Dallas, P. L. Turner Company, 1928; vii, 167 pp. $2.50), by Eugene C. Barker. Four of the five chapters were delivered as University of Texas Research Lectures in 1928, while the fifth appeared in the annual report of the American Historical Association for 1911. Together they represent the results of many years of patient and intelligent sifting of contemporary material dealing with the colonial and revolutionary periods of Texan history. From the available evidence Professor Barker has reached conclusions not surprising to students acquainted with his previous contributions to the subject. He finds that the Texan revolution was "neither the culmination of a deep-laid program of chicanery and greed nor the glorious response of outraged freemen to calculated oppression of tyrants" (p. v). It was rather the inevitable result of an attempt, unwise in conception, to bring two peoples of vastly different cultural inheritance into a close political union. In this broader aspect the revolt becomes something more than a mere chapter in local history. It assumes importance as an interesting experiment in racial and cultural assimilation. Professor Barker rejects the plausible but prejudiced theory, advanced by abolitionists and later accepted by many American publicists, that the revolt of Anglo-Americans against Mexican authority was a "disgraceful affair promoted by sordid slaveholders and land speculators" (p. 147). Land speculation, in the author's opinion, retarded rather than hastened the outbreak of hostilities. Slavery played no part in precipitating the revolution, though it was, like the religious question, "a dull, organic ache" (p. 86). Both of these colonial grievances might have been remedied without resort to arms had not the substitution of a centralized oligarchy for a federal republic in Mexico brought in its wake an extension of imperial authority at the expense of local privilege in Texas. This political fact was the immediate occasion for war, but fundamentally the struggle developed out of the "conflict of civilizations." —JOHN A. KROUT, Columbia University.

The Effect of the World War upon the Commerce and Industry of Japan (published for the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace by the Yale University Press, New Haven, 1929; xxiv, 345 pp. $4.00) is the first of the Japanese series on the Economic and Social History of the World War, that colossal task undertaken by the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace. It is by two

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authors, Professor Kakujiro Yamasaki of the Tokyo Imperial University, who has done the book on commerce, and Professor Gotaro Ogawa of Toyo Kyokai University, who prepared the section on industry. These two scholars have assembled in this one volume a great deal of pertinent and valuable reference material. It is not easy reading but it is decidedly useful. In the discussion of commerce Professor Yamasaki has outlined the important developments in foreign trade, foreign exchange, domestic trade, the exchanges and prices, first during the war years, and then has followed their fortunes during the post-war years 1919, 1920 and 1921. He points out not only the tremendous advances made during the war and early post-war years but also the severe reaction that shook the very foundations of Japan's economic structure in 1920 and 1921, and the frantic measures taken by the government and the trade associations to prevent complete disaster. Professor Ogawa has limited his study of industry to the war years only and in that respect his contribution is not as complete as might be desired. After a very brief summary of the general industrial development in Japan during the war years, he discusses in some detail those branches of industry that were markedly influenced by the war, especially shipbuilding, iron and steel, the machinery industry, textiles and chemicals. Many of these industries had made little progress in Japan before the war, and their tremendous development under the stimulus of war needs and war prices was necessarily artificial. The study of their fortunes under post-war conditions would therefore be especially significant. Professor Ogawa has suggested in his conclusions the disintegration that followed and has pointed out the weaknesses that beset the further development of industrial activity in Japan. While the lack of technical skill and the relatively high cost of production in the major industries are important deterrents, the chief stumbling-block to Japan's ranking among the great industrial nations is a serious lack of the important raw materials for industry. — DOROTHY J. ORCHARD, New York City.

The Peace Pact of Paris, by David Hunter Miller (New York, G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1928; vii, 287 pp. $3.00), is about the best explanation to be found of the so-called Kellogg Pact. In his usual incisive and frank, but fair, manner, Mr. Miller gives us the story of the making of the Pact of Paris—a story less popular in style, and more critical, but none the less enthusiastic, than various others which have been written. His conclusions as to the consequences of the treaty have not yet been borne out, for the simple reason that no

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leader has yet appeared courageous enough to face an obstreperous Senate and continue the work which popular enthusiasm imposed upon a reluctant administration. As to the credit for making the treaty, Mr. Miller makes no bones: "An anniversary message of friendship and offer of a Treaty addressed by a Foreign Minister of one great country to the people of another, followed by official and press silence, brought into its own by the initiative of private individuals and then supported by such a wave of public opinion as to constrain diplomatic negotiations." Nor does the treaty, he thinks, belong to the outlawry-of-war movement, though the outlawry leaders hailed it as their own, "which it was not, either in form or in substance". Seventeen out of the twenty chapters, one hundred and twenty out of one hundred and forty-nine pages, are devoted to a chronological, but critical, study of the negotiations. Almost as much space is devoted to the relevant documents. Things equal to the same thing are equal to each other; and so Mr. Miller observes that since we reserved self-defense, nothing is left to be renounced except aggression—though we disliked that term. Article 2 is controlling, according to the author, who says, quite correctly, that it is putting the cart before the horse to say that pacific settlement follows renunciation of war. The latter is impossible without the former. If the treaty is broken, it is Article 2 which is broken first. Nor does Mr. Miller believe that the United States could stand aloof if the treaty were broken. To him the treaty means that Article 16 of the Covenant of the League of Nations has the moral acquiescence of the United States; that neutrality is impossible and that sea law is ended. Against this stands President Hoover's subsequent statement that no sanctions beyond public opinion are needed in international society. To this reviewer, the author's logic is compelling; and his statement that the Pact is actually implemented by the Covenant, when read with the recent amendment of the Covenant to adjust it to the Peace Pact, should lead to some serious reflections concerning the unfortunate habit into which the Senate—not the American people—has fallen, of uttering large words while allowing other nations to do all the work and assume all the responsibility.—CLYDE EAGLETON, Washington Square College, New York University.

The Cuban sugar crisis and the efforts of the Cuban government for the past three years to negotiate more advantageous commercial arrangements have been instrumental in bringing to publication the United States Tariff Commission's comprehensive study of *The Effects of the Cuban Reciprocity Treaty of 1902* (Washington, Gov-

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ernment Printing Office, 1929; v, 436 pp. 60 cents). Unique among commercial treaties in that it sets up exclusive preferential relations between two legally independent nations, this document has been widely misinterpreted. Thanks to Dr. Benjamin B. Wallace, Anthony B. Kenkel and others, there are now some unimpeachable facts to go on—facts to the extent of eleven chapters of text, six appendices and 221 statistical tables. Scarcely an aspect of Cuban-American commercial relations has failed to find its place in this avalanche of statistical analysis. Convenient as these tables are to persons who may make other inquiries of them, for anyone concerned with Cuman economic development their principal purport in connection with the problem at hand is negative. The Reciprocity Treaty has not had many effects which can be stated in positive, statistical terms. It is the conclusion of the compilers of the report that the advantages which it has conferred, past and present, have gone chiefly to Cuba. The report lays little stress upon the fact that the tariff preference amounts effectively to 11.8 per cent upon the value of Cuban exports to the United States in recent years, as compared with 4.8 per cent upon United States exports to Cuba. It emphasizes as the principal advantage directly traceable to the treaty, the price premium upon sugar which Cuba enjoyed from 1904 at least to 1909 and in part until 1913. In this respect the present report moves in part over the ground covered by the Commission in its study of *Reciprocity and Commercial Treaties* (1919); and it repeats the conclusion, derived from detailed study of sugar prices, that this price premium has been non-existent since Cuba has been able to supply all of the United States' demand for foreign sugar. The bulk of the report, however, is now devoted to the question whether the United States has derived or derives commercial advantages from the Reciprocity Treaty. Analysis of Cuban imports from the United States as a whole, by commodity groups, by preferential groups and by competing classes, and comparison with trends shown of United States trade with other Caribbean countries, support the conclusion that reciprocity has had a minor effect, if any, on the volume and content of our exports to Cuba. Instead of a single, highly competitive staple, our exports consist in a wide variety of manufactured goods not responsive to slight changes in cost. The benefit of the preference in Cuba accrues chiefly (the report suggests) to importers at the Cuban end. The scholarly caution with which these judgments are set forth is somewhat marred by certain paragraphs in the summary of conclusions which speculate

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unguardedly about a sum of $35,000,000 a year which Cuban producers might realize at the expense of the American market, if they could keep the supply reaching that market below American requirements. Appendices narrate the story of the failure in 1902 of the reciprocity movement when first brought before Congress. There is no appraisal of the political effects of reciprocity. The commercial relationship which the report illuminates abounds in the politico-economic paradoxes created by modern business. Cuba's preference to American goods realizes price benefits chiefly for Cuban importers. The United States preference benefits Atlantic seaboard refiners; and Cuba can secure help for her sugar industry not by negotiating for more preference, but only by the act of grace of Congress should it lower the basic domestic tariff.—LELAND HAMILTON JENKS, Rollins College.

Dr. Hugh L. Keenleyside of the Canadian diplomatic service has written a timely volume on *Canada and the United States* (New York, Alfred A. Knopf, Inc., 1929; xxi, 425 pp. $3.25), the only adequate treatment of its kind yet available. This surveys in detail the political and diplomatic aspects of Canadian-American relations from the Revolutionary War to the present. There are also a brief introduction by Professor Kennedy of Toronto University, two and a half pages of acknowledgments by the author, ten useful maps and charts illustrative of the various major episodes, and a detailed index. The author appears to have delved extensively into contemporary newspaper sources and memoirs as well as official documents and secondary material. The first four chapters deal respectively with Canadian-American relations during the Revolutionary War, Loyalist influence in Canada, the War of 1812, and the critical episodes of the middle period. These cover the era of overt and threatened attempts at annexation by the United States, abetted in several cases by disgruntled elements in Canada, but strenuously resisted by the government and the bulk of the population. The author then reviews the major and minor boundary disputes between the two countries and the fisheries controversy, which have bequeathed a legacy of much misunderstanding and considerable irritation, at least in Canada. The grounds for dispute, the case for each side, and the judgments of careful students upon the issues are succinctly stated. Succeeding chapters are devoted to commercial diplomacy and to migration. A final section deals with the war and post-war relationships. The sober and systematic discussion of these various causes of friction in the past should do much to clear the Canadian atmosphere. At the

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same time the author has drawn attention to several considerations which do not seem to have been realized by Americans, but which have been and are the basis of a good deal of unnecessary ill-feeling in Canada. Hence in addition to the purely informative value of Dr. Keenleyside's book, it should be a distinct contribution to mutual understanding and cordial relations between the two countries.—A. GORDON DEWEY, Amherst College.

The Australian Tariff (Melbourne, Melbourne University Press, 1929; xvii, 232 pp. 2s. 6d.) is the work of an Informal Committee consisting of Professors Brigden, Copland and Giblin and Messrs. Dyason and Wickens. It is an evaluation of the effects and the burden of the Australian tariff in the last two or three decades. Its most striking conclusion, reached without reference to the merits of free trade or of protection in general, is that in the economic and political situation which has actually confronted Australia (limited natural resources, the struggle for a White Australia, etc.), Australia could not have maintained the present population at a higher standard of living under a free trade régime. Indeed, the inference clearly is that under free trade the living standard would have been distinctly lower than at present. An attempt is also made to trace the ultimate incidence of the protective tariff—which seems to fall chiefly on the exporting groups, especially the marginal landholders; and to show that in certain cases, notably sugar, butter and dried fruits, the cost of protection greatly outweighs the benefits secured from it. Taken as a whole, however, the study is rather disappointing. The exposition is often confused and tediously verbose; and it happens all too often that satisfactory categories of analysis are set up, only to be left devoid of much material content. The latter difficulty is explained in part by the fact that a good deal of the data secured by the Committee was confidential in character, and could not be used directly. But even with allowance for this, the impression left by the book is that its substance consists largely of fairly general conclusions which, however well warranted by the writers' own informed judgment, are not adequately supported by the evidence actually submitted. Interesting though the authors' conclusions are, any outside criticism of them is therefore short-circuited.—JAMES W. ANGELL.

The fourth institute on the Norman Wait Harris Memorial Foundation at the University of Chicago, held in the summer of 1927, dealt with "Problems of the British Empire", but the public lectures, which have been published under the title *Great Britain and*

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the Dominions (Chicago, The University of Chicago Press, 1928; x, 511 pp. $3.00), were devoted to the self-governing parts of the Empire. They were delivered by Sir Cecil Hurst, legal adviser to the British Foreign Office, Timothy A. Smiddy, minister of the Irish Free State to the United States, John W. Dafoe, editor of the *Manitoba Free Press,* Sir William Harrison Moore, dean of the Faculty of Law in the University of Melbourne, Eric H. Louw, trade commissioner for the Union of South Africa to the United States and Canada and now minister of the Union to the United States, and Angus S. Fletcher, director of the British Library of Information in New York. These gentlemen range freely and in very readable fashion over the problems of the British Commonwealth, with particular reference to the imperial and foreign relations of the Dominions. Since the Commonwealth, so far as its working constitutional practices and conventions are concerned, is an association quite without precedent, it is not surprising that its internal and external relations seem decidedly anomalous. Sir Cecil Hurst, representing the view of the British Foreign Office, maintains that the Empire is a political unit, but in the course of his discussion its unity becomes elusive, and he himself admits that it is "difficult to define with precision wherein lies its political unity". Mr. Dafoe, speaking for Canada, sees the Empire as "a moral unity" and therefore "a political unity in the larger sense of that term". Mr. Smiddy, presumably voicing the sentiment of the government of the Irish Free State, is hopeful that the principle of equality of status between Great Britain and the Dominions "will beget a moral bond which will be very much more cohesive than any political bond". It is chiefly as a symposium of representative points of view that this volume has its value.—R. L. SCHUYLER.

An inevitable choice faces the compiler of a book of documents dealing with British trade unionism. On the one hand the work might gather for the mature student certain documents which though fundamental in importance are not generally available. On the other hand it might aim to supply the relatively unfamiliar student of the trade-union movement with a series of samples of various aspects of trade-union policy and of its forms and behavior. Mr. W. Milne-Bailey, compiler and editor of *Trade Union Documents* (London, G. Bell and Sons Ltd., 1929; xxvii, 552 pp. 8s. 6d.), has chosen the latter course, and his collection will go far toward meeting the needs of American students. The book is divided into four parts preceded by a concise and useful historical survey of the trade-

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union movement. Part 1 deals with the value, aspirations and objects of trade unionism; Part 2 with the structure and organization of trade unionism; Part 3 with the functions and methods of individual trade unions and Part 4 with the place of trade unionism in the community. Each section is prefaced by an analysis by Mr. Bailey, who speaks with the authority of one who has played an important part in the recent Mond-Turner Conference and who is also the Research Secretary of the Trades Union Congress. On the whole Mr. Bailey has made a wise selection of the material at his disposal, and his sins are rather those of omission than of commission. More use might have been made of the debates at the annual Congress meetings, especially during the pre-war years of which the Reports are now so difficult to obtain. Extracts from Congress speeches during the years when the Labour Representation Committee was under discussion, or dealing with the attitude of the unions to the revolutionary changes in their practices and arrangements during the war, or to the recent Mond-Turner Conference, would have given an invaluable insight into trade-union mentality. Mr. Bailey is throughout a little too partial to the official reports of the General Council, and one misses any representation of National Minority Movement or other left-wing trade-union documents. In a future edition room might also be found for such interesting and important documents as the Manchester Guardian company-union agreement, the co-öperative experiment between the London, Midland and Scottish Railway and the appropriate unions, concerning production problems, and documents relating to the "Spencer" type of union in Nottinghamshire. These could well be included at the expense of the occasional documents relating to foreign labor movements for whose inclusion in a book dealing otherwise so exclusively with British trade unionism Mr. Milne-Bailey fails to make a very convincing case. —E. M. BURNS, Columbia University.

The dissolution of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy, and the establishment of a number of new states in consequence of the peace treaties of 1919, focused the attention of international lawyers on the problem of state succession. The most complicated and most controversial aspect of this problem, namely, the effect of state succession on public debts, has received an enlightening treatment in a book—*La Succession aux dettes publiques d'État* (Paris, Librairie Hachette, 1929; 184 pp.)—by Professor A. N. Sack, containing his lectures delivered before the Academy of International Law at The Hague. In the first part of the book the author considers the legal

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nature of public debts. The evolution from such debts as the public patrimony of the Middle Ages up to present times, when the public debt is guaranteed by the whole domain of the state, is richly illustrated by the historical development of finances in England, the Germanic countries and absolutist France. The second part deals with the effect of political and territorial succession, respectively, on public debts in the Middle Ages and in contemporary theory and practice. The various theories affirming or denying the succession of states to debts, and the suggestions advanced in differentiating between general and special debts, are subjected to Professor Sack's analytical scrutiny. From the fact that public debts of modern times are contractual obligations, secured by the whole public domain of the state, Professor Sack concludes that political transformation effects no change whatever on public debts (p. 113). In case of territorial transformation, the whole territory of the state on whose behalf the debt originally was contracted remains charged with such a debt but changes are effected in the relations between creditor and debtors; and the author closes his study with a survey of the changes thus effected. He considers the obligations of the original debtor and the succession states, respectively, toward the creditors, and conversely, the rights of the creditors against the original debtor and the succession states. According to his conclusions, in case of territorial transformation, each state acquiring territory of the former debtor shall assume a proportional part of the public debts; the refusal of a succession state to assume this obligation by no means obliges the other succession states or the dismembered original debtor state to pay the share of the debt incumbent on the territory acquired by the reluctant succession state (p. 161). The creditors have corresponding rights against the original debtor state on the one hand and the succession state on the other; *i. e.*, they have a claim and right of remedy against the original debtor and the successor, respectively, to the extent of each state's proportional responsibility for the total debt. Professor Sack has handled this complex and controversial topic in a truly admirable manner. The historical introduction enables the reader to follow the evolution of the problem and to understand the political, financial and economic factors involved. The comparative method employed by the author in tracing this evolution in various countries gives an interesting illustration of the diverse results produced by differing political organizations. The richness of material—both legal and non-legal—used by Professor Sack reveals the conscientiousness with which he undertook

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this study, and it leaves little doubt in the reader's mind as to the soundness of his conclusions. An author of several standard treatises on this and related topics, Professor Sack has made, through the present book, a distinguished contribution to international financial law.—Francis Deák, Columbia University.

The first and second volumes of Professor Lucien Brocard's study of regional, national and international economy — *Principes d'économie nationale et internationale* (Paris, Recueil Sirey, 1929; vol. I, xv, 503 pp. 50 francs; vol. II, 697 pp. 65 francs)—deal with the national economic life of France and with the economic and social policy which is pursued by its different governmental authorities. While the treatment is occasionally theoretical, as in the discussion of the formation of prices in the national economy, it is more generally of a descriptive character. The point of view is always fresh and original—an achievement of no mean value in this field. The author draws from an unusually wide scholarship in the allied fields of law, sociology, philosophy and anthropology. These volumes should prove to be of exceptional value to those who wish to familiarize themselves with the present economic and social structure of France. The chapters on population and the family in Volume I, and on legislation and governmental policies in these fields in Volume II, give a fair and well balanced statement of the characteristic French view. The full treatment of these problems (over 270 pages in all) and the strong section on the general "social policy" of France (126 pages) give the book a unique place in the literature of the subject. The synthesis of economic, social and political factors, together with a brisk discussion of the views of contemporaries on mooted points, adds to the book's interest, even if the reader does not share the author's enthusiasm for Friedrich List and his national system. The latter, however, only increases the interest in the coming third volume which will complete the cycle with a discussion of the "International Economy".—Harry D. Gideonse, Rutgers University.

Textbooks on the history of the French Revolution have a way of becoming antiquated almost as quickly as books on the origins of the World War, for the revolution is still a highly controversial subject and attracts more able research men than perhaps any other phase of European history. Louis R. Gottschalk's *The Era of the French Revolution (1715-1815)* (Boston, Houghton Mifflin Company, 1929; ix, 509 pp. $3.00) is introduced by an unusually modest and honest preface, in which the author states that it pretends to being little

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more than "a presentation of the latest interpretations of that era." He mentions the works of Sée, Marion, Mathiez, Sagnac, Pariset, Rose and Driault as those upon which his account is primarily based. Every teacher of the period will welcome the volume as a convenient survey of the status of our present knowledge of a highly complicated subject. It is a book that can be confidently recommended, for it is not only well informed, but written with great detachment and more than ordinary common sense and balance. Though the viewpoint is more nearly akin to that of Mathiez than to any other, there is little of the extravagance of the French historian in this volume. Gottschalk has taken the good wherever he found it, without attempting to propagate any particular doctrine. The title of the book is rather misleading. In the first place, the period covered is really that of the Revolution and Napoleon. The earlier part of the eighteenth century is considered with reference to the Revolution almost exclusively. Furthermore, the history of Europe beyond the frontiers of France is treated only incidentally and really only in connection with the epoch-making events in France itself. No doubt there is justification enough for this procedure, though it will hardly do to attack the period too systematically from this angle. The style, too, might well have been improved, for the sentence structure is not infrequently awkward and not always clear. At times one can hardly escape the impression of breathless haste and insufficient attention to presentation. A number of historians are said, in the preface, to have read the manuscript, so it seems strange that there should still be rather obvious slips in dates and words, all of which might well have been noted in the proof-reading. One important and perfectly familiar name is consistently misspelled throughout. These are minor points of detail to which the reviewer feels obliged to call attention. But they must not be taken as adverse criticism of the book as a whole. Gottschalk's volume is, in most respects, far superior to any other single-volume text available at the present time, and should find extensive use in American universities.—WILLIAM L. LANGER, Harvard University.

Since 1871 the German Center Party has called itself "'the political representation of the Catholic element of the German people". Is its claim to this title justified? Dr. J. Schauff has made a detailed investigation of the question, and published the results in *Die deutschen Katholiken und die Zentrumspartei* (Cologne, J. P. Bachem, 1928; 189 pp). From 1871 to the last pre-war election in 1912 the Center counted in its ranks from 16.5% of the Reichstag members

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to as many as 26.7% in 1890. In addition, the Alsatians, Poles and other regional parties representing mostly Catholic voters stood with the Center in matters of *Kulturpolitik*. The post-war system of proportional representation, however, resulted in a considerable reduction of the number of Center deputies, thereby correcting the discrepancy between the strength of the Center at the polls and in Parliament. There was also a large loss of Catholic population through cession of territory (18.89% of the total church membership in Germany as against 4.49% for the Protestants). The "Catholic" bloc was consequently reduced from its pre-war strength of one-third or more of all Reichstag members to one-fifth or less. After analyzing the 1924 election results in government districts whose populations are at least 90% Catholic, Dr. Schauff found that while about 98% of the votes cast for the Center came from Catholics, nearly one-half of the Catholic voters supported other parties. Of all voting Catholics, 58.1% voted for the Center, 17.8% for the Right, 21% for the Left and 3.1% for other parties. Non-Center Catholics appear to tend to the radical Left, especially in solid Catholic districts. Even among Catholics voting for the Right we find a Left tendency, a relatively stronger preference for Dr. Stresemann's People's Party than for the National Party. In the Catholic districts of Bavaria only 44% of the Catholics voted for the Center (Bavarian People's Party), while the Left's share of the Bavarian Catholic vote runs in some districts as high as 70%. In Bavaria, however, the non-Center Catholics distinctly favor the moderate rather than the radical Left. Dr. Schauff also estimates the percentages of the Protestant vote cast for the different parties. The National Party was found to be the most strongly Protestant, 88.1% of its votes coming from Protestant voters, or only 10% less than the proportion of Center votes coming from Catholics. Of all Protestant votes, the entire Right drew 49% and the Left 51%. According to Dr. Schauff there is a strong relation between "faithful" (*bekenntnistreu*) Catholicism and Catholic votes for the Center. The Center is strongly entrenched in those districts where there are most *bekenntnistreu* Catholics (except Bavaria), and weak in the others. Dr. Schauff gives numerous tables and descriptions of the methods used in this extensive and thorough investigation, to which students of suffrage and party problems are deeply indebted. It is to be hoped that the results of his investigation of the last German election will also be published. — JOHN B. MASON, University of Wisconsin.

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